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السودان في رسائل ومذكرات

Sudan Notes and Records

INCORPORATING المذكرة فيها

وقائع الجمعية السفية بالسودان

Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan.

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NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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2. Arabic or other foreign words, including Latin scientific names of species, etc., should be underlined (not in inverted commas) and where necessary followed by the English translation in brackets. The Arabic form for the word may also be given. Titles (but not authors) of books or periodicals mentioned should also be underlined (not in inverted commas). If there are several references it is better to list them at the end and refer to them in the text by numbers or by author and date only.

3. Articles may where suitable be divided by suitable headings and subheadings. Paragraphs should not be numbered. Contributors are invited to add a Summary to their articles.

4. For the transliteration of Arabic words the orthography of the Journal, and for place names that of the Survey Department (R.G.S. II), should be followed; for the other African languages that of the International African Institute may be followed.

5. Maps and diagrams should be drawn as neatly and simply as possible in black ink on white paper. Where possible a portion of an existing map should be used and the Survey Department should be consulted at an early stage. While unable to undertake the drawing of special maps they may be able to modify an existing one to suit the purposes of the contributor.

السودان فى رسائل ومدونات

SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS

FOUNDED 1918

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Khartoum.

Transliteration of the Arabic Alphabet

adopted by the Editors of *Sudan Notes and Records*

ا at beginning of word omit, hamza (') elsewhere	ذ dh (coll. d)	غ gh
ب b	ر r	ف f
ت t	ز z	ق q (coll. g)
ث th (coll. t or s)	س s	ك k
ج j or g	ش sh	ل l
ح h	ص s	م m
خ kh	ض d	ن n
د d	ط t	ه h
	ظ z	و w
	ع ‘	ي y

VOWELS

fatha	a,	lengthened	ā
kasra	i,	,,	ī
damma	u,	,,	ū

DIPHTHONGS.

ى –ai (as in aisle).

و –au (as in mauser)

The ل of the article always remains *l*.

The silent *t* (ة) is omitted.

NOTES.

1. The system is not applied to well-known names, such as Khartoum, Omdurman, etc.

2. The vowel sounds of *e* in “get” and *o* in “hot” with the corresponding long vowels (*a* in “gate” and *o* in “home”), which occur only in the colloquial, are expressed by e, o, ē, ō.

e.g. beled, Mohammed, bēt (or beit), hōsh.

Ei may be used as alternative to show the long ē.

3. In geographical names the conventional spelling used by the Sudan Government Survey Department is followed, although not always agreeing with the above transliteration.

4. At present phonetic type is not available for proper reproduction of non-Arabic African languages.

5. “Dotted type” for the accurate transliteration of ح ص , etc. is not at present available.

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SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS

INCORPORATING

PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE SUDAN.

VOL. XXXV PART 1 JUNE 1954

EDITORIAL

The current number of *Sudan Notes and Records* is an attempt to put into practice the now well-established policy of including in our pages articles dealing with the social and economic problems of the modern Sudan. This does not of course imply that the traditional fields of archaeology and anthropology are to be neglected ; the reputation of *Sudan Notes and Records* as an archaeological and anthropological journal is not one to be lightly hazarded, and every effort will be made to maintain it. But it seems no more than reasonable that our journal should reflect the fact that the Sudan is a rapidly developing country which has to face in its own particular setting problems which have much in common with those found elsewhere in the world. With so many competing claims it will not be an easy task to strike and maintain a suitable balance of interests within the journal; but it is hoped that the results will prove acceptable, and that the specialist, reading the articles of his fellow-contributors in other fields, will find that they increase his understanding of both the past and the present of the Sudan.

* * * *

It has from time to time been suggested that *Sudan Notes and Records* should adopt what is described as a " more popular " style. It is not always quite clear what is implied by this criticism. It is of course very desirable that all articles published should be comprehensible to the intelligent general reader ; and to this end contributors are urged to avoid, or at least to explain, the " technical shorthand " which they would use in writing for a specialised journal. But if it be implied that *Sudan Notes and Records* should adopt the style of a " popular magazine," we can but submit that such a suggestion rests upon a mistaken view of what our journal attempts to be and to do. Its object is not to provide more or less informative and intelligent light reading about the Sudan. There is, indeed, probably a place for a journal which would perform precisely that function ; though whether such a journal could be self-supporting, and whether it should be published in Arabic or English or both, are obviously debatable questions.

But the task of *Sudan Notes and Records* is quite different from that of any such publication ; it is to publish articles which are a contribution to human knowedge in their own particular sphere ; and the value

of these articles is assessed not by their appeal as recreational reading, but by their accuracy and their usefulness to other workers in the same field of research. The " popular article " may have great merits, but it is by its very nature ephemeral ; and *Sudan Notes and Records*, as its title indicates, exists in order to provide a permanent record of knowledge which will be of lasting interest to serious students of the Sudan. If it were to abandon this task, it is difficult to see who or what would take it up; and the loss would be, in its own way, irreparable.

* * * *

This task is all the more important because the sources of knowledge in the Sudan are apt to be very precarious. It is an editorial platitude that the oral and traditional sources of Sudanese history and folk-lore are in danger of obliteration ; but readers of Mrs. Culwick's paper in this number will learn with dismay that even recent written records are in grave danger.

* * * *

In this and the preceding number an attempt has been made, where the nature of the material permits, to provide fuller and more analytical Arabic summaries. It is hoped that this feature will meet with the approval of Sudanese and other Arabic-speaking readers.

* * * *

It is perhaps not generally known that *Sudan Notes and Records* is prepared to publish suitable articles in Arabic as well as in English; it is hoped that any potential contributors who may hitherto have been deterred by the language difficulty will now hesitate no longer. Articles submitted in Arabic should, wherever possible, be accompanied by a summary in English.

* * * *

The Ed tor wishes to express his appreciation of the valuable assistance of two of his colleagues—Doctor Ihsan Rashid 'Abbas who has translated the Arabic Summaries ; and Mr. K. M. Barbour who has assisted with the cartographical work and has undertaken the arrangements for the reproduction of many of the maps and diagrams.

SKETCH MAP I



LEGEND

International Frontiers

River

Area under review

PLATE I

PRINTED BY THE SUDAN SURVEY DEPARTMENT APRIL 195-

DEARTH OF CHILDREN AMONG THE AZANDE:
PRELIMINARY REPORT

by

H. B. McD. Farrell, M.B., Ch.B.

(Medical Officer, Special Duties,

Ministry of Health, Sudan)

INTRODUCTION

For at least the past 25 years officials and other observers living in the Azande area have noticed and commented on an apparent dearth of children among the people of that Tribe. The Azande themselves appear to have been and to be aware of this. The phenomenon became known as " Zande Infertility ".

The object of this survey was to discover if the available figures confirmed this impression and to review the possible aetiological factors at work.

The Azande (singular Zande) occupy an area of Central Africa of considerable extent. Part of this area is in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, part in French Equatorial Africa and part in the Belgian Congo. The section of the Tribe with which this paper is concerned inhabits the Ezo Sub-District of Equatoria Province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (see sketch maps I and II). The area is administered from sub-district headquarters at Ezo and is under the medical charge of Sources Yubu Hospital (Sleeping Sickness Settlement).

The area is one in which Trypanosomiasis is endemic and among the measures adopted to control the disease are :—

(1) Registration of all inhabitants, of movement within the area, of immigration to the area and emigration from it.

(2) Medical inspection of all inhabitants at regular intervals, the registration documents being used to check that no one is missed and absentees found being put in a short period of " quarantine".

(3) Compulsory resettlement of the population in " Lines " (see Note I, " Gbaria Lines "). Although the present form of resettlement is primarily an agricultural measure, the original resettlement of the people along roads was for the purpose of Sleeping Sickness control.

The strict control exercised makes this a particularly suitable area from which to obtain statistical information. There are, however, certain limitations. For instance, it is impossible to obtain an accurate Crude Live Birth Rate or Death Rate by direct and simple methods since only those infants who have been born and who have survived long enough to be seen at the following inspection are accurately recorded. Those who are born and who die before the next inspection are practically never recorded among either the births or deaths, and still births are never registered.

During the past 30 years constant change has been the lot of the Zande, both tribally and personally. Formerly a forest dweller, living in scattered homesteads as far as convenient from his neighbour, he was first shifted to the land bordering the roads and later to carefully mapped out " Lines ". He is compulsorily medically inspected, and his agricultural activities are carefully supervised. He is a carefully preserved and protected individual but a much supervised man.

The origin of the Tribe is obscure. They are believed to have come from the West, conquering and absorbing their victims as they came. Larken, P.M. (*Account of the Azande*, 1926) writes :—

> " Pure Zandes are comparatively few and are out-numbered by the aborigines .... the original inhabitants have been so ready to assimilate the customs and language of their conquerors that for a rough survey no differentiation between victors and vanquished need be made."

They were a highly successful martial race until defeated at the Battle of Tembura in 1905 by the Government troops, but their present appearance accords ill with their former martial reputation.

The impression one gets of the sexual morals of the Azande inspires wonder rather than horror. Both male and female appear to have a voracious appetite. This does not seem to be a recent development since in his *Account of the Azande* Larken noted a certain " lightness " at least among the women.

> " He (the Zande) is not a village dweller ..... the reason being the fear of magic and jealousy with regard to his women folk ..... moreover the ladies of the land not being remarkable for their fidelity are relieved of ..... temptation when a mile of forest separates them from .....potential lovers".

The society is a polygamous one and apart from marriage temporary liaisons are common. No stigma attaches to illegitimacy nor does the previous production of a bastard prejudice the women's chance of future marriage. Illegitimacy is, however, comparatively rare.

SKETCH MAP II

MEDICAL FACILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EZO SUB-DISTRICT OF ZANDE DISTRICT, EQUATORIA



PLATE II

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Among the general population the estimated number of wives per man was 1.2. In a sample of 336 householders it was also found to be 1.2, distributed as under :—

One wife	— 48%
Two wives	— 12%
Three wives	— 5%
Four wives	— 4%
Five wives or more	— 2%
No wives	— 29%

If " bachelors " were excluded from consideration, the distribution was :-

One wife	— 68%
Two wives	— 17%
Three wives	— 7%
Four wives	— 6%
Five or more wives	— 2%

In this same sample it was found that of these wives 31% believed themselves past the menopause, 58% were between the age of 15 and the menopause and 11% were under 15 years.

Apart from a very few dwarfs, lepers and mentally afflicted, spinsterhood is practically unknown.

Sexual experience begins at an early age, 10-12 years, and the Azande themselves admit the practical impossibility of marrying a virgin. Virginity is neither highly prized nor greatly protected and, although lip service is paid to its desirability in one's sister or daughter, neither parents, brothers nor the girls themselves appear to take any but the most perfunctory steps to preserve it.

POPULATION STATISTICS
TABLE I.

	1949	1950	1951	Sources Yubu 1952
Total Azande Population	37,356	38,461	50,299	1,081
Adult Male	11,929	12,582	15,793	382
Adult Female	14,872	15,991	20,122	514
Child Male	—	—	7,054	96
Child Female	—	—	7,330	81
Total Children	10,555	9,888	14,384	185 *
Adult Sex Ratio	80	79	78	74
Child Sex Ratio	—	—	96	118
Number of Children per Adult Female	0.71	0.62	0.71	0.36
Child/Adult Ratio	1/2.7	1/2.9	1/2.5	1/4.8

*8 infants of undetermined sex.

These figures show a population pattern which is fairly uniform (see Table III). It is not, however, a normal one. The increase in population is apparent and not real. It is due to the fact that each year a greater part of the area has been resettled and the population registered. By 1951 the whole area with minor exceptions such as the Missions had been resettled and registered. The population pattern for Sources Yubu differs from the other three in having a higher proportion of adults and a lower proportion of children. This, however, can be accounted for by a difference in definition. In the figures for the Azande population in Table I for the years 1949, 1951 and 1951 the term " children " means " all offspring of the householder still living with their parents". In the case of girls this means until they go to their husband's house which may not be till 17 years, and in the case of boys until they have a separate household which may not take place till 18-20 years in some cases. In the figures for Sources Yubu the ages were carefully assessed and only those under 15 years were included in the term " children."

Table II opposite shows a comparison between the population figures, for the Azande, for 1951 with those for Egypt for 1937 and England and Wales for 1948, the last two calculated from figures given in the United Nations Demographic Year Book 1949-50. From these it would appear that the Azande hold an intermediate position between an Egyptian population which was increasing and an English one which was only slightly increasing. The population pattern shown in Table III also indicates this intermediate position of the Azande population.

TABLE III.

	1949	1950	1951	Sources Yubu 1952	Egypt	U.K. (1948)
Proportion of Adult Male ..	32%	33%	32%	35%	30%	38%
Proportion of Adult Female ..	40%	41%	40%	37%	31%	41%
Proportion of Children	28%	26%	28%	18%	39%	21%

The abnormalities in this population pattern are sufficiently striking,
(1) A marked female preponderance.
(2) A low child/adult ratio.

Female Preponderance.

This could be accounted for in a number of ways.

TABLE II

Age Groups	Egypt—1937			Azande — 1951			U.K. (England and Wales)—1948		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All ages	15,920,694	7,966,675	7,954,019	30,290	22,847	27,443	43,502,000	21,091,000	22,411,000
	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%	—100%
0-15 years	6,225,514	3,160,728	3,064,786	14,375	7,054	7,321	9,324,000	4,760,000	4,564,000
.. ..	—39%	—40%	—39%	—29%	—31%	—27%	—21%	—23%	—20%
Adults (15 plus years)	9,695,180	4,805,947	4,889,233	35,915	15,793	20,122	34,178,000	16,331,000	17,847,000
	—61%	—60%	—61%	—71%	—69%	—73%	—79%	—77%	—80%
Sex Ratio Adult ..		100			78			94	
Sex Ratio Child ..		103			96			104	
No. of children per adult female		1.3			0.71			0.52	
Child/Adult Ratio		1/1.6			1/2.5			1/3.7	

(a) **Inaccuracy of the Figures.**

There are good reasons for believing these figures to be accurate. In the first place they compare well with each other over these three years. Secondly, having been compiled for three separate purposes, namely Sleeping Sickness Control, Taxation and Agricultural Control, it would seem unlikely that three separate departmental organisations could be deceived in exactly the same way over the same period.

(b) **A Markedly Higher Mortality Rate Among Men Than Among Women.**

There are no figures available from among the general population but it does not seem to be true for the hospital population. In the year 1951/52 there were 3,407 admissions to hospital, of whom 46 died, giving a death rate of 13.5 per 1,000. Of these 1,654 were men and of these 31 died, giving a death rate of 19 per 1,000 Of the 1,267 women admitted 14 died, giving a death rate of 11 per 1,000. The remainder, 486, were children, and of these 1 died, a death rate of 2 per 1,000.

(c) **Immigration by Women of Other Tribes.**

Again no figures are available. The one other tribe adjacent to this part of the Azande area, the Balanda, is locally reputed to produce more fertile women and some intermarriage certainly occurs. (See Note II.)

(d) **Emigration of Men.**

All such movement is recorded and does not seem to take place to any very great extent.

(e) **Greater proportion of Females at Birth than is Usual.**

No figures are available.

None of these factors, by itself, provides an adequate explanation of this phenonemon and if immigration of women of other tribes is occurring on a greater scale than is believed, the local belief in their fertility can hardly be founded on fact.

Low Child/Adult Ratio.

This is even lower than the figures in Table I would suggest for the reasons given on page 8. Several factors might be at work to produce this low figure :—

(1) A high proportion of infertile marriages.

(2) A low Live Birth Rate: i.e. normal fertility with a high proportion of conceptions ending in abortion or still birth.

(3) A high Infant and/or Child Mortality Rate.

Reproduction Rate

The ages of the population of Sources Yubu having been assessed, the reproduction rate was calculated by the method suggested in the United Nations Demographic Year Book for 1949-50.

$$\text{Reproduction Rate} = \frac{\text{Number of children under 5 years.}}{\text{Number of women 15-49 years.}}$$

$$= \frac{78}{426} \times 1000$$

$$= 183.$$

This is an extremely low figure since for a population maintaining but not increasing its numbers the figure should be in the region of 300. The numbers involved in this particular calculation were, however, very small.

OBSTETRIC AND FAMILY HISTORIES.

Obstetric and family histories were taken from a number of Azande women. They were not selected except in the respect that all lived within easy reach of Sources Yubu. Where this could be done with reasonable accuracy the ages were estimated. Unfortunately sufficient accuracy could be assured in only the minority of cases. These were then divided into three groups :—

(1) First half of reproductive life, i.e., 15-29 years.
(2) Second half of reproductive life, i.e., 30-45 years.
(3) Those whose menstruation had ceased and whose ages were estimated to be over 45 years.

Table IV shows the results obtained for these three groups and compares them them with results obtained for the whole series.

TABLE IV.

	First Half Reproductive Life	Second Half Reproductive Life	Past Reproductive Life	Whole Series
Number of Women	187	163	52	1,034
Number of Nulliparae	113—60%	67—41%	5—10%	458—44%
Number of Pregnancies	107	277	221	1,917
Average Number of Pregnancies per Woman	0.6	1.7	4.3	1.8
Average Number of Pregnancies per Parous Woman	1.4	2.8	4.7	3.3

TABLE IV.

Number of Abortions .. .. (% Pregnancies)	11—10%	35—13%	11— 5%	108—6%
Number of Stillbirths .. .. (% Pregnancies)	6—5.6%	10—3.6%	4—2%	85—4%
Number of Stillbirths per 1000 Live Births	66	43	19	50
Proportion of Pregnancies ending in Stillbirth or Abortion..	15.6%	16.6%	7%	10%
Number of Infant Deaths per 1000 Live Births	168	151	139	—
Number of Child Deaths per 1000 Live Births	19	78	125	—
Number of Infant and Child Deaths	187	229	264	317

Owing to the smallness of the numbers in whom age was determined, comparison between the three groups can hardly be expected to give significant results. Such as they are these figures would appear to suggest that :—

(a) The number of nulliparae in the frst two groups is high. With regard to the first group it has been noticed that many girls marrying in their teens fail to produce their first child until their early twenties. This was commented upon by Larken (*Account of the Azande*), who says :

> " The man is fertile at this age (17 years), the girl usually is not and ordinarily she will not become a mother until 23-24".

(a) The abortion rate is not unduly high since this in European societies has been variously estimated as between 10% and 20%.

(c) The stillbirth rate is high but not outstandingly so when one considers the remoteness of most of the population from antenatal care or even in many cases from medical aid. Practically all confinements are conducted by native " midwives " whose function is as much magical as obstetric.

(d) The number of infant and child deaths per 1000 live births is high.

Considering the figures for the whole series the most striking things are :—

(1) The high nulliparous rate.

(2) The high infant and child mortality rate.

AETIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Venereal Disease.

It is difficult to assess the incidence of venereal disease in the population. Records, naturally, show only the number of cases treated and, at least in the case of syphilis, these records are inaccurate, since the diagnosis of syphilis made by Medical Assistants in dispensaries cannot be relied on, any type of skin condition, not absolutely typical of scabies, taenia or leprosy, being considered sufficient justification for a course of N.A.B. and Bisoxyl. The diagnosis is also popular, and is often made by the patient, to account for vague aches and pains in later life much in the way that "rheumatism" is invoked in more temperate regions. The diagnosis of gonorrhoea is more accurate and is in the majority of cases made microscopically.

In Table V the figures for venereal disease in Sources Yubu are given. These are likely to give a more accurate picture of the situation than those for the general population because of proximity to and intimate association with the hospital (every male and some females are employed by the hospital authorities and their families are well known to these authorities), and because diagnoses are likely to be more accurate.

TABLE V.

Population 1951	% Treated for any Form of V.D.	% Treated for Syphilis	% Treated for Gonorrhoea
Adult Male—410	14%	1.5%	12.5%
Adult Female—485	10%	4%	6%
Total Adult—895	12%	3%	9%
Children—219	2.3%	1.3%	1%

These figures indicate that there is a high incidence of these diseases but not high enough to be implicated as the sole aetiological factor in reduction of population. Congential syphilis and ophthalmia neonatorum are not common and only one case of acute salpingitis has been seen in a year.

2. **Leprosy**

The incidence is high. There are 3,344 registered lepers from among the Azande population of the area, of whom 1,478 are male and 1,966 are female, a sex incidence of 1/1.3. These registered lepers constitute 6.6% of the Azande population and new cases are constantly being discovered. The classification of these cases is as follows :—

Neural	68%
Lepromatous	14%
Mixed	5%
Unclassified	13%

Leprosy can cause infertility but it is only believed to do so in the male in advanced lepromatous cases in which the testicles are involved. Here lepromatous cases are in the minority and none have been seen with obvious testicular involvement. The incidence among these cases is, also, greater in the female than the male. The majority of cases are mild and show a considerable degree of resistance.

In " Leprosy " by Sir Leonard Rogers and E. Muir, the authors write :—

> " decreased fertility as a whole is, therefore, of minor importance except in advanced lepromatous cases in males".

However, according to Hansen, quoted in the same work, the testicles are involved in all nodular cases and other workers have found that the birth rate among lepers is about 2/3 that in non-leper communities.

Taking into consideration the mildness of the disease in this dstrict, the high degree of resistance indicated by the proportion of neural cases and the sex incidence it seems unlikely that this condition, despite the probability of there being many undiscovered cases, in a significant factor in reduction of population.

3. **Sleeping Sickness.**

No new cases of Trypanosomiasis have been discovered in the past year and the numbers have been markedly decreasing in previous years. 84 old cases remain under observation or treatment.

In the adjacent part of the Azande area, administered medically by Li Rangu Sleeping Sickness Settlement, new cases are being discovered in some numbers and a difference, believed significant, has been shown between the child/adult ratio in that part of the area where new cases are being found and the part in which none have been found. In the former this ratio is 1/2.9 and in the latter 1/4.3 (Li Rangu Annual Report 1951/1952).

It has been suggested that Sleeping Sickness may result in reduction of fertility and also that " suramin " used in treatment may have the same effect. The incidence of the disease, however, does not seem sufficiently high for these effects to be widespread.

4. **Endemic Goitre.**

Goitre is endemic in the area and the position regarding it has been clearly stated by Woodman in his recent paper on the subject. Up to 3% of the population are affected and 85% of cases are women. True cretinism is, however, unknown.

5. **Nutrition.**

A detailed nutritional survey was conducted by Mrs. G. M. Culwick in 1950. The main conclusions she reached were :—

(1) The quantity of food is geared to a slow rate of living with a low output of energy.

(2) The protein/carbohydrate ratio is low.

(3) There is some deficiency of riboflavine.

With regard to the first of these conclusions, the rate of living does not seem to be particularly slow. The Azande are far from being hard workers but most have a long working day and can nevertheless dance energetically all night. No more than a guess can be made at the accuracy of this conclusion since no figures for Basal Metabolic Rates are available. Clinical malnutrition is an extreme rarity and severe anaemia, in the absence of Bilharzia or Ankylostoma, has not been seen, nor have cases of riboflavine deficiency been seen.

6. **Voluntary Contraception.**

Whether or not this occurs to any extent is not known. It is, however, noticeable that the men show a more marked concern about inability to have children than the women and some at least firmly believe that in some mysterious and possibly magical way a wife can revenge herself on an unsatisfactory husband by preventing conception.

7. **Malaria.**

Although Malignant Tertian Malaria is a fairly common disease it does not seem to play an important part in the production of abortion or in raising the death rate, at least as far as can be inferred from hospital statistics. In 1951/52 there were 205 cases of Malaria out of a total of 24,949 new cases i.e. 0.8%. Of these 71 were admitted to Hospital out of

a total of 3,407 admissions i.e. 2.1%. There were no deaths. Of these 205 cases 184 were Malignant Tertian, 3 were Benign Tertian and 18 were clinical.

CONCLUSION

Before drawing any conclusions it is necessary to consider the limitations of the material presented.

While the figures given in the first section " Population Statistics " are considered to be accurate, those under the sub-heading " Reproduction Rate " are taken from such a small section of the population that conclusions cannot be drawn from them. In the section " Obstetric and Family Histories " the numbers divided into age groups are again too small for conclusions to be drawn, and under " Aetiological Considerations " the difficulties of obtaining accurate figures for the incidence of Venereal Disease have been sufficiently stressed.

It is, however, concluded that :—

(1) There is a low Child/Adult Ratio.

(2) There is a marked female preponderance.

(3) There is a high Infant and Child Mortality Rate.

(4) Though not so prolific as in the past it is probable that the people are managing to reproduce themselves.

None of the aetiological factors reviewed are in themselves sufficient to account for a lowering in reproduction rate and a great deal more work will be necessary to determine accurately the incidence of Venereal Disease and the incidence of Tubal Occlusion among women.

It is heartening, however, to reflect that these figures here presented for what they are worth do not paint a picture of quite such unrelieved gloom as might have been expected from previous rumour and report.

NOTE I.

The Balanda.

This tribe, once conquered by the Azande, inhabits the area adjacent to and to the north of the part of the Azande with which this paper deals.

Their conditions of life are similar, they are subject to the same form of administration, and they have been moved and resettled in the same way. They are to a very great extent " Zandeised." The endemic diseases to which they are exposed are the same and they are subject to the same rules of medical inspection.

They are believed by the Azande to be more fertile and inter-marriage takes place but the extent to which it does so it not known accurately.

The figures given in Table VI show that the Child/Adult Ratio is higher than that of the Azande but it is still a low one. In Table VIII they are compared. The Balanda population pattern for these years is not so uniform as that of the Azande, the main variation being in the male population and the proportion of females remaining fairly constant.

TABLE VI

	1949	1950	1951
Total Population	16,168	17,390	16,570
Adult Male	4,244	4,830	5,300
Adult Female	5,596	5,816	5,510
Child Male	—	—	2,814
Child Female	—	—	2,946
Total Children	6,328	6,744	5,760
Adult Sex Ratio	76	83	96
Child Sex Ratio	—	—	95
Number of Children per Adult Female.. ..	1.13	1.15	1.04
Child/Adult Ratio	1/1.55	1/1.57	1/1.87

TABLE VII.

	1949	1950	1951
Adult Male	27%	27%	32%
Adult Female	34%	34%	33%
Children	39%	39%	35%

TABLE VIII.

YEAR.	Azande	Balanda
1949	1/2.7	1/1.55
1950	1/2.9	1/1.57
1951	1/2.5	1/1.87

NOTE II.

"Gbaria" Lines

These are linear plots of land each of the same size marching with each other, the row or "line" of plots being placed normally at right angles to the road. Each plot is held in the name of one householder and on it he lives and cultivates.

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تناقص الاطفال بين قبائل الزاندى

منذ خمس وعشرين سنة ، والاعتقاد سائد بأن عدد الاطفال الذين يولدون فى قبائل الزاندى اقل من النسبة العادية وان الزاندى انفسهم يحسون بهذه الحقيقة .

وهذا البحث محاولة أولى للكشف بطريق الاحصاء عن مدى صدق هذه الظاهرة المزعومة وقد استمدت مواد هذا البحث من دراسة منطقة « أزو » ، فلوجود هيئة تشرف على مرض النوم فى هذه المنطقة جاءت الاحصائيات الحيوية (اى المتصلة بالولادة والزواج والموت) صالحة لتكوين هذه الدراسة الاولية .

ويشير الكاتب الى أن مجتمع الزاندى قائم على تعدد الزوجات (٣٢ ./. من الرجال متزوجون باكثر من زوجة واحدة) وتشيع هناك ايضا صلات جنسية غير شرعية فالعزوبة بين النساء امر غير معروف عمليا .

ويدل تحليل احصائيات السكان فى مجموعه على أن هناك زيادة ملحوظة فى عدد الاناث (الاناث فوق سن البلوغ ٣٧ ./. من السكان عام ١٩٥٢ وفى مصر ٣١ ./.) وقلة فى نسبة عدد الاطفال (الاطفال ٢٨ ./. من عدد السكان يقابلهم بمصر ٣٩ ./.) ويناقش الكاتب التفسيرات الممكنة لتضخم عدد الاناث ولكنه لا يصل الى نتائج ايجابية دقيقة .

ويظهر ان القلة الواضحة فى عدد الاطفال بالنسبة للبالغين ترجع فى الدرجة الاولى الى قلة « الاخصاب » بين نساء الزاندى فى النصف الاول من حياتهن التناسلية (مرت الاشارة قبلا الى ان المرأة الزاندية لاتصبح أماً قبل ان تبلغ سن ٢٣ – ٢٤) كما ترجع الى النسبة الكبيرة فى وفيات الاطفال من كل الف يولدون احياء ، فلا الاجهاض ولا ولادة الاجنة ميتين من الارتفاع بحيث يؤثران تاثيرا بالغا.

ثم يورد الكاتب اسبابا طبية لانخفاض نسبة الاخصاب ، ويعد من بينها : الامراض التناسلية والجذام ومرض النوم والتضخم المزمن فى الغدة الدرقية وسوء التغذية والملاريا ويعتقد بوجود منع متعمد للحمل ، فان بعض الزاندى يعتقدون ان نساءهم يستعملن وسائل سحرية لتجنب الحمل.

ويرى المؤلف أن ليس فى هذه الاسباب نفسها تفسير كاف لقلة التناسل غير ان انتشار المرض التناسلى واثره فى تقليل الاخصاب فى المرأة لم تكشف عنه المـواد الاحصائية الممكنة كشفا تاما . ويرى انه من المحتمل ان الشعب لايزال يميل الى كثرة التوالد وان لم تكن كثرة هائلة كما كانت فى الماضى وان الارقام التى تقدمت (مهما تكن أهميتها) لاترسم صورة قاتمة كالتى راجت فى الشائعات والتقارير السابقة .

22

"EMIR SULEYMAN IBN INGER ABDULLAH"

An episode in the Anglo-French conflict on the Upper Nile, 1896-1898.

By G. N. Sanderson

In December 1898 the *Contemporary Review* published an article entitled "France, Russia and the Nile" the anonymous author of which sought to prove that France, by dint of "underhand intrigue and deadly treachery", had contrived a vast international conspiracy directed against British interests in the Upper Nile region. The other parties to this conspiracy were supposed to be Russia, Turkey, Abyssinia and the Mahdist State.[1] In the author's view, the relations of France with the Khalifa amounted to a betrayal of Christian civilisation; and this fact should be duly borne in mind by the British Government when it was framing the settlement which was to follow the French evacuation of Fashoda.

Even the most sensational journalistic "revelations" usually have some foundation in fact; and this one was no exception. It was suspected, correctly enough, that during the last few years of the Mahdist régime relations between the Khalifa 'Abdallahi and the Negus Menelik II had improved considerably; and there was reason to believe that this improvement had been encouraged by the French, in the hope of making diplomatic contact with the Khalifa through the good offices of Abyssinia. After the Abyssinian success at Adowa in March 1896, the French, seconded by the Russians, had intensified their efforts to secure paramount influence at the court of Menelik and to efface the memory of their equivocal attitude during the Italo-Abyssinian war. Early in 1897, the Governor of Obock, M. Léonce Lagarde, had arrived in Addis Ababa on a special mission to the Negus; he had returned with a treaty, the contents of which were not divulged, and the Abyssinian title of "Duke of Entoto". During 1897 and 1898 there was a marked increase in the number of French and Russian "travellers" and "explorers" operating in Abyssinia.[2] Moreover, it was known that the French had from time to time encouraged the Sultan of Turkey to embarrass the occupying Power by asserting his suzerain rights in Egypt (e.g., in March 1896, when the Sultan was induced to protest against the projected Dongola campaign).[3]

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 761-778. Cf. Langer, William L., *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 2nd Edn., (New York, 1951), p. 540.

[2] Cf. Woolf, Leonard, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, (London n.d. ? 1920), pp. 197-201; and Rodd, J. Rennell, *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, 1894-1901, (London, 1923), p. 113-114.

[3] Cf. Shibeika, Mekki, *British Policy in the Sudan*, 1882-1901, (London, 1952), pp. 359-361.

But how were these ill-assorted allies to be persuaded to work harmoniously with France and with one another? The author of "France, Russia and the Nile" though that he had discovered the answer in an article published on 27 October 1897 in the French newspaper *L'Eclair*, which he describes as a mouthpiece of the French General Staff.[1] This newspaper asserted that in September 1896 negotiations had been completed between the French Government and a certain " Soliman Inger", an accredited emissary of the Khalifa. Translated extracts from *L'Eclair* are quoted to the effect that in return for the cession to France of the Bahr al Ghazal, and the promise of a friendly reception for the Marchand Mission, the French Government had agreed to give diplomatic support to a Mahdist mission to Constantinople. The mission was to travel via Abyssinia and Djibouti (presumably with the connivance of the Negus), and the Sultan was to be pressed to accept the Khalifa as the ruler of an independent Sudan under Ottoman " suzerainty "—and, of course, under French diplomatic patronage.

Such a scheme did not perhaps seem quite so fantastic in 1896-8 as it does to-day. Those who cared to find out knew perfectly well, even then, that the Khalifa could not and would not accept the alliance of an European Power, still less cede territory to it ; and that the Mahdist State could hardly accept the Sultan's suzerainty without denying its essential role as an apocalyptic New Order destined to supersede, if necessary by force, the corruptions of the existing Islamic community. But French publicists, and even French politicians, too often preferred to ignore or even to deny these facts, and to cherish the naive illusion that the Khalifa would welcome a French mission with open arms if only he could be brought to understand the difference between Englishmen and Frenchmen. Nor was this illusion confined to more or less ignorant adventurers like Olivier Pain and the Marquis de Morès.[2] It was also entertained by men of ministerial rank. and seems to have been an almost unquestioned dogma in the Foreign and Colonial Ministries.[3] André Lebon, Colonial Minister in the Méline government, writing in June 1896 to Victor Liotard, the French Commissioner in the Upper Oubangui, makes it quite clear that the plan for the Marchand Mission counted upon the establishment of

[1] Not without reason, it seems. In 1896, when the agitation for the re-opening of the Dreyfus case was beginning to get under way, *L'Eclair* published an article inspired by the General Staff, which "proved" Dreyfus' guilt. (Brogan, D. W., *The Development of Modern France*, 1870-1939, (London. 1940), p. 331-332). There is, however, no evidence that Inger was at any time in direct contact with the French General Staff.

[2] For Olivier Pain, see Hill, Richard L., *Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, (Oxford, 1951), p. 301 ; for Morès, see Hill, op. cit., p. 241, and Brogan, op. cit., p. 284 ; and cf. Byrnes, Robert F., *Antisemitism in Modern France*, Vol. I, (New Brunswick, N.J., 1950).

[3] See, as sample evidence, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, Ie Série, Tome XII, (Paris, 1947), No. 219 (Berthelot to Guiyesse, 30 November 1895) .

friendly relations with the Mahdists. Writing of the Marchand Mission, he says : " Mais ce caractère exclusivement pacifique que doit conserver l'oeuvre entreprise . . . nous (oblige) à établir, sinon une alliance véritable, tout au moins de bons rapports avec les Derviches. Il ne faut pas que les Mahdistes, apprenant l'arrivée des Français, puissent confondre leur entreprise avec celles de leurs rivaux européens. Il importe de leur faire entendre que la France n'a contre eux aucun sentiment d'hostilité . . . "[1] The French made no secret of their desire for friendly relations with the Khalifa, nor of their belief that such relations could in fact be achieved ; and the writer in the *Contemporary Review*, confronted with what appeared to be a circumstantial report that such an arrangement had indeed been concluded, may be forgiven for assuming that there had really been fire in a quarter where smoke had been visible for so long.

But who was " Soliman Inger", and what were in fact his relations with the Mahdists and the French ?

Published accounts of " Soliman Inger's " career are to be found :—

(i) In a notice in the London *Observer*, published on the occasion of the death of Alexander Inger, alias " Soliman Inger". [2]

(ii) In a note by Mr. G. W. Bell, entitled " Suleiman Hariga," in *Sudan Notes and Records*.[3]

(iii) In an article, derived from Bell, in R. L. Hill's *Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*.[4]

So far as I am aware, no other accounts exist ; Hill points out that Bell's information is unsupported by further evidence.

Mr. Bell asserts that Inger was a Mahdist Amir and an intimate of the Khalifa, and adduces evidence from two sources :—

(i) The *Observer* article already mentioned.

(ii) The reminiscences of al Mulazim Awal 'Ali Eff. Subahi, M.C., who served under the Amir Hamdan Abu 'Anja and after the Reconquest enlisted in the Egyptian Army.

The material presented as fact by Mr. Bell (as distinct from what is admittedly conjecture) may be summarised as follows :—

(i) From *The Observer* : Alexander Inger, whose death near Oradea-Mare in Transylvania is reported, was the son of an Austrian officer who spent some years in the Turkish service.

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[1] *D.D.F.*, Ie Série, Tome XII, No. 411, 23 June 1896 ; and cf. an article by André Lebon in *Revue des deux mondes* (4e Période, Vol. 158, p. 274 ff.)

[2] *The Observer*, 8 September, 1935.

[3] *S.N.R.*, Vol. XX. Part 2, 1937, pp. 296-299.

[4] Hill, op. cit., p. 180-181.

Alexander, who also became an officer, received his military education in the Cadet School at Traiskirchen and the Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt. Tiring of garrison life in Bosnia, Inger retired from the Austrian service and, following his father's example, joined the Turkish Army. He was posted to Egypt, where he became a convert not only to Islam, but also to Mahdism. He then made his way to Omdurman, where he was promoted to high office by the Khalifa and was known as the " Emir Soliman Inger". He took part in the Mahdist campaign against Negus Tecla Haimanot which led to the sack of Gondar (1887). At some period not stated, but presumably after the battle of Matammah (March 1889), Inger became the " king " of an Abyssinian province. He returned to Europe after the death of the Khalifa and lived until his own death in a castle near Oradea-Mare. In or about July 1935 he is said to have " sent a memorandum to the League of Nations, in which he demanded that if Italy conquered Abyssinia he should be restored to the governorship of his former province".[1]

(ii) 'Ali Eff. Subahi adds to this : That Inger first appeared in Omdurman " during the fourth year of the Khalifa's rule " and that he was appointed " an Emir and Staff Officer responsible for the drill and equipment of the entire forces". He was Chief of Staff to Hamdan Abu 'Anja (in 1887), and he founded an " extra garrison post " at Walad al Kakar, near Khashm al Qirba.[2] Inger derived his nickname " Suleiman Hariga " from his practice of having his soldiers branded in the thumb with a ج for جهادي, as a precaution against desertion. ('Ali Eff. himself was thus branded). He was tall, fair and clean-shaven, and " could have carried Slatin Pasha on his shoulder".[3]

Mr. Bell's account is not however free from internal inconsistencies. If Inger really appeared during the fourth year of the Khalifa's rule it is difficult to see how he could have taken part in the Abyssinian campaign of 1887. I also fail to understand Mr. Bell's contention (loc. cit., p. 299) that " That Dervishes maintained their hold over the conquered portions of the country "—by implication, the Amhara province of Abyssinia. I can find no evidence that there was any permanent occupation of Abyssinian territory by the Mahdists either after the campaign of 1887 or after that of 1889. As for 'Ali Eff.'s branded ج whether Inger was responsible for it or not, this device was certainly not Inger's own invention, for soldiers serving in the Sudan during the Turkiya were sometimes thus branded.[4]

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[1] *S.N.R.*, loc. cit., p. 296-7.

[2] Ibid., p 298.

[3] Ibid., p. 299.

[4] Douin, G., *Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismail*, Tome III, 3e Partie, Fascicule B, (Le Caire, 1941), p. 1147.

But if Inger was really an Amir, we might expect to find some rather more convincing evidence of the fact than 'Ali Eff.'s reminiscences and the reports of *The Observer* and *L'Eclair*. It would be interesting to know whether the *Obresver* story was based upon anything more reliable than statements made by Inger himself during his retirement ; but unfortunately that newspaper was unable to give me any information about the source of its report on Inger's death. The account in *L'Eclair*, as will be shewn, seems to derive entirely, or almost entirely, from Inger's unsupported statement. Mr. Bell comments upon the fact that Slatin makes no mention of Inger, and suggests reasons for his silence which may or may not be convincing. But did similar considerations also impose silence upon Frs. Ohrwalder and Rossignoli, and upon Neufeld ? Wingate, as Director of Military Intelligence to the Egyptian Army, was well-informed about the Khalifa's Amirs. But no trace of an Austrian Amir called Inger can be found in the " Intelligence Reports, Egypt". If Inger remained in Abyssinia until 1899, as Mr. Bell conjectures, we might expect to find some trace of him in the secret *Précis of Information obtained by the British Mission to Abyssinia, March to June*, 1897.[1] This mission, headed by Rennell Rodd, with Wingate as second-in-command and Gleichen as Intelligence Officer, collected very full information on " Foreigners and Foreign Missions in Abyssinia", and on important Abyssinians[2]. None of the persons mentioned can possibly be identified with Inger. Finally, it seems reasonable to suppose that the " Staff Officer responsible for the drill and equipment of the entire forces " would have left at least occasional traces of his presence and activities in the Khalifa's official correspondence. But I am informed by a colleague at present engaged in cataloguing the Khalifa's archives that he has found no reference to a " Suleiman Inger " or " Suleiman Hariga", although he has examined a considerable amount of material relating to to the period of Inger's alleged activities as an Amir. The " argument from silence", though never quite conclusive, is in this particular case peculiarly strong, and would in itself cast the gravest doubt upon the accounts given by *The Observer* and by 'Ali Eff. Subahi.

But if the " Emir Suleiman Inger " is shadowy to the point of non-existence, there is on the contrary ample information about a certain Karl Inger who was arrested by the " Anglo-Egyptian " authorities at Suakin in October 1896. He is mentioned in Rennell Rodd's *Social and Diplomatic Memories*, 1894-1901,[3] and in the *Précis of Information* relating to Abyssinia;[4] and a file in the Archives of the Civil Secretary

[1] This brochure was printed by the War Office for confidential circulation. It bears no date, but presumably appeared soon after July 1897, when the Mission arrived in England. Copy No. 28 (Gleichen's) is in the Newbold Library of the University College of Khartoum.

[2] Op. cit., Appendix C, pp. 77-80 ; Ch. II, pp. 18-24.

[3] Rodd, op. cit ., p. 183-184.

[4] *Précis*, p. 17, p. 133.

at Khartoum (No. 268) contains a full account of his arrest and examination by the Suakin authorities. For the details of Inger's career up to his retirement from the active list of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and for certain information about him during the period 1914-1917, I am indebted to the courteous co-operation of Hofrat Dr. Oskar Regele, of the Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv), who was good enough to reply to my enquiries.[1] From these sources it is not difficult to demonstrate that the " Amir " and the Karl Inger of Suakin are one and the same, and that Inger was an imposter who was neither an Amir nor indeed at any time in contact with the Khalifa. The details of his relations with the French (the most interesting part of his activity from the point of view of general history) remain unfortunately somewhat obscure. Certain conclusions are indeed suggested : but they cannot, on the evidence at present available, be demonstrated with complete finality.

The Austrian military archives contain no record of an Alexander Inger. They do however contain the dossier of Leutnant Karl Inger, born at Temesvar in Hungary (now Timisoara, Romania) on 18 September 1868. During the first World War, this officer lived in retirement in a castle in Transylvania, and his letters to the Austrian War Ministry were signed " Emir Suleyman ibn Inger Abdullah". The Inger arrested at Suakin was also born, according to his own statement, at Temesvar on 18 September 1868.[2] There is an obvious resemblance between the signature of " Emir Suleyman ibn Inger Abdullah", a photostatic copy of which was kindly sent to me by the Kriegsarchiv, and that of Karl Inger of Suakin. There can be no reasonable doubt that the " Emir " and the Suakin Inger are identical.

Karl Inger, who was in fact the son of a " master shoemaker", attended the Infantry Cadet School at Temesvar from 1883 to 1888, and passed out with the rating " Very Good". (There is no evidence that he ever attended the Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt). While at the Cadet School, on 19 September, 1885, Inger voluntarily enlisted in the 61st Infantry Regiment, in which he held acting non-commissioned and cadet rank before being commissioned " Leutnant " (i.e., 2nd Lieutenant) in the 85th Infantry Regiment on 1 November 1890. It is therefore clear that Inger could not have taken part in any of the Khalifa's Abyssinian campaigns ; nor could he have appeared in Omdurman in the fourth year of the Khalifa's rule. Inger was granted a year's leave from April 1892 to April 1893. During this period he seems to have visited Morocco, and to have gained some knowledge of Arabic ; but there is no evidence at all that he visited or attempted to visit the Sudan. Moreover, it is abundantly clear from Inger's statements at the time of his arrest that he was very imperfectly acquainted with Sudanese affairs. On 5 December 1894 Inger

[1] Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv) Letter No. 2867/1952, 15 September, 1952.

[2] C.S. File 268, Inger's written statement of 10 November 1896, enclosed in S. D. SCR 144 of 11 November (covering despatch by Governor Suakin).

requested a transfer to the Reserve, stating in explanation that he wished to settle in Morocco. Inger's retirement from the Active List was approved by the War Ministry on 10 February 1895, and he was at the same time posted to the reserve of the 39th Infantry Regiment in the rank of "Reserve-Kadett-Offiziersstellvertreter".

For Inger's movements and activities between February 1895 and his arrest at Suakin on 31 October 1896 we have three main sources of information : first, the statements made by Inger himself while in custody ; second, a series of four anonymous letters, denouncing Inger as a spy working in the interests of France, which were addressed to the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian War Office, and were posted in Cairo at various dates between 8 and 16 November 1896;[1] third, the report of Slatin Pasha, who interrogated Inger at Suez on behalf of the Intelligence Department.[2] Slatin's report is accompanied by a further written statement made by Inger at Suez. This third source adds nothing new up to the time of Inger's arrival in Cairo in May 1896 ; thereafter it provides additional information about Inger's dealings with the French and with a certain M. Ximenes, a man of indeterminate occupation and somewhat fluctuating loyalties.

The value of such evidence is obviously debatable, and it seems necessary to justify the reliance which I propose to place upon it. Slatin's report and Inger's accompanying statement will be considered in the discussion of Inger's relations with Ximenes and with the French.

Inger made three statements at Suakin ; the first, apparently an oral one, was summarised by Miralai Parsons Bey, the Governor of Suakin, in a report to Cairo dated 10 November 1896;[3] the second, which was written and much more lengthy, was submitted by Inger on 10 November to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the circumstances of his arrest.[4] These are supplemented by Inger's oral statement to the Court and by his replies to the questions put to him.[5] The original of the written statement has disappeared and the file contains only a translation made by Mr. Henry Lamb, H.B.M's. Consul at Suakin. The English text contains one or two small lacunae, and not a few ambiguities and incoherencies, which might lead one to suspect that the translation was defective. But there has survived in the original German a letter, which the Suakin authorities refused to forward, from Inger to the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Cairo ; and a persual of this letter suggests that Mr. Lamb is probably not to blame for the shortcomings of the translated statement.

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[1] Both the statements and the letters will be found in C.S. Archives, File No. 268.

[2] *Public Record Office*, Foreign Office, 78/4763. Enclosure in: Cromer to Salisbury. No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896.

[3] File 268, marked " Int. R. Sc. Confl. 201."

[4] File 268, Enclosure in Parsons' despatch S.D. SCR 144 of 11 November 1896.

[5] Ibid., Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry (marked S.D. SCR 147).

Incoherencies apart, if Inger was in fact an imposter, anything which he says should be treated with reserve. His Suakin statements consist partly of a factual account of his movements since 1895, and partly of an explanation of his motives for entering the Sudan. The factual part of his statement can be corroborated from independent sources—for instance, from his passport, which was visaed as follows :—Constantinople, December 1895; Massawa, March 1896; Jidda, October 1896.[1] Moreover, Inger was at the time of his arrest an exhausted and badly frightened man. Parsons Bey, in his report of 10 November, says : " He had been wandering in the plains for 5 days exposed to unusually heavy rains without shelter, without food excepting a few dates and without transport. On entering the office he requested permission to sit down, his demeanour pourtraying (*sic*) great physical exhaustion and mental anxiety". He had good reason for anxiety. He had been arrested in a theatre of war, armed and disguised ; his disguise concealed the uniform of the enemy. (He was in fact wearing a Dervish jibbah inside out so as to conceal the patches). There was strong circumstantial evidence that he had been trying to communicate with and assist the enemy ; he might well fear Court Martial on a capital charge. In these circumstances Inger seems to have made up his mind to tell the truth, if not the whole truth, about his previous movements and actions, and to try to shew that his behaviour was capable of an innocent explanation. Many of his admissions were extremely damaging to himself—more damaging than perhaps he realised, for Inger seems to have been, in Parsons' words, " devoid of all common sense". But unless he were completely insane he would hardly have gone to the trouble of deliberately manufacturing incidents so incriminating to himself. I propose then to accept his account of his movements as substantially true, so far as it goes. As an explanation of Inger's motives, his statements are indeed far from satisfactory ; I doubt if he knew himself what his real motives were.

The anonymous letters are worthy of more consideration than is usually given to such documents. In an earlier letter which has disappeared, but which is unambiguously referred to in the first of the surviving ones, the writer gave accurate information about Inger's forthcoming arrival at Suakin ; this was duly passed on to Parsons by Wingate : " Secret. I have received an anonymous letter that a European speaking a little Arabic and passing himself off as a Moslem will arrive shortly in Suakin. He is slightly below middle height, thin and wears light moustache . . . "[2] (Not, be it noted, tall and clean-shaven). Inger himself believed, most probably correctly, that his betrayer was a " friend", Ximenes by name, in whom he had confided while in Cairo. Such a person might be expected to be well-informed about Inger's immediate past. Some of

[1] Ibid., Telegram (Decypher) No. 173, Suakin to Mukhabarat (i.e., Intelligence Dept.), 1 November 1896.

[2] File 268, unnumbered draft for cypher, Mukhabarat to Muhafiz, Suakin, 17 October 1896.

the statements in the letters confirm Inger's own story ; others can be checked from independent testimony. Finally, the writer inspires confidence by his tersely matter-of-fact style, and by his evident anxiety to provide easily verifiable information. " Détail facilement contrôlable", he remarks in one place, and this applies to most of the information which he offers. But the evidence of the anonymous letters is certainly to be used with caution ; their author, in sharp contrast to the muddle-headed Inger, appears to have been an able and intelligent man, quite capable of buttressing the important lie with a number of less important truths.

According to Parsons' report of 10 November, Inger made a voluntary statement soon after his arrest. He said that he had landed from a dhow at Jazira 'Abdallah, where he changed into Arab dress which he had obtained in Jidda. His object was to make " peace between the Dervishes and the Egyptian Government". He seems also to have mentioned that he stayed at Massawa during March 1896 ; for in reply to a telegraphic enquiry by Parsons, confirmation of this fact was received from General Baldissera. [1] The summary of Inger's preliminary statement contains little else of interest, except the remark that " Carl Inger shows strong feelings of enmity against a Mr. Ximenes who resided at Shepheard's Hotel—this individual he states had betrayed him".

Having admitted so much, Inger could hardly avoid further explanations. During his imprisonment he composed a long written statement, which he submitted to the Court of Inquiry on 10 November.[2]

Inger begins by emphasising that his retirement from the Active List (which he correctly dates 10 February 1895) was a voluntary and honourable discharge ; and he is throughout at pains to insist on his status as an officer. He retired because he wished to enter the service of the Sultan of Morocco. He had begun to study Arabic in 1892, and had begun an Arabic translation, which he completed in Morocco and Cairo, of certain Austrian military training manuals. (These translations were found in Inger's possession at Suakin, and were for a time regarded by his captors as highly incriminating documents). On the strength of his Arabic drill-books Inger hoped to obtain a military appointment in Morocco. In fact, he experienced the first of a long series of failures. " I received support from nobody and failed in Morocco because the whole country was in an uproar as a result of Muley Hassan's death". On the voyage from Gibraltar to Tangier in April 1895 (the Ms. has " 1896", but this is clearly a slip) Inger became friendly with a certain Lekisch—a fellow-Hungarian, according

[1] File 268, Telegram, Baldissera to Governor Suakin, 3 November 1896.

[2] Ibid., S.D. SCR 144, Enclosure. Wherever no other source is mentioned, this statement is to be regarded as the authority for the narrative of events up to the time of Inger's arrest.

to the anonymous correspondent.[1] He stayed with Lekisch in Tangier for some months.

In November 1895 Inger left Morocco to try his luck in Turkey. He hoped to enter the Turkish Army ; but as the Austrian diplomatic authorities in Turkey refused to give him a recommendation, he was unsuccessful. At the end of January 1896 he left Constantinople for Egypt, armed with what he calls a " slight " recommendation from his Consul in Tangier to Baron Heidler, the Austrian diplomatic Agent in Cairo. But Baron Heidler was evidently not impressed either by Inger or by his recommendation, for he flatly refused to help, and Inger was reduced to hawking his Arabic drill-books around the Egyptian War Office in search of a patron. He claims to have seen several high officials, including his compatriot Slatin Pasha, but none of them would help him.

In February he volunteered for service with the Italians in Abyssinia, and for the first time his efforts to become a soldier of fortune seemed likely to bear fruit. The Italian diplomatic Agent visaed his passport for Eritrea, and forwarded his application (together with a copy of the precious drill-book) to General Baratieri. But Inger was not the man to sit quietly in Cairo while empires were being lost and won in Abyssinia ; and, as " the situation in Erythrea became continually worse", he embarked for Massawa on the Italian transport " Umberto I " without awaiting a reply to his application. On arrival at Massawa, he was told that his papers had been lost in the confusion following the battle of Adowa, and that he was to apply to General Baldissera at Asmara.[2] At the end of a fortnight Baldissera replied, regretting that no use could be made of Inger's services as he was not an Italian subject. Baldissera's telegram to Parsons confirms this part of Inger's story.[3]

Towards the end of March Inger left Massawa for Djibouti, where he arrived on 5 April. He now intended to make a journey into Abyssinia, but with what object remains obscure. Inger says that he had been keeping a diary and intended to write a book about the war. But the anonymous correspondent says that he intended to offer his services to Menelik, and hints that he was moved by pique against the Italians. " L'hiver dernier I . . . alla offrir ses services à Baldissera: refusé en Erythrée, il alla à Djibouti pour s'offrir au Négus contre l'Italie."[4] Whatever Inger's real plan, it came to nothing, for he was informed that a journey into the interior required the personal permission of Menelik, which would be forthcoming (if at all) only after a delay of two or three months. This seems to have daunted even the pertinacious Inger, and he remarks somewhat naively, " At Massawa I had been kindly received and treated as a comrade and

[1] Ibid., Anonymous letter No. 1. Date (from postmark) 8 November 1896.

[2] Baldissera, like Inger, had begun his career as an Austrian officer (Hill. op. cit., p. 70).

[3] File 268, Baldissera to Governor Suakin, 3 November 1896.

[4] Ibid., anonymous letter No. 2, postmarked 9 November 1896.

a guest, and *for that reason* I could not write to the Negus". He made his way to Aden, and thence to Suez and Cairo, where he must have arrived about the end of April or the beginning of May 1896. (The anonymous correspondent says " En Mars de retour au Caire". This is clearly impossible, but " Mars " may be a slip for " Mai ")[1].

Inger says that on leaving Aden it was at first his intention to go to Suakin, but as he had no " acquaintances " there, he decided to make for Cairo instead. He does not say why he proposed to go to Suakin, but from his subsequent behaviour it seems likely that he intended once again to seek employment in the Egyptian Army. In fact, when he reached Cairo and found the preparations for the Dongola camapign in hand, he immediately applied for a Commission in an Egyptian regiment. Once again his applications were rejected. He was indeed offered a non-commissioned appointment (apparently in the Police—his statement is not quite clear at this point); but this he not unnaturally refused. A personal appeal to Slatin at Wadi Halfa was also unsuccessful.

It was at this time, according to his statement, that Inger first became seriously interested in the affairs of the Sudan. He read Slatin's and Ohrwalder's books and came to the conclusion that " the Dervishes were certainly cruel but might yet be made good". More particularly, he became convinced that the Khalifa was prepared to accept Ottoman suzerainty, and was in effect fighting for Ottoman rights against Egyptian (or " Anglo-Egyptian ") aggression. The translated statement is at this point somewhat ambiguous. The actual words are; " I read that the Khalifa Abdullah was not so much setting himself up as Khalifa but rather striving for the Sultan's crown". It may seem a strained interpretation to take " for " as meaning " on behalf of", but only thus can this sentence be reconciled with what follows. For Inger had somehow convinced himself that a peaceful settlement was possible, the key to which was, in his own words, " that the Khalifa Abdullah should be recognised by the Sultan of Turkey as Sultan of Nubia". " It would be rendering the world a great service", he thought, " if one could bring about peace between the Soudan and Egypt in this way". Inger evidently felt that he was the man to do the world this service ; he formulated a plan, and took into his confidence his old acquaintance Lekisch, who had by now moved to Cairo.

But it was not until the end of May that Inger found an opportunity to put his plan into action. About this time he made the acquaintance of M. Ximenes, who was living at Shepheard's and who described himself as a correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge*. Ximenes said that he too wished to go to the Sudan ; and when Inger told him of the " task of civilisation " which he proposed to assume, Ximenes found it " good and honourable". But Ximenes did not confine himself to merely moral sup-

[1] Ibid., loc. cit.

port. " You want to go to the Soudan", he said. " Well, wait. I have great connections. You shall have everything that is necessary for the expedition."

It was finally agreed that Inger should lead an expedition to Omdurman via Djibouti, followed in due course by the more circumspect Ximenes. Inger's was to be a small expedition, the expenses of which were not to exceed 10,000-15,000 francs ; Ximenes, who was to follow him through Abyssinia, was to have some 150,000 francs at his disposal.[1] The anonymous correspondent says that Lekisch was also drawn into the plot at this stage. Lekisch was to attempt to communicate with the Khalifa via Asswan ; and, we are told, did actually go to Asswan in the guise of a tourist at about the same time as Inger arrived at Suakin.[2] Inger is however silent about this matter. (Indeed, he seems to have shewn an honourable reluctance to implicate his friends, except of course Ximenes whom he believed to have betrayed him. The anonymous correspondent, on the other hand, goes out of his way to denounce all those who were in any way connected with the affair). At Omdurman, Inger and Ximenes were to put their scheme to the Khalifa, who was to be persuaded to allow them to escort a Mahdist mission to Constantinople, " to seek peace from the Sultan". However, it seemed desirable to secure the backing of some Great Power for so ambitious a plan ; and . . . " we thought of France". Ximenes, who claimed to be " en rapport with Paris, Constantinople and Russia "[3], agreed to " prepare everything " so far as French support was concerned.

Meanwhile Inger, on his own admission, was collecting information about the numbers and armament of the Khalifa's army and was endeavouring to " work out an organisation of this force "—which seems a curious occupation for an apostle of peace. All was to be ready by the end of July ; but July ran into August and Ximenes produced neither money nor evidence of French support, taking refuge in a series of excuses when Inger pressed for further information.[4] A suggestion that Inger himself should go to Paris was received with marked coldness by Ximenes, who replied that Inger " would probably spoil everything " ; and Inger's suspicions were further aroused when Ximenes began to shew signs of distress remarkable in one with his " great connections". He had to borrow money to pay his hotel bill and " his wardrobe was reduced to a pair of torn trowsers".[5] Inger feared that his name was being used for " dishonourable purposes " ; and, as relations with Ximenes were already

[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O., 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896, Enclosure (Slatin's report dated 17 December).

[2] File 268, Letter No. 1 (8 November 1896); Letter No. 4, postmarked 16 November 1896.

[3] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Inger's written statement dated 10 December).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

strained, he decided to proceed to Paris at once, giving Ximenes to understand that he was going to Hungary.[1]

In Paris his fears were confirmed. Ximenes was " carrying on a disgusting correspondence, which had nothing to do with Peace or Well-doing . . . he was only endeavouring to make money out of it "—not, apparently, with much success. But in spite of this revelation, Inger did not abandon the plan which he had developed with Ximenes' advice and encouragement. He saw the widow of the Marquis de Morès, and Prince Polignac, both of whom had, it seems, given moral though not financial support to Ximenes' proposals. " He then paid a visit to Ximenes' representative in Paris, a Captain Ducharic, who told him that Ximenes had applied to the French Government for 20,000 francs through the father-in-law of one of the French ministers whose name he did not recollect" [2]. But Ducharic was not hopeful about the chances of obtaining the money. Nothing daunted, Inger decided to approach the French Government directly. " I elaborated a programme for the object of the expedition. I submitted this programme to the Foreign Office in Paris and asked if France would support the mission. They assented and promised me assistance". He met a M. Lagarde of the Colonial Ministry and a M. Borel (also spelt Borelle and Borelli) who is described in Slatin's report as an " Under-secretary of State " at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3] On Inger's second visit to this latter Ministry he was informed that his project was generally approved by the Minister and that he would be given recommendations to the French authorities in Egypt and on the Red Sea littoral. There could however be no question of financial support until his *bona fides* was more fully proved.[4] During the course of these negotiations he was asked whether he was certain that the Khalifa would receive the expedition. " I said ' Yes'. It was a *lie*, a lie for the good of humanity! "[5] In September Inger returned to Egypt, having warned the French against Ximenes, whom he accused of trying to raise money by false pretences.[6]

It would appear from the above that it was during his visit to Paris in the Summer of 1896 that Inger first began to pose as an accredited representative of the Khalifa. He had already begun to call himself " Soliman " while in Cairo [7]; and the scheme which he expounds in his statements is clearly identical with the " infamous . . . diabolical " plot hatched by " Soliman Inger " of *L'Eclair*. The author of " France, Russia

[1] Ibid.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report of 17 December).

[3] Ibid. ; and C.S. File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

[4] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report).

[5] File 268, Inger's written Statement of 10 November 1896, enclosed in Parsons' despatch S.D. SCR 144 of 11 November.

[6] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report).

[7] File 268, Anonymous letter No. 2, 9 November 1896.

and the Nile " translates a passage from *L'Eclair* which purports to be a statement by " Soliman Inger " himself. It begins by pointing out that the possession of the Bahr al Ghazal by France would protect the Khalifa against British aggression from Uganda (*sic*), and that " Egypt would then become free, for England would have no excuse for prolonging the occupation "—presumably because France would become the guarantor of the Khalifa's good behaviour on his Northern frontier. Inger then explains his scheme for the assertion of Turkish suzerainty over the Sudan, backed by French diplomatic support. The final and crowning move in this political game was to be Turkish " intervention for peace between the Soudan and a free Egypt". He continues: " Strengthened by the acceptance of the French Government, I forwarded, in September 1896, my request to the Khalifa, in which I said : ' A French column, Captain Marchand, will arrive by the French Congo at Bahr-el-Ghazal (*sic*). They are our friends, as France wishes to assist us and has accepted me as Ambassador. Let the Khalifa at once despatch a mission, by way of Abyssinia, to Djibouti, as the French Government has promised a good reception for it and its embarcation. (i.e., for Constantinople.) I return to place myself at the head of the army against England ' . . . After this report Marchand was well received and could freely advance on to the Nile." Inger then mentions his arrest at Suakin and his subsequent return to Europe " to concontinue the negotiations". [1]

It seems certain that Inger did visit Paris in the Summer of 1896 and that he met French officials who at least did not discourage him in his projects. His various statements are too detailed and consistent to be pure works of imagination. The fact of the visit, at least, is confirmed by the anonymous Cairo informant : " L'ex-officer resta à Paris presque deux mois, combinant son affaire d'espionnage et de flibusterisme " [2] . . . " il chercha à s'entendre avec les Français pour secourir le Khalife en vue de créer des difficultés à l'Angleterre" [3] But it is not easy to discover just how far the French were prepared to go and to what extent they took Inger seriously. I shall return to this question later.

It would be profitless to discuss at length whether Inger was " really " just an ordinary intriguer or a disinterested and high-principled worker for peace. When explaining himself to the Suakin authorities, Inger dilated on the peaceful motives of his political and military intrigues in a style which is to-day the small change of international controversy ; in a statement for French consumption, while not omitting the " peace " motif, he naturally stressed the political advantages which would accrue to France. His cool assertion that " after this report Marchand was well received and

[1] *Contemporary Review*, art. cit., p. 768.

[2] File 268, Anonymous letter No. 1.

[3] Ibid., Letter No. 2.

could freely advance on to the Nile " [1] is very revealing. It surprises not so much by its mendacity as by its sheer irresponsibility. Inger was evidently a self-dramatising romantic who yearned to play an important part as a military or political free-lance. When resounding successes failed to come his way, he was quite prepared to invent them, and perhaps after a time to believe in them himself.

On his return to Egypt Inger at once began to canvass his friends, and also influential Egyptians, in an attempt to raise money for his scheme. In this he was unsuccessful, though his plans were widely approved. " All these people said ' Oh, it would be a blessing for Egypt and for the Soudan ' —but nobody gave me any money". He saw Zubair Pasha and 'Abd al-Qadir Pasha (Governor-General of the Sudan, 1882-3), but " they only answered him with empty words". [2] Zubair Pasha, in fact, washed his hands of the whole affair by sending Inger's card, with an explanation of how he had come by it, to the Intelligence Department. [3] Inger goes so far as to assert that the Khedive himself knew of his scheme and heartily approved of it; but even this high patronage failed to produce any tangible results. [4]

At the same time he was negotiating with M. Boutiron, the acting French Minister in Egypt, both for money and for written credentials. No such credentials, he says, had been given him in Paris, nor had he asked for any. M. Boutiron refused to give him any money, even though— " I asked for no money for myself. My aim was holy : it was Peace". Inger's original plan had apparently provided for a caravan of some forty camels[5] : but this had to be drastically cut down. " I fancied that if I arrived at Omdurman with three or four men and told the Khalifa that Europe desired Peace, and if my three or four men saw that the French Consul supported me—that would be enough". Even so, a letter would no doubt have been useful ; but this M. Boutiron steadfastly refused to provide, lest so compromising a document should fall into unfriendly hands. But information does in fact seem to have been received from Paris about Inger, for Boutiron was prepared to assist him diplomatically so far as he was able. [6]

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[1] It is of course not impossible that these remarks, which are supposed to be Inger's *ipsissima verba*, were in fact invented by whoever wrote the article in *L'Eclair*. But they are so much in Inger's style that it seems a little perverse to doubt that they represent the gist at least of what he said.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report of 17 December).

[3] C.S. File 268 contains Inger's card and an explanatory note by Wingate.

[4] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report).

[5] File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Inger's statement.

[6] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit. (Slatin's report).

So far the French, if they had agreed to anything, had agreed to an expedition via Djibouti and Abyssinia. But because of the failure of the French to finance this plan, Inger now decided to abandon it, and to attempt to enter the Sudan by Suakin, with his " three or four men". As a first step he proposed to go to Jidda, where he would fit out his expedition ; and he therefore asked M. Boutiron to give him a recommendation to the French Consul at Jidda. Boutiron was evidently taken aback at this development, for he refused to take any action without prior reference to Paris ; no doubt his determination not to give Inger anything in writing was strengthened by the revelation of this new and much more foolhardy plan. However, he did agree to consult Paris ; and without staying for an answer Inger set off for Jidda, on the understanding that Boutiron should telegraph to the French Consul there the result of his enquiries. It is impossible to make sense of Inger's testimony, as it stands, about the instructions finally received from Paris by M. Boutiron, and about the transmission of these instructions to Jidda. When he appeared before the Court of Inquiry he asserted that no information at all had been received by M. Boutiron about him at any time before his departure from Egypt. But when he was interrogated by Slatin he admitted that M. Boutiron had agreed to help him diplomatically; [1] and it is surely unlikely that Boutiron would have made this promise on his own responsibility. In his written statement of 10 November Inger merely says that no reply had been received to Boutiron's enquiry about the change of plan, and gives the impression that Boutiron knew all about the original arrangement, but was not prepared to sanction a radical alte ation without reference to Paris. When Inger asserted before the Court of Inquiry that when he left Egypt M. Boutiron had heard nothing from Paris, he was asked : " Do you know if M. Boutiron ever received instructions from Paris ? " ; and he replied, " Yes, he told me he had and wrote it to M. Barrière, Editor of the *Journal Officiel* in Cairo. He said he had authority to allow me to proceed to Djibouti near Obock into the Soudan " (*sic*). [2] The Court made no attempt to clear up these confused and contradictory statements. Perhaps Inger had misunderstood the question, and was now admitting that these were the original instructions received by Boutiron—which was very probably the truth. Again, Inger says in his written statement of 10 November that no instructions had been received by the French Consul at Jidda when he arrived there, a ıd that he asked the Consul to make telegraphic enquiries. He does not mention the result of these enquiries, and it might be inferred from the Consul's subsequent behaviour towards him that no answer or an unfavourable answer had been received. But when Inger first arrived in Jidda the French Consul shewed an interest in him which is hardly explicable if his arrival was completely unheralded. The most likely explanation seems to be that Jidda did in fact receive instructions about Inger, and that these instructions were a confirmation of the

[1] Ibid.

[2] File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

original arrangement by which Inger was to proceed via Djibouti. As will be seen, reasons are not lacking to explain the subsequent change in the Consul's attitude to Inger.

On 6 October 1896 Inger embarked at Suez for Jidda on the S.S. " Mohalla". On board he became acquainted with a certain Bimbashi Fadli, who was as it happened the Senior Medical Officer at Suakin.[1] Bimbashi Fadli stated before the Court of Inquiry that Inger travelled dressed as an Algerian by night and as an European by day. Inger said that he was really a Muslim, but dressed as a Christian " so as to get better service from the restaurateur". He also claimed to be a correspondent for *Le Temps*.[2] This claim is a curious example of Inger's inveterate habit of boastful inaccuracy. He did indeed hold cards authorising him to act as correspondent of four French journals ; but *Le Temps* was not one of them.[3] As the anonymous informant asserted,[4] and as Inger himself afterwards admitted to Slatin,[5] his status of correspondent was the merest camouflage. Inger's knowledge of French was in fact negligible;[6] though the informant went a little too far when he said that Inger did not even know his own language. Inger's German is not indeed above reproach; but his mother tongue was very likely Magyar and not German.

On his arrival at Jidda Inger wrote to the French Consul who, he says, visited him in quarantine and brought him food. Bimbashi Fadli's evidence tends to confirm this ; he says that after Inger had been removed to quarantine, the French Consul enquired for him aboard the " Mohalla " and then went away in the direction in which Inger had been taken. But when Inger called at the French Consulate after his release from quarantine, he met with an almost hostile reception, being brusquely dismissed with the remark that he need not trouble to call again ; and he found himself stranded in Jidda with nowhere to live. Inger believed that " the sudden change in the attitude of the French Consul " was " due to information communicated by M. Boutiron that the Egyptian authorities were on Inger's track".[7] Boutiron may well have got wind of the imminent betrayal of the plot ; but it is doubtful whether the information was actually in Wingate's

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[1] Ibid., Parsons' despatch Int. R. Sc. Confl. 201 of 10 November, 1896.

[2] Ibid., Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Bimb. Fadli's evidence.

[3] Ibid., Inventory of Inger's effects The journals were: *Le Petit Journal, Revue d'Islam, Revue de Géographie* and *Revue Coloniale.*

[4] Ibid., Anonymous letter No. 3, posted between 9 and 16 November 1896.

[5] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc.cit. (Slatin's report).

[6] Ibid., Lamb to Boyle 10 November 1896 enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury No. 139 Confidential, 16 November 1896. (Boyle was Oriental Secretary at the Cairo Agency.); C.S. File 268, Anonymous letter No. 3.

[7] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896, Enclosure (Slatin's report dated 17 December).

hands at this date. Inger's dealings with the French Consul were all prior to 15 October ; but the Intelligence Department did not warn Suakin of his impending arrival until 17 October.[1] However this may be, the French Consul may well have felt fully justified in disowning Inger if the latter persisted in his hazardous plan of going to Suakin, or in the even wilder scheme, which he appears to have formed about this time, of attempting to join 'Uthman Diqna. An official employed by the Ottoman Telegraph at Suakin, one Amin Bey, stated in evidence that he had met Inger in Jidda ; Inger gave out that he was a Muslim and called himself Sulaiman, and there was a rumour that he had a seal which would pass him into the presence of 'Uthman Diqna. (A small silver seal was in fact found among his effects at the time of his arrest). He also claimed to be a French Citizen ; but when the French Consul refused to own Inger the Frenchman, and when Inger the Muslim persisted in wearing " a European head-dress " the police became suspicious and gave him notice to quit.[2]

Inger says that he now attempted to obtain a Turkish passport through the Austrian Consul at Jidda. Presumably this was in accordance with the Turkish " Règlement du 16 Rajab 1260", by which foreigners wishing to travel in the interior of the Ottoman dominions had to apply for such a passport through their own diplomatic authorities.[3] The Sudan was (at least according to one school of thought) still part of the Ottoman Empire *de jure;* and if Inger really believed in his own theory that the Khalifa was anxious to be on good terms with the Sultan, he might well consider that a Turkish passport would be a very useful document to have in his possession. In the event he failed to obtain the passport, and had to be content with a Consular visa for Suakin.[4]

He now began to make active preparations for his journey. An " agent " called Sa'id found him a servant ; and a " Soudanese slave " agreed to accompany him to Omdurman and to recruit two other men for the expedition. But on the day of departure only the servant appeared at the rendezvous. " The others saw that the French Consul would have nothing to do with me . . . . . I saw myself abandoned and betrayed ; what could I do ? " Inger's reply to this question is not easy to follow. He says that if he had gone back to Europe he would have been accused of cowardice ; if direct to Suakin, of selling himself to the English. He was left, he says, with two alternatives :

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[1] C.S. File 268, Unnumbered draft for cypher, Mukhabarat to Muhafiz, Suakin, dated 17 October 1896. Inger's passport was visaed by the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Jidda on 15 October. (See below.)

[2] File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Evidence of Amin Bey.

[3] Cf. Gelat, Philippe, *Répertoire de la législation et de l'administration égyptiennes*, Vol. III (Alexandrie, 1909) p. 626.

[4] This visa was granted on 15 October (*P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, loc. cit.—Slatin's report).

" (1) To perish in the desert and quit the falsehood of this world; or

(2) Trust to God's aid and, If I were not predestined to die, proceed to Suakin".

At Suakin he would give the lie to the attacks which had been made upon him and would demonstrate that he was working for peace. " No one", he remarks, " not even my friend, knew that I had given up the idea " —presumably, of going to Omdurman. The only meaning that I can extract from these incoherent statements is that Inger had decided to make merely a token entrance into the Sudan, and intended to allow himself to be arrested. But in fact he only seems to have formed this rather desperate resolution after an abortive attempt to reach 'Uthman Diqna. He told Lamb, the British Consul at Suakin, that he had " crossed over to Daroor[1] where he had endeavoured to obtain guides to take him to Osman Digna's camp but failed".[2] Later, at Suez, Inger told yet another different story to Slatin. He had, he said, been assured at the French Foreign Ministry that " Captain Le Marchand's expedition " would be delayed until Inger had negotiated the cession of the Bahr al Ghazal to France ; but while in Jidda he had learned that this expedition had already started. This alarmed Inger, for he feared that his life would be in danger if news of Marchand's advance reached Omdurman before he could explain the peaceful intentions of the French ; " it was this bad faith on the part of the French, which, in a large measure, induced Inger to give himself up".[3] This highly unplausible story seems to have been merely an imaginative afterthought. The Marchand Mission had indeed been under way since July 1896 ; and on 18 September Marchand himself had left Loango for the interior.[4] But even Inger must have realised that if he ever reached Omdurman at all he would arrive there long before Marchand's movements could possibly become a source of disquiet to the Khalifa. At all events, Inger hired a dhow, and landed on the African coast at a place called Jazira 'Abdallah[5] on or about 26 October ; and having changed into a Mahdist jibbah worn inside out so as to conceal the patches, he sent back his servant with his European clothes,[6] retaining only the drill-books and his personal effects. He points out that he could easily have destroyed the drill-books had they really been

[1] Marsa Darur, about 15 miles North of the present Port Sudan.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Lamb to Boyle, 10 November 1896, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury No. 139 Confidential, 16 November 1896.

[3] Ibid,. Slatin's report enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896.

[4] Delebecque, Jacques, *Vie du général Marchand*, 30th Edn., (Paris, 1936) pp. 91, 95.

[5] Possibly the same as Ras 'Abdallah, an off-shore spit about half-way between Suakin and the present Port Sudan. (See *The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot*, Ninth Edn., (1944), pp. 205, 209.)

[6] Lamb says that the servant deserted when Inger refused to pay cash in advance. (*P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Lamb to Boyle, 10 November 1896).

incriminating ; instead, he preferred to keep them, — so as to prove that he had not handed them over to the Mahdists!

Inger's usual bad luck did not desert him after his landing in the Sudan. The end of October 1896 was a period of exceptionally heavy rain around Suakin, and for some five days he wandered about, suffering severely from hunger and exposure. His efforts to get himself arrested seem at first to have met with little success, in spite of the strict watch which was doubtless being maintained as a result of Wingate's warning telegram. Muhammad Bey Ahmad, the Mamur of Suakin, who was apparently the first official to interrogate Inger, states: " He said, ' I am very tired, I have been on the move for ten days and I have not slept or eaten anything for five days.' I asked him, ' Why if you were so tired did you not go to the fort at Handub and get food and rest there ? ' He replied ' I saw Handub Fort, but there was so much water I could not get there ' ". [1] On the morning of 31 October, drenched, famished and exhausted, Inger was accosted near Hashin, some ten miles West of Suakin, by a local tribesman who was hunting hares, and who seems to have had no idea that the distressed stranger was a wanted man. At Inger's own request the tribesman escorted him to Suakin, where he was identified and placed under arrest. [2]

Inger claimed the protection of the Capitulations, and asked to be allowed to communicate with the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Cairo. But this request was not granted, in spite of his repeated protests. [3] An attempt was even made to keep the fact of the arrest a secret, at least for a few days. But on 4 November, by an oversight on the part of the military censor, Reuter's agent at Suakin was permitted to telegraph a brief report that a European dressed as a Dervish had been arrested. When this report was published in Cairo, some person unknown (very likely the anonymous informant) offered to Reuter's agent there a more circumstantial account in which the nationality of the prisoner was revealed. This report appeared in the London Press on 7 November. It disconcerted the Intelligence Department considerably and led to an acrimonious correspondence with Suakin. [4] Even after this leakage, Wingate seems to have thought that the minimum of publicity should be given to the affair. The original draft of Appendix P. to Intelligence Report. Egypt, No. 50 was entitled " Abyssinian Affairs and Karl Inger", and Inger's attempt to enter the Sudan is linked with the forthcoming msion of Lagarde to the Negus. But the

[1] File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Evidence of Muhammad Bey.

[2] Ibid., loc. cit., evidence of 'Isa Ahmad and Mustafa Ardab ; ibid., Parsons' report Int. R.Sc. Confl. 201 of 10 November 1896; ibid., Inger's letter of 11 November (never forwarded) to the Austrian Consul. Inger is at pains to point out that he entered Suakin of his own free will.

[3] Ibid., Inger's letter of 11 November.

[4] See the exchange of telegrams in File 268.

Appendix as finally printed contained no reference to Inger and was entitled simply " Abyssinian Affairs".[1]

Cromer learned of the arrest on 31 October.[2] On the following day he passed the information on to Salisbury and asked the Foreign Office to consider whether Inger was properly triable by Court Martial. Sir John Scott, the Judicial Adviser to the Khedive, thought that the case was covered by a proclamation of 19 March 1896 placing the Frontier Province and all territory to the South of it under military law. But Cromer was anxious not " to try the man and then have to give him over to a Foreign Power".[3] There was apparently reason to believe that Inger had at some time prior to his arrest renounced his Austrian nationality;[4] and on 3 November Salisbury replied that both on this account and because Inger had been arrested in a theatre of operations where military law was in force, the Capitulations could give him no protection from trial by Court Martial.[5]

This decision was communicated to Suakin, and on 6 November a draft of the charges against Inger was telegraphed to Cairo. The charges were : " endeavouring to treacherously hold converse with the enemy " ; and (on the strength of the Arabic drill-books) " endeavouring to treacherously give assistance to the enemy".[6] But by the following day Cromer had already made up his mind " not to assemble any Court Martial, for the present, at all events". A Court of Inquiry was to be set up " to collect evidence and to record any statement which the prisoner may wish to make ;" and further action would be decided after consideration of the findings of this Court.[7] The Court opened on 9 November, and lasted until 12 November, but its proceedings seem to have been conducted in a somewhat perfunctory manner. Evidence of arrest was taken at considerable—perhaps excessive—length; but no attempt was made to cross-question Inger on his statements—not even when they conflicted with his answer to one of the few questions put by the Court.[8] Indeed, Miralai Parsons

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[1] The typed draft of this Appendix is in File 268.

[2] File 268, Decypher No. 172, Suakin to D.M.I., 31 October 1896.

[3] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4765, Decypher No. 263, Cromer to Salisbury 1 November 1896.

[4] Ibid., Decypher No. 265, Cromer to Salisbury, 2 November. A similar statement is made by Slatin (Report of 17 December, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896—F.O. 78/4763). Yet Inger possessed an Austrian passport, visaed by an Austro-Hungarian Consul (C.S. File 268, Decypher No. 173, Suakin to Mukhabarat, 1 November).

[5] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 141/320, Salisbury to Cromer No. 118, 3 November 1896.

[6] File 268, Decypher No. 180, Suakin to Mukhabarat, 6 November 1896.

[7] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 135, 7 November, 1896.

[8] Concerning the instructions received from Paris by M. Boutiron. (See File 268, proceedings of the Court of Inquiry).

evidently felt some sympathy for his rather pathetic prisoner, and pleaded with the Cairo authorities in his favour. In a postscript to his despatch of 10 November Parsons said that he no longer considered that the drill-books were specially devised for the improvement of Mahdist tactics. In his opinion, they were simply standard infantry training manuals translated into Arabic. And when forwarding Inger's written statement to Cairo on the 11th, he remarks : " In my opinion Karl Inger has been misguided, has no occupation as an adventurer—possessed of a certain amount of military knowledge but devoid of all common sense". In a further passage which has been so heavily deleted as to be barely legible he appears to urge that the graver charges against Inger should not be pressed.[1] Lamb, in his letter of 10 November to Boyle, expressed a similar conclusion in less sympathetic terms. For Lamb, Inger was " a poor dreamer of unrealisable dreams who is quite beneath our vengeance", and he thought that " the most dignified course " would be to hand him over to his Consulate.[2] After reading these reports, Cromer hesitated no longer. With his more complete knowledge of Inger's activities, he may not have agreed entirely with Parsons' charitable view. But it was clearly not worth while risking friction with a friendly Power in order to punish with the utmost rigour of the law so incompetent a conspirator. Without awaiting the findings of the Court of Inquiry, he decided that there was no need to try " by Court Martial, or indeed by any other tribunal " this " impecunious and probably half-witted adventurer". He proposed to Salisbury that Inger " should be sent to any port in Europe to which he may desire to proceed".[3] Baron Heidler, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Cairo, was consulted, and he agreed that Inger should be embarked from Suez on the Austrian Lloyd S.S. " Imperatrix."[4] These instructions were duly sent to Suakin,[5] and on 7 December Inger was embarked under escort on the S.S. " Beheira " from Suakin for Suez. At Suez he was to be handed over to the custody of Slatin, who was to hold him *incommunicado* (except for a visit by Baron Heidler), until the " Imperatrix " was ready to sail for Trieste. The " Imperatrix " sailed on 12 December ; and by the 15th she (and Inger) had cleared Port Said.[6]

After leaving the " Beheira", Inger discovered that he had left behind him " in the bath room . . . of which the window is not broken", a " small leather charm". His distress was so great that Wingate began to suspect

[1] File 268, Parsons' reports Int. R. Sc. Confl. 201 of 10 November, and S.D. SCR 144 of 11 November.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Lamb to Boyle, 10 November (enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 139 Confidential, 16 November).

[3] Ibid., Cromer to Salisbury, No. 139 Confidential, 16 November.

[4] Ibid., Slatin's report of 17 December, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 156 Confidential, 21 December.

[5] File 268, Cypher Secret No. 1248, Mukhabarat to Suakin, 3 December 1896.

[6] Ibid,. loc. cit. ; and Cypher No. 220, Mukhabarat to Suakin, 15 December.

that this object contained some important document, and ordered Parsons to make a thorough search for it.[1] Wingate's suspicions were not perhaps quite so gratuitous as might be supposed. The anonymous informant had asserted that Inger was the bearer, not only of the maps and drill-books which were actually found in his possession, but also of a " commission verbale de leur (i.e. aux Mahdistes) offrir des armes de la part des Français "[2] — a document which never came to light, and which no doubt even Inger would have taken care to destroy had he ever really possessed it. Inger must have concealed his " leather charm " at the time of his arrest, for it does not appear in the inventory of his effects which was then made, and which must have been in Wingate's hands by this time. The careful concealment of this article and Inger's exaggerated distress at its loss might well be the clue to the missing—and highly incriminating—document. The memento was in fact found ; but its importance to Inger was evidently sentimental not political. It contained nothing but " a metal coin and gold charm in (the) shape of a heart."[3]

If the *Eclair* is to be believed, Inger must have made another visit to Paris on his return to Europe ; but nothing more was heard of him in Egypt until 21 March 1897, when he obligingly announced in the *Courrier d'Egypte* his intention of making a further attempt to enter the Sudan. This announcement was not overlooked by the Intelligence Department, and on 23 March Slatin wrote to Parsons requesting that a sharp look-out be kept for Inger, " who may probably attempt to go to Suakin incognito".[4]

But Inger had evidently learned to avoid Suakin. His attempt of 1897 was made through Djibouti and Abyssinia, presumably with French connivance. According to Wingate's report in the *Précis of Information* on Abyssinia, Inger had first landed at Zeila, but had been turned back by the Assistant British Resident there.[5] He had then moved on to Djibouti and had presumably received French permission to proceed into the interior. Whether the French were also prepared to sponsor him with the Abyssinian authorities does not transpire ; the fact that Inger actually set out on his journey is not conclusive evidence, particularly as Inger was always apt to be impatient with formalities which delayed his plans. It seems clear, however, that the French were still prepared to countenance Inger even after the Suakin fiasco. Moreover, the Governor of the French Somali Coast in 1897 was M. Lagarde, without doubt the Lagarde whom Inger claimed to have met in Paris during the Summer of 1896.

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[1] Ibid., Cypher No. 220, 15 December.

[2] Ibid. Anonymous letter No 1, 8 November 1896. (It is clear from the context that the " commission verbale " was supposed to be a *written* document. Cf. for asimilar usage, " note verbale " and " procès-verbal ").

[3] Ibid., Parsons to Wingate (letter), 16 December 1896.

[4] Ibid., Slatin to Parsons (letter), 23 March 1897.

[5] Op. cit., p. 17.

Unfortunately for himself, Inger chose to set out on his journey at the very time when the British mission to Abyssinia was returning from Addis Ababa to the coast. On 6 June 1897 at a place called Sharsharbeh, about one and a half stages to the East of Harar, he suddenly found himself face to face with the English party, which of course included the redoubtable Wingate himself.[1] " He no doubt cursed the bad luck which led the ubiquitous Englishman once more to cross his path on a lonely trail in Africa".[2] The efforts of the stranger to avoid the British aroused suspicion; and he was stopped, identified and interrogated by their Intelligence Officer, Capt. Count Gleichen. Inger was wearing " oriental dress", and was travelling with two companions, believed to be a Frenchman and a Greek, " but he was very guarded in his conversation". " Being in Abyssinian territory, it was impossible to stop them, but a note was despatched back to Ras Makunnen (of Harar) to warn him against entertaining any friendly feelings towards them".[3] In his summary of this incident, Wingate asserts that Inger had given " solemn assurances on his release from Suakin to abandon all idea of entering the Sudan", but was now undoubtedly making an attempt to reach the Sudan through Abyssinia with the connivance of the French. " His movements will, in all probability, be guided by French interests".. In a footnote dated 21 July 1897, Wingate reports with satisfaction that Inger had in fact been sent back to the coast by the Abyssinian authorities at Harar.[4]

This second fiasco seems to complete the tale of Inger's doings as a Mahdist Amir, for he does not seem to have ventured again into the Red Sea littoral. Towards the end of 1897 he was in Budapest, where he notified the Turkish Consul-General of his plan to set up the Khalifa as Sultan of Nubia under Ottoman suzerainty. But "Loutfi Bey, rightly judging the man to be a compound of madman and adventurer", refused to have anything to do with him, warned the Porte not to listen to his pretensions, and also informed his English colleague Beauclerk of Inger's intrigues.[5] At about the same time Inger was denounced to a wider public in the columns of the *Pester Lloyd*. A letter from Cairo gave an account of the career of this " sham Mussulman", an account which seems from Beauclerk's summary to have been spiteful but not inaccurate, apart from a picturesque embellishment to the effect that Inger had been sentenced by the English to eighteen years' imprisonment for espionage, but had afterwards been released as a lunatic and banished from Egypt.[6] The name of the Cairo

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[1] Ibid., p. 133.

[2] Rodd, op. cit., p. 184.

[3] *Précis of Information*, p. 133 ; Rodd, op. cit., p. 183.

[4] *Précis of Information*, p. 17. According to Rodd (op. cit., p. 184) " Wingate had his (Inger's) dossier by heart."

[5] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 141/332, Beauclerk to Rumbold, No. 23 Confidential, 25 May 1898. (Beauclerk was Consul-General at Budapest ; Rumbold, Ambassador at Vienna).

[6] Ibid., loc. cit.

correspondent is not mentioned; but it is surely no hazardous conjecture that sees Wingate's anonymous informant at work again.

But Inger had not entirely lost interest in the scene of his previous activities ; by May 1898 he had hatched a new African scheme in which Inger the Peacemaker, now promoted to royal rank, is replaced by Inger the commercial entrepreneur. In that month he was to be observed " driving ostentatiously about the town " of Budapest, dressed in European clothes but wearing a *tarbush*. He gave out that he had been " in confidential relations with the Mahdi (i.e., the Khalifa) as one of his superior officers"; and, what was more, that he had recently been chosen by the Somali shaikhs as " King " of that part of Somaliland which had not yet been brought under European influence. As an enlightened monarch, Inger was concerned for the economic welfare of his subjects ; and he was anxious to interest the Hungarian Minister of Commerce, and commercial circles generally, in a plan for promoting trade between Europe and Somaliland. Needless to say, Inger needed financial assistance before anything could be done, and it was even rumoured that he had " received a sum of money for this purpose " ; but Beauclerk considered it " more than doubtful whether he will succeed with his absurd proposals". [1]

Beauclerk's prediction seems to have been fulfilled ; for by August 1899, Inger was in London. Here he attempted to enlist support for his Somaliland scheme from Harrington, who was on leave from Addis Ababa, where he was the British diplomatic representative. Inger " favoured " Harrington " with a considerable number of interviews " [2], and explained his proposals in a letter of great length and little coherence. [3] He said that he had formed a company in Hungary,[4] in which the " engl. Vice-consul " and the " hung. Minister President " had interested themselves. But he had now abandoned his Hungarian connections ; and in order " to acquire the whole and entire benevolence from the high engl. Government", he hastened to offer to that Government important political and commercial advantages in Somaliland. He was at pains to point out that his " activity in the last years has been only for the high engl. Government's interests " ; impressions to the contrary were due to his many enemies who had " placed (him) in a very bad light". Inger laid stress upon his alleged Islamic origins ; he claimed to have been " born in Hungary from a mohamedan family" [5], and said that his grandfather had died " as Moslim in Turquei". Besides developing the commerce of Somaliland, Inger

[1] Ibid., loc. cit.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/36, Harrington to Maxwell, Private, 31 August 1899.

[3] Ibid., Enclosure, Inger to Harrington, 26 August 1899.

[4] He calls it an " auction " ; meaning, presumably, " société par actions."

[5] But Inger's Army record gives his religion as Roman Catholic. (Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv), letter No. 2867/1952, 15 September 1952.)

also proposed to regenerate the world of Islam. " I have a modern education and I will start the path for all the Moslims, so that they are able to come nearer to culture".

The details of his scheme, even if they could be elicited from the confused farrago of his letter, are hardly worth describing. Briefly, he claimed to have great influence with the Somali shaikhs (though he no longer called himself " king ") ; and to be in a position to offer a variety of commercial concessions to the British Government. In some way which is far from clear, the " Somalination " was also to assist in closing " the gap that is between Rhodesia and the present position on the Midle-Nile". He concludes by assuring the high engl. Government of his entire devotion, whether or not it accepted his proposals. The letter is signed " Amir Soliman Inger " ; but on this occasion Inger tactfully refrained from alluding to his exploits in the service of the Khalifa. Harrington did not of course take these proposals seriously: but he expressed the opinion that Inger was " an undesirable person to have anywhere on the East Coast even with a commercial object" [1]

Not long afterwards, Inger seems to have returned to Hungary and to have settled down permanently to the life of a landed gentleman in Transylvania. The only real mystery about him is perhaps the source of the wealth which enabled him to acquire a " castle " and considerable estates. It is indeed far from clear how he contrived to live during his wanderings from 1895 to 1899 ; when he was arrested at Suakin his total cash resources amounted to 32 " dollars". [2] His activities as an adventurer seem to have been uniformly unprofitable ; and to do Inger justice, there is no reason to believe that he hoped to turn his intervention in the affairs of the Sudan to personal financial gain. It is of course possible that the family business of shoemaking was on an industrial scale, and that in due course Inger inherited a sizeable fortune. But this remains conjecture, for so far no information at all has been forthcoming on this subject.

However, Inger's retirement does not appear to have been complete. In the early years of the first World War, and the period immediately preceding it, he seems to have maintained, or resumed, certain connections with Turkey ; nor was he entirely forgotten in the Sudan. In April 1915 a German spy was arrested in Egypt ; among those known to have been his former associates " Soloman Inger " was mentioned. The press reports of this incident inspired a certain William Thompson to write to

[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/36. loc. cit.

[2] File 268, Inventory of Inger's effects annexed to the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. The anonymous informant asserts that Inger lived by exploiting the affections of elderly ladies. (Ibid., Anonymous letter No. 3.)

Sir George Arthur (then Private Secretary to Earl Kitchener) with further information about Inger.[1] Thompson had met Inger in Constantinople in 1914 ; the latter was ostensibly on business, but in fact devoted much of his time to political intrigue. According to Thompson, Inger, together with two Germans, Baron Otto von Gumpenberg and Baron von Bentheim, had been with Enver Bey in Tripoli — presumably during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12. Thompson though that the " Hungarian adventurer . . . known as the Emir Suleyman " was " the most dangerous man of the lot", and much more to be feared than von Gumpenberg, on whose head the Egyptian Government had put a price of L.E. 40. He was a Muhammadan and " really an Emir " (although this dignity had by now, it seems, been acquired in Morocco and not in the Sudan). " He is intelligent and capable; is very vain and loves to play a leading part in any important undertaking. I think it is most probable he would be utilised by the enemy in any nefarious scheme against us in Egypt . . " Thompson's characterisation of Inger as " intelligent and capable " is perhaps an example (and not the only one) of Inger's ability to cut a fairly impressive figure on slight acquaintance.

Thompson also gives a detailed personal description of Inger, which tallies well enough with the more laconic information dating from the Suakin period, and which is perhaps worth recording for the very vivid picture which it gives of Inger's physical appearance. " The Emir Suleyman", says Thompson, " is about 44 years old (47 would have been nearer the mark) about 5 ft. 9 & ½ in. in height, fair and very handsome, has fine light blue eyes, generally soft in expression, a rather long pointed nose and a very well shaped mouth with beautifully even small teeth. His moustache is fair and about 3 in. long, worn horizontal with a slight curve upwards. He is very proud of it and would dislike to sacrifice it ; in disguise he would probably wear it drooping. Seen without his Fez, his head is not large, his forehead is low in front and his hair rather thick and turning grey. His ears are pointed on the upper edge and the whole face reminded me of the classical ' faun ' ".

A copy of Thompson's letter was forwarded to the Sudan Intelligence Department through the G.O.C. Egypt [2]; and one Ibrahim Dimitri, who " was performing the duties of Intelligence Officer at Suakin " at the time of Inger's arrest in 1896, was called upon for a statement. This statement contains nothing new except a claim by Dimitri that he personally effected the arrest near Handub — a claim that is flatly contradicted by all the contemporary evidence.[3] Shortly afterwards, descriptions of the three enemy agents — one of them " reminiscent of the classical ' faun ' " — were circulated to Governors of Provinces, and to Inspectors of Districts

[1] C.S. Archives ; File ADI/448-31-1915, Thompson to Sir G. Arthur (copy), dated 28 April 1915. (I have not succeeded in identifying this William Thompson.)

[2] Ibid., War Office to G.O.C. Egypt (copy) dated 4 May 1915.

[3] Ibid., Memorandum by Ibrahim Dimitri, 8 June, 1915.

on the Abyssinian frontier, whence enemy agents were most likely to enter the Sudan.[1]

This circular produced no immediate results ; but almost exactly a year later there was, for the last time, an " Inger scare " in the Sudan : an episode which, though he himself took no part whatever in it, nevertheless ends in the farcical anti-climax which seems to be typical of all Inger's activities. In June 1916 the frontier Shaikh Abu Shotal, to whom descriptions of the wanted men had been circulated, reported to Inspector Roseires the presence at Qubba, near the Abyssinian frontier, of " El Amir Suleiman " and an Austrian whose name he did not know. The information was duly passed to Governor Singa and to the Assistant Director of Intelligence at Khartoum.[2] It was suspected that " El Amir Suleiman " was Inger, and immediate enquiries were ordered,[3] the results of which were not long in forthcoming. The mysterious strangers were in fact Yamani merchants who, having completed their commercial transactions (the sale of garlic), had " returned to the interior of Abyssinia " before the Government intelligence agents could catch up with them.[4]

The outbreak of the first World War did indeed stimulate Inger to offer his services to his country, though not exactly in the capacity feared by the Sudan Government. In a letter dated 2 September 1914 and signed "Emir Suleyman ibn Inger Abdullah", he informed the Austrian War Ministry of his exploits as a Mahdist Amir (it is charitable to suppose that by this time he believed in them himself) and pointed out that by virtue of his varied military experience and Muslim connections, he was in a position to carry out an important and decisive military operation against Serbia in the Balkan theatre. Or, alternatively, he could play a similar part in the Caucasus, where the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, 'Izzet Pasha, was one of his personal friends. But the War Ministry took no action to avail itself of this remarkable offer. Inger wrote once more to the War Ministry, apparently for the last time, in January 1917 ; and on this occasion the military authorities at Vienna thought it worth while making enquiries about the ex-officer who signed himself " Emir Suleyman ibn Inger Abdullah". The upshot of these enquiries was that Inger was a harmless crank, and the matter was allowed to drop. He was described to the War Ministry at that time as a religious enthusiast and as a man of exalted and eccentric ideals (" . . . als religioser Phantast, als Mann mit exaltierter, idealistischer Natur . . . ") who lived like a recluse in his castle and occupied himself with the administration of his estates.[5] Evidently he had by this time given

[1] Ibid., A.D.I./448 of 13 June, 1915.

[2] Ibid., Inspector Roseires to Governor Singa, 10 June, 1916 ; Governor Singa to A.D.I. Khartoum, 11 June 1916.

[3] Ibid., A.D.I. Khartoum to Governor Singa, 12 June 1916.

[4] Ibid., Governor Singa to A.D.I. Khartoum, 2 July 1916; same to same, 15 July, 1916.

[5] Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv), Letter No. 2867/1952, 15 September 1952.

up his Turkish intrigues—or else had learned to cover his tracks at least well enough to hoodwink the Hungarian police.

Yet, whatever else was spurious about Inger, his conversion to Islam seems at least to have been genuine. Just when and how this conversion took place is not clear. He was already calling himself Sulaiman while at Cairo in the Summer of 1896.[1] Bimbashi Fadli's evidence about his behaviour on the S.S. " Mohalla " might seem to indicate that his conversion was a little half-hearted ; yet it may not be entirely fanciful to detect Islamic influence in some of his turns of phrase, particularly in the Suakin statement. (E.g., " . . . quit the wickedness of this world . . . " ; " . . . trust to God's aid. and if I were not predestined to die . . . "). However this may be (and I do not press the point) there is no doubt that in 1917 Inger published an exposition of the Quran entitled " Der Wahre Glaube "—" The True Faith".[2]

There seems to be no foundation for the story that in 1935 Inger wrote to the League of Nations requesting that he should be restored to the Governorship of his former province in Abyssinia. The European Office of the United Nations has been good enough to inform me that no communication from Karl Inger can be traced in the archives of the League.[3]

Inger evidently died about the beginning of September 1935 : but the exact date of his death is unknown to me. The notice in *The Observer*, so prolific in fiction, omits to mention this fact, which must have been easy enough to ascertain at the time.

It would, I think, be a mistake to regard Inger as a calculating and systematic imposter. He seems originally to have assumed the role of Mahdist emissary without premeditation, in order to improve his chances of obtaining support from the French. Once he had chosen his part in this way, its importance grew steadily in his own mind, for he seems to have lived in a private world where realities could be ignored ; and his reckless mendacity was probably the result not so much of a planned scheme of deception as of a reluctance (which may well have finally developed into an inability) to distinguish between his fantasies and the real world. His fantastic claims apart, Inger was ingenuous to the point of simple-mindedness. He seems to have been completely unaware of the dangerous implications of his own actions and statements ; and this lack of guile, together with his total inability to assess the facts of a situation, made him a farcically incompetent conspirator. He was perhaps not quite so misguided and innocent as Miralai Parsons in the goodness of his heart believed him to be ; but it is impossible not to feel a certain sympathy for this muddle-headed romantic, whose grandiose pretensions masked a succession of ludicrous failures.

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[1] File 268, Anonymous letter No. 2, 9 November 1896.

[2] Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv). No. 2867/1952.

[3] Letter dated 8 September 1952.

Karl Inger and Ximenes.

Wingate's anonymous informant supplies so much interesting information about Inger and his associates—not least about Inger's dealings with the French—that an attempt to identify him seemed to be worth the making. The evidence seems conclusive that the letters were in fact written by the M. Ximenes of whom Inger has so much to say. It is possible to collect a few miscellaneous pieces of information about Ximenes — a character as bizarre in his way as Inger himself ; but he seems to have belonged to a profession which shuns publicity, and the meagre record thus revealed is no more than an enigmatic footnote to the history of international rivalry in the Nile Valley.

Inger himself was quite convinced that Ximenes was the author of the letters in which his plans were betrayed and his personal character scurrilously attacked. [1] The Intelligence Department seems to have concurred in this opinion, for against the passage of Parsons' report [2] which records this conviction, there may be observed a pencil line and a faint " tick " — presumably added by the recipient.

An examination of the letters themselves also supports this view. The four which survive are without date, address, salutation or signature. Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are in their original envelopes ; and as letters and envelopes were numbered on receipt, these can be can be dated from the postmark. The envelope of No. 3 has disappeared. The letters are written in French in neat " script " characters ; whoever wrote them was evidently experienced enought to suppress the more obvious clues which could lead to formal proof of his identity. The French is however not quite perfect ; and (so far as I can judge) the mistakes are those of a foreigner rather than the illiteracies of an ill-educated Frenchman. There is nothing in the form and style of the letters at least which is inconsistent with their having been written by Ximenes who was, according to his own statement to Inger, a Spaniard.[3] The author is also minutely informed about the movements and actions of Inger and his friends in Egypt. He gives precise details of Inger's changes of address, and even of telegrams which Inger had sent ; and he urges the Intelligence Department to verify this information by examining hotel registers and telegraph office records. He knew all about the drill-books, and accurately described a photostatic map of French origin which was duly found in Inger's possession at Suakin.[4] He inculpates a number of Inger's acquaintances who were alleged to be involved in the plot—the

[1] " A Tanger il (Inger) exerça le métier de rufian, vivant aux crochets d'une vieille anglaise. Au Caire il exploita une vieille italienne. " (File 268, Anonymous letter No. 3.)

[2] Ibid., Parsons' report Int. R. Sc. Confl. 201, 10 November 1896.

[3] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Inger's written statement to Slatin, 10 December, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896.

[4] File No. 268, Anonymous letters Nos. 1 and 2.

Hungarian Lekisch [1], a M. Lesieur of *L'Echo d'Orient* [2] and a certain Hans Resener, who had published in the German and Austrian Press " les plus odieuses vilenies contre Kitchener Pacha, contre Wingate bey et contre Slatin Pacha, ainsi que . . . contre Lord Cromer "; and whose brochure in German on the iniquities of the English occupation had recently been translated into French for publication in Cairo. [3] In fact, the only known intimate of Inger who is not mentioned in the letters is Ximenes himself. Unless we gratuitously assume the existence of some person unknown who was in Inger's confidence to the same degree as Ximenes, and who for reasons equally unknown was anxious to shield the latter, it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that Ximenes was Wingate's anonymous informant.

But just who and what was Ximenes ?

He was known to Rodd as a secret agent of the Sultan; and Rodd seems to have thought for a time that Ximenes was the moving spirit of the conspiracy and Inger merely his agent. [4] His status as a correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge* was verified by Inger while in Paris. (He was however paid by the line, and not a regular employee). [5] He had attempted to raise money for the Omdurman expedition from the widow of the Marquis de Morès, from Prince Polignac and from Prince Henri d'Orléans ; the Marquise de Morès and Polignac had expressed sympathy with the objects of the scheme, but neither they nor Prince Henri had contributed any money. [6] In Paris Ximenes maintained an agent, Captain Ducharic, who was supposed to be able to raise funds through his influence with a ministerial family, but who was not apparently informed of the details of Ximenes' schemes. [7] Inger claims to have been the first to reveal the duplicity of Ximenes to the French Government ; but he also says that he was warned by M. Boutiron " to be most careful", as Boutiron " knew nothing but bad about Ximenes". [8] Inger also alleges that when he returned to Egypt, Ximenes uttered threats against his life, and also threatened to

[1] Ibid., Letter No. 2.

[2] Ibid., Letter No. 3.

[3] Ibid., Letters Nos. 2 and 4. (Hans Resener's publication and its French translation appear in the B.M. Catalogue of Printed Books, Supplement, Vol. 9. The titles are : *Agypten unter englischer Okkupation und die agyptische Frage* (Berlin 1896); and *L'Egypte sous l'occupation anglaise et la question égyptienne* (Le Caire 1896).

[4] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4770, Memo. by Rodd, 7 November 1896.

[5] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Inger's statement of 10 December to Slatin; Slatin's report of 17 December, enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury No. 156 Confidential of 21 December 1896. The *Indépendance Belge* was, at least in 1894, " generally believed to be often inspired direct from Paris." (*P.R.O.*, F.O. 10/614, Plunkett to Rosebery, No. 4 Africa, 7 January 1894).

[6] *P.R.O.*, FO. 78/4763, loc. cit.

[7] Ibid., Inger's written statement to Slatin, dated 10 December 1896.

[8] Ibid., Inger's statement.

denounce him to the French Government as a Prussian spy. As a result a bitter quarrel took place in the course of which Ximenes was manhandled and horsewhipped by Inger and Lekisch –if Inger's highly-coloured account is to be believed. [1]

The incompetence of Ximenes' proceedings as described by Inger may well be exaggerated ; it is not easy to reconcile this account with the careful and systematic denunciations contained in the anonymous letters, nor with the sustained interest in Ximenes which was shewn by the British authorities in both London and Cairo. Cromer drew the attention of Lord Salisbury especially to Inger's " exposure of the procedure of Monsieur Ximenes (which) will, I venture to think, be of interest to Your Lordship". [2] Nor did the British lose interest in him after 1896. In the *Précis of Information* on Abyssinia, Wingate remarks that Inger's " former companion M. Ximenes was in Aden when the British Mission returned to that place". (i.e., on 16 June 1897). He had visited several of the Red Sea ports ; and " He is, in all probability, carrying on a system of secret service ; but his resources are evidently not plentiful, as he was unable to pay his hotel bill in Aden". [3] Again, in October 1898, the Foreign Office thought it worth while to warn Cairo that Ximenes had " been ordered by his employers to proceed from Aden to Egypt and thence up the Nile". [4] Ximenes, in spite of his chronic inability to pay hotel bills, was evidently considered important enough to be worth watching and reporting on.

Inger appears to have believed that Ximenes' treachery was prompted by personal spite — spite at being exposed to the French as a fraud, and at being publicly humiliated in the course of his quarrel with Inger. Certainly, Ximenes bore Inger a bitter grudge, and his rancour (it seems) even pursued Inger into Hungary over a year later. But Inger's explanation of this grudge is not altogether convincing. Especially in view of M. Boutiron's remarks, it is not easy to believe that Ximenes enjoyed very much credit with the French even before Inger's revelations; still less that he really expected to obtain, through the ministerial father-in-law, 20,000 francs for a scheme whose details were not even known to his own agent in Paris. And if his motives were merely personal, why did he denounce, not only Inger and Lekisch, but all who were remotely connected with the affair, including the journalists Lesieur and Resener ?

Ximenes was evidently a man of many interests—a Turkish " agent " of Spanish extraction, who was a correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge*, whose " representative " in Paris was (presumably) a French military

[1] Ibid., Inger's Statement.

[2] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896.

[3] Op. cit., p. 17.

[4] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 141/336, F.O. to Rodd, 1 October 1898.

officer ; and who was prepared to betray his " friend " in order to provide the British authorities with information of some importance. It is, moreover, difficult to avoid the conclusion that he decided at an early stage that there was more to be got from the British by encouraging the plot and then denouncing it, than from the French by attempting to carry it through—though if he could get 20,000 francs on the strength of mere promises, so much the better. No doubt he saw that under Inger's leadership no expedition, least of all the one contemplated, was at all likely to be successful. His reasons for dissuading Inger from going to Paris, and the causes of the curiously melodramatic quarrel which followed Inger's return to Egypt, may be variously judged. But it is quite clear that Ximenes was originally an active instigator of the "scheme"; and that when Inger had finally set out, he denounced it in great detail to the British. " The procedure of Monsier Ximenes", obscure though some of its details may be, reveals for a moment an underworld of international politics which rarely emerges into official documents, and in usually discreetly ignored (in the nineteenth century at least) when biographies and memoirs come to be written.

Karl Inger and the French.

An attempt is made in the following section :—

(i) To identify, and to assess the political importance of, the contacts made by Inger in France.

(ii) To establish how far the French were prepared to go in countenancing Inger, and to what extent they took seriously his claim to be an authorised envoy of the Khalifa.

(iii) To review, in the light of the Inger episodes, and of other relevant material, published and unpublished, certain features of French policy in the struggle for the control of the Upper Nile. In particularly, to examine the relations between the French, the Negus Menelik and the Khalifa 'Abdallahi ; and the policy and proceedings of M. Lagarde, Governor of Obock and French representative at Addis Ababa.

The conclusions reached, except under (i), are to a greater or less extent tentative and provisional ; and the degree of confidence with which I put them forward varies considerably. For instance, I think that the evidence which has now become available demands a re-interpretation of Menelik's policy in the sense I indicate ; but on the other hand I should not claim that I had completely solved the riddle of M. Lagarde's curious behaviour. Indeed, I rather suspect that I have exaggerated the element of consistency and conscious reflection in his policy. Considering the importance of the part he played during the crucial years 1896-1898, remarkably little seems to be known about Lagarde; [1] but the completion

[1] Cf. Brunschwig, H., in *Revue Historique*, No. 424, Oct.-Dec. 1952, p. 274-5.

of this gap in our knowledge must await the opening of the French Foreign Ministry's archives for these years—an event which it appears will not be long delayed.

The aristocratic acquaintances made by Inger in Paris do not play any important part in the story. The widow of the Marquis de Morès was convinced that her husband had been killed at the instigation of the English by agents of Rabih Zubair, and was happy to support (though not financially) any project calculated to injure English interests. Prince Polignac, too, " thoroughly approved of the idea of making the Sudan an independent state under French protection " ; but he referred Inger to the Government for money, advising him " not to sell his life to them as cheaply as his late friend Morès " who had gone to his death " for the paltry sum of 60,000 francs granted by the Government". The Prince also complained bitterly of the Republican parsimony which failed to support *la veuve Marquise*, the relict of an aristocrat who had died for France. [1]

In Paris Inger also met Mustafa Kamil, the Egyptian nationalist leader, and asked to be introduced to Mustafa's influential friends. But the cautious Egyptian seems to have been unimpressed ; he refused to give Inger any introductions, nor would he be even reveal the names of his political patrons. Inger seems to have picked a quarrel with him, accusing him of lukewarmness in the Cause; Mustafa countered by referring — presumably ironically, though Inger certainly did not see the irony—to Inger's remarkable readiness to risk his life for the sake of Egypt. [2]

Inger told the Court of Inquiry that he had forgotten the name of one of the French officials with whom he discussed his plans. The other two were a M. Borel, Borelle, or Borelli of the *ministère des Affaires Etrangères* (described in Slatin's report as an " Under-Secretary of State ") ; and a M. Lagarde of the *ministère des Colonies*. There was no "*sous-secrétaire d'Etat*" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1896 ; but Inger's " M. Borel " must be Hippolyte-Armand-Maurice Borel (1860-1916), who had in May 1896 been appointed *sous-chef de cabinet* to the Minister, Gabriel Hanotaux. [3] Borel's position as a personal aide to Hanotaux lends verisimilitude to Inger's assertion that the Minister had approved of his " scheme "; at all events, Hanotaux would probably at least have been informed of it, and it will be interesting to see whether his *Carnets*, if they are ever published in full, contain any refe ence to "Soliman Inger".

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[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 78/4763, Slatin's report of 17 December enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 156 Confidential, 21 December 1896. Polignac's alleged statement concerning the subsidy to Morès is interesting ; the French Government officially disavowed this expedition.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République française pour* 1907 *et* 1908 (Paris, 1908), p. 163. Evidently either Inger or Slatin had misunderstood the term " sous-chef de cabinet."

Borel, whose final appointment was that of First Secretary at the Brussels Embassy (May 1899), seems to have been a correct (and not particularly distinguished) professional diplomat whose career has attracted little attention whether in his own lifetime or later. But Inger's M. Lagarde of " the Ministry of Colonial Affairs " is a much more interesting person. For he can hardly be other than Antoine-Marie-Joseph-Léonce Lagarde (1860-1936), the Governor of Obock already referred to, and a famous, not to say notorious, figure in French colonial history. He began his career in 1881 as an attaché at the Vatican; but he soon relinquished this appointment for service in Indo-China, and on his return from the Far East in 1884, he was, at the age of 23, appointed Governor of Obock (French Somali Coast).[1] Without apparently relinquishing this post, he became successively "attaché au cabinet de M. Félix Faure, ministre de la Marine " (and later President), in 1894 ; and " secrétaire général au ministère des Colonies " under André Lebon in 1896.[2] He seems indeed to have spent very little time at his insalubrious overseas post in the years immediately before 1897,[3] but he retained his Governorship and the salary that went with it.[4]

In March 1895 the Negus Menelik had opened negotiations with the French Government for closer diplomatic relations between France and Abyssinia, invoking the treaty of 1843 between Louis-Philippe and the King of Shoa.[5] During the Italo-Abyssinian war the French had shewn considerable reserve and had allowed the negotiations to hang fire; but in June 1896 President Faure informed Menelik that he was prepared to

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[1] *Annuaire diplomatique . . . pour* 1907 *et* 1908, p. 223 ; *Larousse du XXème Siècle*, s.v. " Lagarde, Léonce".

[2] Cocheris, Jules, *Situation internationale de l'Egypte et du Soudan*, (Paris, 1903), p. 588.

[3] Michel, a member of the " Mission de Bonchamps " which attempted to reach the White Nile from Abyssinia, asserts that over a period of two years Lagarde spent only eighteen days in the colony. (Michel, Charles, *Vers Fachoda à la rencontre de la Mission Marchand* (Paris, 1900), p. 37). This is perhaps an exaggeration; but it is clear from both published and unpublished French documents that during the period 1894-1897 Lagarde was far more frequently at Paris (or Vichy) than at Obock.

[4] Michel (op. cit., p. 28-9) prints an extract from the Obock budget in which Lagarde is described as " gouverneur d'Obock et secrétaire-général au ministère des colonies."

[5] *D.D.F.*, Ie Série, Tome XII, No. 99, p. 129, footnote; Ferry, René, " L'Ethiopie et l'expansion européenne en Afrique orientale," in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, Tome XXV (1910), p. 27.

begin active discussions for a commercial and political treaty.[1] A diplomatic mission to Addis Ababa was organised, and in November Lagarde was appointed as its leader.[2] By mid-December Lagarde and his mission were on their way from France to Obock,[3] where they arrived on the 30th of the month.[4] Lagarde's presence in Paris in September 1896 cannot indeed be conclusively proved from these facts, but they make it extremely probable and thus tend to confirm Inger's story.

Lagarde's gift for administration was perhaps not great[5]; but he had an appetite for intrigue and personal power which might well make him interested in a scheme like Inger's. He is indeed an example of that exaggerated individualism, so common among French *coloniaux* of this period, which too often cheated of their just reward French military valour and French diplomatic finesse.[6] In particular Lagarde was determined to retain personal control of all French political activity in Abyssinia. The Bonvalot-De Bonchamps expedition to the White Nile was directly sponsored by the Colonial Minister, André Lebon, who requested Lagarde's co-operation in a written directive.[7] Lagarde not only declined to assist the mission in any way ; so far as possible he completely ignored its existence, and he resuscitated as a rival to it a mission of his own — a mission which after many months of inactivity was about to be dissolved, and whose leader Capt. Clochette was a chronic invalid in urgent need of repatriation.[8]

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[1] Ferry, loc.cit.

[2] Vignéras, Sylvain, *Une mission française en Abyssinie*, (Paris 1897), Introd., p.v. (Vignéras was a member of the mission). Cocheris (op. cit., p. 457-8) asserts that Lagarde was chosen to lead this mission in order to relieve André Lebon of an uncongenial subordinate.

[3] Intelligence Reports, Egypt, No 50, Appendix P. (The printed copy is dated 30 December, but it is clear from a draft preserved in C.S. File 268 that this Appendix was actually written about mid-December).

[4] Vignéras, op. cit., p. 1.

[5] Michel (op. cit., pp. 21-40) makes a bitter but well-documented attack upon the inefficiency and inertia of Lagarde's administration except in matters affecting official comfort. He also hints at grave financial corruption. Cf. Wingate in the *Précis of Information...*, p. 15.

[6] This was particularly marked in Abyssinia. Bonvalot quarrelled with Lagarde (Michel, op. cit., p. 94, 245) and with the semi-official French explorer Prince Henri d'Orléans (*Précis of Information* on Abyssinia, p. 15, 78). Cocheris states (op. cit., p. 457) that Lagarde and André Lebon were on bad terms, and Lagarde's behaviour seems to confirm this. But such difficulties were by no means confined to Abyssinia.

[7] Michel, (op. cit., p. 93-4) prints an extract from the ministerial instructions.

[8] Michel, op. cit., pp. 12-13, 17-18, 57, 91, 93-95, 242-247.

Both Michel and Cocheris hold Lagarde responsible for the failure of the plan to reinforce the Marchand Mission by way of Abyssinia.[1] This project may not indeed have been feasible under any circumstances ; but it is true that at no time did Lagarde make any serious attempt to give it effective support. His interest in Clochette seems to have been confined to ensuring that the latter should always be ahead of the Mission Bonvalot ; and this was done by hindering Bonvalot rather than by helping Clochette.[2] After the death of Clochette and the departure of Bonvalot in disgust, Bonvalot's mission was re-organised under the Marquis de Bonchamps and placed under the direct authority of Lagarde.[3] But even though the members of the mission were now no longer " entachés du péché originel "[4], Lagarde's support remained unenthusiastic. He ordered the mission to found a French and an Abyssinian " fortress " on the left and right banks of the White Nile respectively ; but he refused to provide any significant material aid, and in particular failed to forward from Djibouti the sectioned boat which had been specially consigned from France for the use of the expedition, and which alone could have rendered this programme possible.[5]

Michel implies that Lagarde failed to give any assistance because of his excessive interest in his own personal prestige, and because he wilfully ignored the difficulties which faced the expedition.[6] But there may also have been more respectable reasons for his behaviour. Lagarde may have understood more clearly than the Home Government the inconsistency of angling for the friendship of the Khalifa while at the same time inciting Menelik to to extend the area of his effective occupation to the " ancient frontiers " of Ethiopia on the White Nile.

On 14 Myazya 1883 (the equivalent Gregorian date is 21 April 1891, not 10 April as usually stated) Menelik had by proclamation to the Sovereigns of Europe defined his " actual frontiers " as running " from Karkoj . . . to the junction of the Sobat river with the White Nile. From thence the frontier follows the river Sobat . . . and reaches Lake Samburu" (Lake Rudolf). The proclamation continues : " While tracing to-day the actual boundaries of my Empire, I shall endeavour, if God gives me strength, to re-establish the ancient frontiers of Ethiopia up to Khartum . . . "[7] The French Government, in return for Menelik's

[1] Ibid p. 422 *et passim* ; Cocheris, op. cit., p. 457-8.

[2] Michel, op. cit., pp. 95, 115, 146-7.

[3] Ibid., p. 243.

[4] Ibid., p. 245. According to Michel these were Lagarde's own words.

[5] Ibid., p. 253-255 ; p. 243-4, 252. Cf. Langer, op. cit., p. 540 ff.

[6] Michel, op. cit., (e.g.) pp. 244, 246, 255, 391, 420. Rodd says that the French residents in Addis Ababa complained of Lagarde's " ungenial manner and vanity." (*P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury No. 41 Confidential, 22 June 1897).

[7] The *Précis of Information* on Abyssinia (Appendix A, p. 69-70) gives a translation of this document which purports to be " direct from the Amharic." Cf Langer, op. cit., p. 130.

active co-operation, offered the bait of their support for these territorial claims in terms which would nearly, if not quite, restore the somewhat visionary " ancient frontiers of Ethiopia "—although, when it came to the point, this support was expressed in language of a studied ambiguity. [1] But at the very moment when they were encouraging the Negus to take practical steps to assert these claims, in the White Nile — Sobat area at least, the French were also counting upon the establishment of friendly relations with the Khalifa as almost a necessary condition for the success of the Marchand Mission. The absurdity of this contradiction is plainly though unconsciously demonstrated in an article published by Paul Bourdarie in February 1898. [2] Here the revised frontiers of Abyssinia, extending along the White Nile as far as 14° N., are explicitly announced ; at the same time it is strongly hinted that an agreement had been, or shortly would be, concluded with the Khalifa. The author — if indeed he ever thought about it at all — must have imagined the Khalifa to be either remarkably ill-informed or remarkably long-suffering, for the Franco-Abyssinian advance to Fashoda is presented in his article as an accomplished fact. Indeed, M. Bourdarie has such confidence in 'Abdallahi's friendly feelings towards Marchand that he may very well have been a victim of the Inger legend which *L'Eclair* had disseminated in the previous October.

If Lagarde did see this contradiction, his behaviour becomes more comprehensible, for he may privately have decided that the Franco-Abyssinian expeditions were in any case unlikely to be successful, and had better be sacrificed to the need for securing the co-operation of the Khalifa. It is at all events clear enough that, without formally opposing the policy of his Government, he did nothing to help these expeditions even when they were under his own control ; but he does seem to have made more than one attempt to establish contact with the Khalifa. In 1897 we find Inger attempting to reach Omdurman by way of Abyssinia — a route which he could hardly have taken without the support of Lagarde. There is also the evidence of Muhammad 'Uthman al Hajj Khalid, one of the Khalifa's confidential emissaries to the Negus. Muhammad 'Uthman made a statement, of which only the translation survives,[3] to the Intelligence Officer of the Anglo-Egyptian forces on 15 September 1898. He asserts that in the month of Dhu al Qa'da 1315 (March-April 1898)

[1] See the " Convention pour le Nil Blanc " attached to the Franco-Abyssinian Treaty of 20 March 1897 (*infra*, p. 61).

[2] " Les missions Liotard-Marchand-de Bonchamps et la question du Nil " in *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, 15 February 1898, pp. 223-236.

[3] C.S. Archives, Mahdia 1/34, Folder 15.

two messengers reached the Khalifa with letters from Menelik.[1] One of these was a Jabarti (Abyssinian Muslim) in the service of Menelik, named Muhammad al Tayyib ; the other was 'Abdallahi's own envoy Muhammad Bushra. Besides the letters from Menelik, Muhammad al Tayyib brought with him for the Khalifa " a small flag of three colours " which had been given to him in the presence of the " French Consul". (Lagarde was in fact in Addis Ababa throughout the winter of 1897-98.[2]) " Menelik said . . . ' Take this flag ', and he pointed to the flag in the Consul's hand, ' and give it to the Khalifa, and tell him that if the English advance against him he is to fly it at the head of his army. When they see it they will do him no harm, and this will be the same if the French advance against him' ". (The flag was rejected with contumely by the Khalifa, who said " that if Heaven and Earth together should advance against him he would not accept the protection of a European Power. So Muhammad al Tayyib returned and with him the flag.") In fact, at a time when the fate of the Mission de Bonchamps was still unknown, and when it might indeed have already reached its objective,[3] we find Lagarde reverting to the alternative policy of attempting to win over the Khalifa. Taken together with the other indications of Lagarde's attitude, this fact certainly helps to substantiate Inger's assertion that authority for him to proceed to the Sudan by Djibouti and Abyssinia was in fact sent to M. Boutiron ; and such authority could hardly have been granted except with the concurrence of Lagarde. The behaviour of the French Consul at Jidda also suggests that he had received some positive instructions concerning Inger—he would hardly otherwise have hastened on board the " Mohalla " to greet an Austrian ex-Officer of no particular importance. And for the actions of the Consul at Jidda we have not merely Inger's own account, but also the independent testimony of Bimbashi Fadli, the Senior Medical Officer at Suakin.[4] The Consul's later refusal to acknowledge Inger is easily explicable if Inger refused to obey the instructions to proceed via Djibouti and obstinately persisted in going to Suakin or in trying to reach 'Uthman Diqna. It

[1] The translation makes Muhammad 'Uthman say that the two messengers *left Addis Ababa* in Dhu al Qa'da 1315 (March-April 1898). But this is scarcely possible. Muhammad al Tayyib and Muhammad Bushra, who arrived at Omdurman simultaneously or nearly so, were bearers of letters from Menelik dated 9 Ter 1890 (16 January 1898) and 7 Kiyahk 1890 (15 December 1897) respectively. The normal duration of a journey from Omdurman to Addis Ababa was three or four months. (See Mahdia 1/34, Folder 16).

[2] Michel, op. cit., p. 243, 420.

[3] In fact, on 30 December 1897, at the junction of the Baro and the Juba (Pibor), de Bonchamps was obliged to turn back on account of disease and lack of food. (Michel, op. cit., pp. 362-365). But this fact was not of course known in Addis Ababa until several weeks later.

[4] C.S. File 268, Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Bimbashi Fadli's Evidence.

was probably not difficult to foresee that Inger would be arrested, and that the English would question him ; it was therefore advisable for French official circles to have as little as possible to do with him.

I seems then extremely probable that Inger met Lagarde in Paris ; and that Lagarde encouraged him to carry out his " scheme ", or at least that part of it which involved offering French diplomatic backing to the Khalifa. Lagarde may have been the more ready to do this if, as I have suggested, Inger's plan coincided with his own ideas of the correct policy to be followed in the struggle for the control of the Upper Nile. It is not possible to say whether Lagarde ever believed that Inger was really an accredited representative of the Khalifa. But Inger was probably much more plausible as an " envoy " in September than as a prisoner in November. And however " devoid of all common sense " he may have been, he must have had a considerable talent for imposture, as his later career shews. He was moreover a professing Muslim with at least a fair working knowledge of Arabic and, thanks to his wanderings since 1895, a wide if superficial acquaintance with the politics of Egypt and of the Red Sea littoral. His views about the aims and policy of the Khalifa were doubtless fantastic ; but they were scarcely more so than those held in some of the highest French official circles. Even if Lagarde was not fully convinced he may well have thought it not impossible that Inger was somehow in contact with the Khalifa, and that his scheme was at least a chance it worth taking. There was little to be lost if Inger failed ; if he succeeded, would be something of a personal triumph for M. Lagarde.

Ximenes alleged that Inger carried a " commission verbale " to offer arms to the Mahdists on behalf of the French.[1] No such document was found among Inger's papers when he was arrested ; and at Suakin he volunteered the information that he had asked for no written credentials while in Paris. Whether this was a mere oversight or a deliberate decision he does not explain ; but in his statement to Slatin he describes his unsuccessful attempt to obtain written authority from M. Boutiron at Alexandria. There is nothing inherently unlikely in these accounts ; Inger was quite feckless enough to have left Paris without written proof of his mission, and the story of his fruitless struggle with M. Boutiron's diplomatic caution has the ring of truth. On the other hand, Ximenes described with great precision all the documents which were in fact found in Inger's possession ; and even Inger might reasonably be expected to have destroyed so dangerous a piece of evidence, had he really possessed it. To attempt elaborately to weigh the word of Ximenes against that of Inger would indeed be an exercise in futility; but Ximenes (if the letter in the *Pester Lloyd* be his, as I suggest) evidently had a partiality for embellishing a substantially

[1] Ibid., Anonymous letter No. 1, 8 November 1898.

true statement with a resounding and damaging lie. On the whole I am inclined to give Inger (or rather the French) the benefit of the doubt : it is unlikely that he was ever entrusted with a written message for the Khalifa ; and still more unlikely that a definite arrangement for the supply of arms was proposed.

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Inger was not in himself an important person. Such fame as he has hitherto enjoyed rests upon a legend the falsity of which I have been at pains to demonstrate. But the legend was perhaps worth exploding, for Inger is not the only legendary figure who encumbers the modern history of the Sudan. One thinks of Soulié, and of "Ruppert Recking", a mythical German who is supposed to have prevented the outbreak of active hostilities at Fashoda; [1] and the utterly fictitious nature of 'Ali Eff. Subahi's reminiscences makes one a little uneasy about the oral reports from which have been reconstructed the careers of so many Sudanese worthies. This is not to decry the use of oral evidence. It can and must be used. But the statements of single individuals (especially where they do not embody a " received tradition ") are a most dangerous foundation on which to build. It is only when two or more *independent* accounts are forthcoming that the historian can begin to assess their value as evidence.

But if Inger had little importance in himself, his career does illustrate certain features of French policy in the clash over the Upper Nile, and may indeed throw a little new light (though not so much as might be wished) upon the part played in this crisis by M. Lagarde. As it happens, it is mainly the weaknesses of French policy which are brought out in the Inger episode—weaknesses that French historians and publicists have indeed been the first to condemn. The suspicion, never very far from many French minds, that the Khalifa was largely a bogey built up by the English so as to justify their continued occupation of Egypt, [2] led to the fundamental mistake of failing to take seriously the militantly Islamic basis of Mahdism. [3] The resulting belief that a diplomatic arrangement with the Khalifa was within the bounds of practical politics may well have led to a half-belief that Inger was what he claimed to be. The French habit of embarking on elaborate and subtle schemes without seriously considering what resources were

[1] For Soulié see Hill, op. cit. p. 342 ; and for an exposure of the " Ruppert Recking " myth, see Emily, J., " A Fachoda, le 19 septembre 1898," in *Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique française*, March 1937, pp. 124-127, April 1937, pp. 192-194.

[2] Cf. Cocheris, op. cit., p. 333-335, 433.

[3] No doubt the self-consciously " laic " outlook of French Republican politicians was not without influence here. For a caricature of the French attitude cf. the character of " M. Fardet " in A. Conan Doyle's extravaganza *The Tragedy of the Korosko*, (London 1898). The caricature is crude and somewhat lacking in tasté. But it had a foundation in fact.

necessary to give them a chance of success was perhaps a blessing in disguise in so far as it affected Inger's half-baked filibustering ; but a similar failing was all too often a disastrous handicap to schemes which had been launched with the fullest official approval.

It has already been suggested that some of the circumstances which support Inger's account of his dealings with Lagarde may also provide a clue to the latter's puzzling conduct towards the French missions in Abyssinia. For even when every allowance has been made for the individualism of the French *colonial*, and for proconsular impatience with ministerial direction, it is difficult to believe in the monster of complacent egotism and wiful ignorance whose portrait is painted in such dark colours by MM. Cocheris and Michel. The situation in Abyssinia was perhaps more complicated than Michel, with an explorer's single-minded concentration on his goal, was able to appreciate. In theory, of course, the Negus was pledged to complete and well-nigh unconditional support of the French political aspirations on the Upper Nile. For on 20 March 1897 (12 Megabit 1889) Menelik had signed with Lagarde a secret " Convention pour le Nil Blanc " which was duly ratified by the President of the Republic on 24 May 1897. By this Convention the French were to aid " autant que possible, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie pour lui permettre de se maintenir solidement sur le Nil", while the Emperor, " établissant son autorité sur la rive droite du Nil Blanc a partir du 14e degré vers le sud, aidera, autant que possible, les agents du Gouvernement français qui seront sur la rive gauche entre le 14° et le 5° 30 ". (Art. 1) It was agreed that the French flag should fly on the left bank and the Emperor's on the right (Art. 2) ; and a further clause which forbade, in principle, any French occupation of the right bank, in fact conceded to them the right to establish themselves there in case of emergency—the French being, needless to say, the judges of any such emergency. (Art. 3). There is no reference to Menelik's proclamation of Myazya 1883 (April 1891), nor is there any explicit recognition of the Abyssinian claims to *de jure* sovereignty on the right bank ; and these omissions can hardly be accidental.[1] As the architect of so leonine a bargain, Lagarde had perhaps some excuse for his "vanity, " if not for his " ungenial manner".

But it was one thing to persuade Menelik to sign so convenient a treaty, and quite another to induce him to carry out its terms. For Menelik was, after all no simple-minded Lobengula but the ruler of an ancient, complex and (in its own way) politically sophisticated society. In order to survive for long as King of Kings, cunning and dissimulation were as necessary as martial prowess or a reputation for religious orthodoxy. Menelik moreover, had had his lesson at the time of the Treaty of Ucciali ; and on this occasion the legalistic equivocations and significant omissions

[1] This Convention is printed in *D.D.F.*, Ie Série. Tome XIII, (Paris, 1953) No. 159, p. 278-9.

of European diplomacy were successfully countered by the Abyssinian technique of fair promises, polite evasion, obstinate procrastination and skilful manoeuvre between conflicting forces. The French were held in play by protestations of friendship and promises of active co-operation on the Upper Nile; the British, for their part, had to swallow a diplomatic defeat, minor but none the less unpalatable, at Addis Ababa in May 1897. Rodd and Wingate had hoped to settle out of hand the delimitation of the frontier between Abyssinia and the Sudan, and to persuade Menelik to withdraw his claims to the right bank of the White Nile. But Menelik, with French backing, blandly refused to do any such thing. Moreover, the British Mission became convinced, a little uncritically, and partly at least as a result of rumours carefully propagated by Menelik's agents, that the area of effective Abyssinian occupation extended almost to the White Nile; [1] and Rodd thought that any attempt to press the discussion of territorial questions " would be more likely to urge the King to push on with greater energy the progress of his effective occupation". He recommended the postponement of the whole question until after the reconquest of Omdurman, when with " a fleet of powerful steamers " on the White Nile " we should have that moral (*sic*) force behind us in stating our claims and those of Egypt, which is wholly wanting now". [2] The British had to content themselves with commercial concessions of no particular importance, and a promise not to permit the passage of arms to the Mahdists, whom the Negus formally declared " to be the enemies of his Empire". [3] But Menelik in fact kept all the cards in his hand. His successful bluff had preserved his territorial claims from anything more alarming than a formal " expression of reserves " [4]; and at no cost to himself he had, in appearance at least, rendered a valuable service to his French allies in maintaining their *point d'appui* on the right bank of the White Nile.

But Menelik had no illusions about the French and certainly no desire to be their catspaw. Indeed, Rodd points out this fact in a passage which is outstanding among the indifferent and rather uncritical intelligence analyses compiled by his Mission. [5] " My own impression", he says, " is that Menelik has been shrewd enough to use the French, as, in the first instance, he used the Italians, for his own particular ends. He has obtained from them all that he wants in the way of arms and ammunition, together

[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Memorandum by Wingate and Gleichen, enclosed in Rodd to Salisbury, No. 18, 7 May 1897 ; Rodd to Salisbury, Confidential, No. 19, 10 May 1897; Rodd to Salisbury, Very Confidential, No. 21, 14 May 1897, with enclosure by Wingate.

[2] Ibid., Rodd to Salisbury, No. 21.

[3] Anglo-Abyssinian Treaty of 14 May 1897 (printed in Hertslet, E., *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3rd Edn., (London, 1909), Vol. II, No. 99). Cf. *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury No. 20 Confidential, 13 May 1897.

[4] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Enclosure (No. 3) in Rodd to Salisbury No. 21.

[5] E.g., the gross miscalculation of the extent of Menelik's " effective occupation "; the failure to obtain any accurate information about the Lagarde treaty.

with a certain moral support of the territorial claims he had advanced, but now that they come to him to claim their reward, he refers them to their former protestations of disinterested friendship with a somewhat pained surprise that they should demand material advantages which he could only concede at the price of offending other Powers whom he desires to conciliate". [1] It is however very doubtful whether Rodd realised that the Power whom Menelik was at this time most genuinely anxious to conciliate was the Khalifa — although he does from time to time report somewhat vaguely upon the possibility of an Abyssinian—Dervish understanding. [2] In fact, while manoeuvring cannily between the two European Powers whose " friendship " was so importunately thrust upon him, Menelik had revived, with better success, the policy initiated by his predecessor John, [3] and was striving to convince the Khalifa that the traditional hostility between Christian Abyssinia and the Muslim Sudan was a dangerous anachronism in the face of the danger from Europe which threatened both countries. There seems no reason to doubt that this policy represented the genuine inclinations of the Negus. It was not imposed upon him by the desire to conciliate a dangerous neighbour — he had no reason to fear the Khalifa at this time ; and he persevered in it, in spite of 'Abdallahi's coldness and suspicion, down to the very eve of the débâcle at Omdurman. In fact, the importance which Menelik attached to the Khalifa's goodwill goes far to explain the apparent paradox of Abyssinian policy on the White Nile ; namely, the obstinate maintenance of territorial claims (for sound diplomatic reasons) vis-à-vis European Powers, while taking little or no action (*pace* Messrs. Rodd and Wingate) to establish an " effective occupation " in that region.

In the Summer of 1895, Menelik (no doubt with the Italian threat in mind) had begun negotiations with the Khalifa for peace and common actiou against European penetration. 'Abdallahi's reply was short, cautions and non-committal; [4] but the victory at Adowa did not diminish Menelik's desire for an understanding, and in the Spring of 1896 he returned to the charge with more formal proposals. [5] Though he could not agree to the Khalifa's demand that, as a condition of friendship, all Europeans whether travellers or traders should be expelled from

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[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 41 Confidential, 22 June 1897.

[2] Ibid., (e.g.) Rodd to Salisbury No. 18, 7 May 1897. But Wingate, at any rate, thought that the initiative had come from the Khalifa, and that Menelik's attitude was " one of disinterested neutrality." (*Précis of Information*, Appendix B, p. 71-2.)

[3] C.S. Archives, Mahdia 1/34, Folder 16, " John King of Zion, King of Kings of Abyssinia, to the Great 'Abu Anja," 17 Kiyahk 1881 (25 December 1888).

[4] Ibid., Folder 12, Khalifa to Menelik, Safar 1313 (July-August 1895). In answer to a verbal message.

[5] Ibid., Folder 16, Menelik to Khalifa, 8 Myazya 1888 (15 April 1896); same to same, 29 Dhu al Hijja 1313 (11 June 1896).

Abyssinia,[1] relations did in fact improve considerably; by the middle of 1897 'Abdallahi was prepared to make at least a show of friendship and to co-operate on particular problems — for instance, the disciplining of " Wad Tur al Guri", the unruly Amir of the Bani Shanqul.[2] Throughout these transactions it was Menelik who took the initiative. Muhammad 'Uthman, the Khalifa's envoy, noticed the evident anxiety of the Negus to be on good terms with the Khalifa, and 'Abdallahi's extreme coldness and lack of any corresponding anxiety.[3] This judgment is corroborated by the almost fulsome tone of the letters which Menelik wrote and caused his Rases to write to the Khalifa, and by the Khalifa's grudging and scarcely civil replies.[4] And the value which Menelik set upon this friendship is equally shewn by the care which he took, from 1897 onwards, to avoid possible " incidents by giving his ally due notice of any movement of Abyssinian troops towards the frontier of the Khalifa's domains.[5]

After having taken such pains to woo the reluctant Khalifa, it would have been hardly consistent for Menelik to jeopardise this precarious friendship by a tactless insistence on his territorial claims in the White Nile — Sobat area. Nor did he do so. It is true that in March 1898 an expedition under Dejazmatch Tassama advanced from Goré into the Sobat valley. MM. Faivre and Potter of the Mission de Bonchamps, and a Russian, Col. Artamanov, were allowed to accompany this expedition ; and a small flying column which included the Europeans did in fact reach the Nile-Sobat confluence on 22 June 1898, eighteen days before the arrival of Marchand. But this party, and indeed the whole expedition, suffered so severely from hunger and disease that it could do no more than plant a French and an Abyssinian flag and then retire immediately.[6] Moreover, this expedition was no more than a reconnaissance in force ; it was not

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[1] Ibid., Folder 12, Khalifa to Menelik, Rabi' al-Akhir 1314 (September-October 1896).

[2] Ibid., Folder 15, statement of Muhammad 'Uthman al Hajj Khalid. I gratefully acknowledge my debt to my colleague, Doctor Ihsan Rashid 'Abbas, for indispensable assistance in reading and translating certain Arabic correspondence of which no English version was available.

[3] Ibid., Folder 15, Statement of Muhammad 'Uthman.

[4] Ibid., Folder 16, Ras Bitwatid Mangasha to Khalifa, 6 Safar 1314 (17 July 1896) ; Ras Mangasha of Tigré to Khalifa, 6 Yakatit 1889 (12 February 1897) — This letter was written from Addis Ababa, and the Arabic version is in the hand of Menelik's scribe; Negus Tekla Haimanot to Khalifa, 20 Yakatit 1889 (26 February 1897) ; Menelik to Khalifa, 7 Kiyahk 1890 (15 December 1897) ; and Folder 12, Khalifa's letters already cited.

[5] Ibid., Folder 16, Warning of Tassama's expedition (see below) ; Ras Makonnen to Amir Muhammad Mahmoud, 5 Shawal 1315 (27 February 1898), concerning troop movements in the Bani Shanqul area. (Muhammad 'Uthman states that Menelik also wrote directly to the Khalifa on this subject).

[9] Michel, op.cit., pp. 431-461.

intended to effect any permanent occupation and was in fact quite incapable of doing so.[1] The Europeans who accompanied it were little more than guests, and had no powers of command ; and there is no evidence that Menelik ordered or even approved the rather futile gesture of planting and immediately abandoning an Abyssinian flag at the Nile-Sobat confluence. On the contrary, he took care to give the Khalifa specific notice of this expedition, pointing out that its object was to observe the movements of Europeans who were believed to be approaching the Abyssinian frontier from the South and South-west.[2] Had Menelik really intended effectively to occupy this region it is difficult to see what he had to gain by giving advance warning of the expedition's movements.[3] In fact, whatever his policy in other areas, the Negus made no attempt to occupy the Sobat valley, where in any case Abyssinian highlanders could hardly survive the climate.[4] Quite apart from his relations with the Khalifa, he may have realised that an occupation of this area might sooner or later lead to a humiliating withdrawal under British pressure—a serious consideration for a monarch whose prestige depended so largely on his reputation for invincibility. The paper claims, on the other hand, were a useful counter with which to bargain for more valuable territory —e.g., the debatable land of the Bani Shanqul, which was reputed to contain gold workings, and whose Amir " Wad Tur al Guri " (*alias* 'Abd al-Rahman Khojali) had owed an uncertain allegiance sometimes to the Khalifa, sometimes to the Negus.

The attitude of the Negus to the French expeditions, which were supposed to be working in Abyssinian as much as in French interests, was very equivocal. He had to humour the French, for (quite apart from his Treaty obligations) he depended on their goodwill for the free passage of arms and ammunition from Djibouti ; and he relied on their support

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[1] Ibid,. p. 395.

[2] Mahdia 1/34, Folder 16. An unsigned and undated letter to the Khalifa, but clearly from Menelik. There can be no doubt that Tassama's expedition is the one referred to.

[3] The hand of the scribe and the colour of the ink used in the Arabic version of this warning letter suggest that it belongs to the same period as Menelik's letter of 7 Kiyahk 1890 (15 December 1897). Tassama's expedition did not leave Goré until 10 March 1898. (Michel, op. cit., p. 432).

[2] For a contrary view, see Langer, op. cit., p. 541. Harrington, the British diplomatic agent in Addis Ababa, also thought that " Menelik is thoroughly aware . . . that effective occupation is the card to play." (*P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/34, Harrington to Walker (private) 11 April 1898).

in dealing with other European Powers.[1] But he had clearly no desire to commit himself too deeply to the French, nor to be beholden to them for territorial gains of very doubtful value. He was lavish in vague expressions of encouragement, but very sparing of active support; and whenever possible he affected to treat the expeditions as mere "travellers" or "explorers". Thus the first imperial authorisation granted to the Mission de Bonchamps took the form of a letter to Dejazmatch Tassama which simply introduced the mission as "travellers", and which, significantly enough, ended with the words; "Mais toi (i.e., Tassama), viens vite, nous parlerons de cela lorsque tu seras ici".[2] It was only after interminable procrastination, and on the urgent petition of two members of the mission who had specially returned to Addis Ababa from the western boundary of Abyssinia, that authority was finally granted to the Marquis de Bonchamps to acquire territory on behalf of the Negus; and the document in which this grant is embodied is curiously curt, jejune and informal in style.[3] And it is difficult to believe that the repeated obstruction of this mission by local Abyssinian chiefs, often on the flimsiest pretexts, was always due to failure to understand, or to obey, the orders of the Emperor.[4]

Menelek's policy of rapprochement with the Khalifa can hardly have remained unknown for long to French circles in Abyssinia. It must have been known, for instance, to Alfred Ilg, a Swiss engineer who after many years as a semi-official adviser to the Negus was formally appointed "Councillor of State" at the time of M. Lagarde's first visit to Addis

[1] *P.R.O.*, F.O. 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 37, No. 41 (June 1897).

[2] Michel, op.cit., p. 137, gives a French translation of this letter. Cf. also the formal letter in which, at the time of the dissolution of the mission, Menelik thanked Michel for "the journey he had made." (Ibid; between pp. 420 and 421). There is no mention of the political objects or results of the "journey"—e.g., the treaty which had been concluded on Menelik's behalf with the "King" of Gambeila.

[3] Ibid., pp. 137-251, *passim*.

[4] Ibid., p. 54 ff.; p. 138 ff.; p. 203 ff.; p. 259 ff.

Since writing this, I have been confirmed in this interpretation by my discovery, in the Archives of the *Ministère de la France d'Outremer*, of an (undated) draft submitted to the Colonial Minister be de Bonchamps. The draft is headed "Causes d'impossibilité de jonction avec Marchand," and begins: "Les Abyssins n'ont pas aidé la Mission; ils ont fait tout leur possible pour empêcher son départ vers le Nil," and proceeds: "Départ de la Mission trop longtemps entravé . . . la Mission a été retenue sous des prétextes multiples." Binger, the *Directeur des affaires d'Afrique*, minutes as follows: "Dire qu'après les rapports de M. de Bonchamps combien il paraît aléatoire de compter sur l'appui de Ménélik." (*France d'Outremer, Missions, Afrique*, III, 36a, No. 2).

Ababa.[1] Ilg was the friend and commercial partner of M. Chefneux, the leading French business man in Abyssinia, and from 1891 onwards both men were in close touch both with Lagarde and with French official circles generally.[2] The incident of Muhammad al Tayyib and the French flag shews that by the winter of 1897-98 at the latest Lagarde himself knew something of this policy ; he had indeed come to believe, *more gallico*, that it was anti-British rather than anti-European — or at least that it could be used to subserve French interests. Menelik evidently did nothing to disabuse him of these pleasing illusions — but he did make very sure that the Khalifa should not misunderstand his real intentions, by sending at the same time (and probably by the same messenger) a warning urging 'Abdallahi to do all in his power to prevent Europeans from entering the Sudan.[3] Lagarde's use of Inger as an intermediary in 1897, in spite of the latter's sorry performance at Suakin in the previous year, may represent an earlier attempt to profit by Menelik's line of communication with the Khalifa ; but as there is no evidence (apart from Wingate's suspicions) of any prior arrangement with the Negus, it may have been simply another example of the somewhat irresponsible opportunism which Lagarde had already shewn in his dealings with Inger.

But I suspect that from the begininng Lagarde had grave doubts whether Menelik would exert himself to carry out the terms of the " White Nile Convention " ; and that he kept these doubts to himself, having no wish to depreciate a treaty which was his own diplomatic masterpiece and which must have added considerably to nis professional reputation. But,

[1]Vignéras, op.cit., p. 178-9. For Ilg's relations with Menelik, see Keller, C., *Alfred Ilg* (Leipzig, 1918), especially Chs. V-VIII. Also Le Roux, Hougues, *Ménélik et Nous*, (Paris, n.d., ? 1902), p. 228 ff. Le Roux asserts that Ilg owed much of his influence to the fact that he and Chefneux were the first to point out to Menelik the implications of the notorious Art. XVII of the Treaty of Ucciali.

[2]Ilg's close liaison with the French, especially after 1891, is clearly shewn in correspondence preserved in the archives of the *ministère des Affaires Etrangères*. (*Mémoires et Documents, Afrique*, Tome 138—Abyssinie 5). Unfortunately this volume does not go beyond December 1895, and the later papers are not yet open to inspection. For Ilg's dealings with Chefneux and with the French Government in the matter of the Ethiopian railway concession, see Gilmour, T.L., *Abyssinia : The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers*, (London, 1906), pp. 12-13, 63-72. Cf also Le Roux, loc. cit. and p. 7 ; Langer, op. cit., p. 541 ; Woolf, op.cit., p. 197-198.

[3]C.S. Archives, Mahdia 1/34, Folder 15, Statement of Muhammad 'Uthman ; cf. ibid., Kitchener to Rodd, Strictly Confidential, 7 September 1898. It is not quite clear whether the letter embodying this warning is still extant. It was one of the enclosures in Kitchener's report of 7 September, but is now no longer with this document. It may be the same as the letter already referred to as giving notice of Tassama's expedition This letter was probably written in December 1897 or January 1898, and contains an urgent exhortation to the Khalifa to be on his guard and not to let Europeans into his domains on any pretext.

as opportunity offered (and without troubling to explain himself to Paris), Lagarde seems to have fallen back on what appeared to him to be the alternative policy of making friendly contact with the Khalifa—a policy which had been put before him in a definite if fantastic shape by Inger in 1896, and for which, as we have seen, there had always been a hankering in French official circles. To this policy French or " Franco-Abyssinian " expeditions to the Nile were at best irrelevant; at worst they might be positively dangerous. Moreover such expeditions were apt to be commanded by angry men in a hurry, whose requests for assistance required from Lagarde administrative exertions for which he had by all accounts neither the taste nor the capacity. Lagarde's attitude to the Bonvalot - de Bonchamps expedition was doubtless influenced by personal pique as well as by considerations of policy ; but he also gave very little support to the expeditions under his personal control. In spite of his official instructions, [1] he seems in private to have consistently discouraged the " Drive to the Nile " ; and he was evidently convinced that Menelik's promised collaboration was of little value. He warned Bonvalot at the outset not to expect too much of Menelik [2]; he doubted whether the expedition of Tassama would lead to any useful result [3]; and in 1898 he reported to the French Colonial Ministry, doubtless correctly, that Menelik had no real desire to see foreign missions operating within his Empire. [4]

Lagarde's policy of courting the Khalifa, although it was not by any means a mere personal foible which bore no relation to official French policy, was profoundly mistaken — for it assumed the impossible, that 'Abdallahi could ever be persuaded to collaborate with infidel " Franks". And it is difficult to palliate Lagarde's sabotage — it is not too strong a word — of a mission which he had been officially instructed to assist. [5] But his reputation has perhaps suffered excessively as a result of these errors and shortcomings. He has been held up to obloquy, particularly by French historians, as the man whose wilful perversity prevented Abyssinian reinforcements from reaching Marchand at Fashoda and so did much to bring about the collapse of the French position on the Upper Nile in the last months of 1898. [6] But it is very doubtful whether such reinforcements would have seriously affected the final issue ; it is equally doubtful

[1] For these instructions, see Hanotaux, G., *Fachoda*, (Paris, 1909), p. 133-135; and Michel, op. cit., p. 93-4.

[2] Michel, op.cit., p. 102.

[3] Ibid., p. 419.

[4] Ibid., p. 422.

[5] It is difficult to know what to make of Hanotaux' assertion (op.cit., p. 135) that Lagarde faithfully carried out his instructions.

[6] Michel, op.cit. ; Cocheris, op.cit. ; Delebecque, op.cit., p. 175-6; also Treves, Paolo, *Il Dramma di Fascioda*, (Milano, 1937), p. 132. Langer (op.cit.) and Woolf (op. cit.) are less willing to commit themselves.

whether the plan was ever feasible, either politically or physically. Menelik, for reasons which have been suggested, confined his support to words ; and both the climate and the lack of supplies for man and beast in the Sobat valley rapidly inflicted crippling casualties upon Abyssinian troops.[1] On the general issue of his policy towards the Khalifa, Lagarde might well have pleaded that he was simply applying in his own sphere of activity the principles laid down by André Lebon for the guidance of Liotard in June 1896.[2] The responsible heads of the *ministère des Colonies* and the *ministère des Affaires Etrangères* cannot in fact be absolved from a heavy share of the blame for the Abyssinian fiasco. Perhaps because they underrated the political acumen of *les indigènes*, they failed to take seriously, or to remedy, the fundamental inconsistency of their policies towards the Khalifa and towards Menelik. And it is not perhaps to be wondered at that in the resulting confusion M. Lagarde tended to sit even more lightly than usual to his official instructions.

[1] Michel (op. cit., pp. 431-461) gives a grim account of the disasters which befell the reconnaissance to the Sobat mouth.

[2] *D.D.F.*, Ie Série, Tome XII, p. 655.

الامير سليمان بن انجر عبدالله

في هذا المقال طرف من سيرة كور انجر الذى كان حينا من الزمن ضابطا فى الجيش النمساوى الهنغارى ، وادعى فى اخريات ايامه أنه كان احد امراء الخليفة عبد الله . وفى سنة ١٨٩٦ — ١٨٩٧ كان انجر على صلة بالدوائر الفرنسية الرسمية بل انه فى الحقيقة قام بدور المعتمد السرى للفرنسيين ، ولذلك اتجه كاتب المقال الى توضيح بعض مظاهر السياسه الفرنسية فى النيل الاعلى والحبشة على ضوء سيرة أنجر باعتباره كان معتمدا فرنسيا ، وعلى ضوء مااستطاع ان يحصل عليه من مواد أخرى بعضها نشر وبعضها لم ينشر

ولد انجر عام ١٨٦٨ فى تيمسفور(وتسمى اليوم تيمسورا برومانيا)، وتلقى ثقافة عسكرية ، وفى عام ١٨٩٥ اعتزل الخدمة فى الجيش النمساوى ، ثم قضى ثمانية عشر شهرا فى شمال افريقية وشرق المتوسط ومنطقة البحر الاحمر ، محاولا ان يجد لنفسه وظيفة عسكرية فى مراكش وتركيا ومصر واريتريا والحبشه ، فلما اخفقت محاولاته جميعا توجهت همته نحو شئون السودان واحداثه . وفى القاهرة لقى تشجيعا من رجل يدعى اكز يمنيز — وكان هذا فيما يبدو جاسوسا ضليعا — فهداه تفكيره الى خطة يقنع بها الخليفة ان يقبل سيادة سلطان تركيا لعله بذلك « يوجد السلم بين السودان ومصر » وفى سبتمبر من عام ١٨٩٦ زار باريس ليستمد العون من هناك ويحصل اذا تيسر ، على معونة ماديه ينفذ بها خطته . وادعى فى باريس انه مندوب مفوض من الخليفة ، ولكن الفرنسيين فيما يظهر لم تجز عليهم دعواه فلم يعطوه مالا وانما التفتوا الى خطته بعين الرضى ، ويبدو ان مسيو لاجارد حاكم ابك (فى الصومال الفرنسى) كان ذا اهتمام خاص بتلك الخطة .

وكان المقرر حسب تلك الخطة ان يدخل انجر السودان عن طريق جيبوتى والحبشة ولكنه غير رأيه هذا فى النهاية ، وعزم ان يدخل من طريق سواكن متنكرا فى زى درويش ، وبعد تجواله على غير هدف بضعة ايام قبض عليه واستجوب ثم اطلق سراحه وتوجه الى تريستا (نوفمبر ١٨٩٦) . اما محاولته الاتصال بالخليفة فقد اصيبت بالاخفاق الذريع لان صديقه المزعوم المسمى اكز يمنيز كان قد افشى كل خططه ومساوماته مع الفرنسيين بدقائقها وتفصيلاتها الى دائرة الاستخبارات السرية بالقاهرة .

وفى سنة ١٨٩٧ قام انجر وربما بتحريض من الفرنسيين ، بمحاولة ثانية ليدخل السودان عن طريق جيبوتى ، وكان حظه من النجاح فى هذه المرة اقل من حظه السابق فبين جيبوتى وهرر التقى بجماعة من الضباط الانجليز يرأسهم رود وونجت ، فتعرفوا على انجر واغروا رأس مكومن صاحب هرر بان يرده الى الساحل

وفى خلال عامى ١٨٩٨ ، ١٨٩٩ كان انجر فى المجر ثم فى انجلترا وفى هذه المرة ادعى انه من امراء الخليفة كما ادعى ان شيوخ الصومال انتخبوه « ملكا » . وجرب ان يثير اهتمام الدوائر الهنغارية الانجليزية بمشروع جديد يكفل التقدم التجارى فى الصومال .

وفى اخريات ايامه آثر انجر — وكان فيما يبدو على جانب من الثراء — حياة العزلة بقلعة فى ترنسلفانيا ، غير انه عاد يعرض خدماته عند نشوب الحرب العظمى الاولى على الحكومة النمساوية — الهنغارية مؤكدا مبلغ مايستطيع الاضطلاع به من مهام ، اعتمادا على الرابطة بينه وبين المسلمين ، وعلى مامر له من تجارب يوم كان اميراً من امراء الخليفة ، وقد اخبرت دوائر الحربية النمساوية بانه شخصية غريبة الاطوار فلم تجرب ان تفيد من خدماته . وكان انجر منذ ١٨٩٦ قد تسمى باسم « سليمان » وفى سنة ١٨٩٩ زعم انه ينتسب الى عائلة اسلامية ، وهذا اذا اخذناه على ظاهره ليس صحيحا لان سجلات الجيش تثبت انه « كاثوليكى رومانى » ولكن يبدو انه اعتنق الاسلام ، ففى عام ١٩١٧ نشر بالالمانية عرضا للقرآن سماه Der Wahre Glaube أى « الايمان الصحيح » .

توفى انجر فى سبتمبر سنة ١٩٣٥ بعد ان صدق الناس فيما يظهر ، انه من امراء المهدية (وانه ايضا كان حاكما للمهدية على مقاطعة بالحبشة) لان هذه الادعاءات نشرت فى مجلة الاوبزرفر اللندنية ، ٨ سبتمبر ١٩٣٥ على انها تمثل الحقيقة .

وفى القسم الاخير من المقال ميل الى القول بان اهتمام لاجارد بانجر قد يلقى ضوءا على ذلك الاخفاق الذريع الذى لقيه لاجارد فى إمداد الحملات الفرنسية الحبشية التى كان عليها ان تحتل الضفة اليمنى من النيل الابيض فاذا سنحت لها الفرصة انضمت الى مارشاند . ان الفرنسيين كانوا يقومون بتنفيذ سياستين

متعارضتين فى هذا الجزء من افريقية : كانوا يرغبون فى كسب صداقة الخليفةوهم يشجعون منليك فى الوقت نفسه ليحتل المنطقة الواقعة على الضفة اليمنى للنيل الابيض وهى منطقة كان يعدها الخليفة جزءا من مملكته . ويشير الكاتب الى ان العلاقات بين الخليفة ومنليك بين عامى ١٨٩٦ — ١٨٩٨ كانت اقوى مما يظن ، وانه ليس من المحتمل ان يكون منليك قد سعى الى احتلال تلك المنطقة التى كان يعدها جزءا من بلاده فى مساوماته مع القوى الاوروبية . ومن ثم يميل الكاتب الى القول بان لاجارد كان يعرف هذا الاحجام فى منليك معرفة يقين او حدس ، فهداه تفكيره الى انه قد يتمكن من خدمة المصالح الفرنسية عن طريق الاتصال بالخليفة اما بوساطة انجر أوبوساطة رسل منليك لابارسال حملات على النيل الابيض . ويرى الكاتب ان المنافسات والاحقاد الشخصية لعبت دورا كبيرا فى الحد من جهود لاجارد لتحقيق ما كان يعده واجبا رسميا .

PROBLEMS OF LOW-COST HOUSING IN THE SUDAN

By P. J. Sandison.

(Presidential Address to the Philosophical Society, delivered at its meeting on 25th November 1953)

IN this paper I propose to deal only with the problems of urban housing in the Northern Sudan. There is a great deal of housing in the country of lower standards than this, but so far we have been unable to tackle the problems which it presents.

A full-sized house of the type which we are considering has three living-rooms, and is built on a plot of land measuring two hundred square metres. The walls are made of "cob", balls of damp earth which are pressed down in layers and trimmed. They are protected from the weather by a plaster made of a fermented mixture of animal droppings, soil, and water, which, is called *"zibla"*. There are no foundations and erosion at ground level is common. The roofs are supported by unhewn beams and rafters of local timber and, are made from palm-fibre mats covered first by a layer of grass and then of earth, plastered on top with "zibla". The joinery of the windows and doors is often secondhand white wood, packing cases and the like.

The three living rooms usually measure four metres by four each, and in addition there are two separate buildings, the kitchen and latrine. The whole plot is surrounded by a cob wall at least six feet high. Smaller versions having two or one living room are more common than the full-sized-house.

It must be admitted that these dwellings turn a blank and forbidding back on the passer-by. Monotonous mud walls, pierced by closed doors and small, tightly-shuttered windows, run for mile after mile broken only by right-angle street intersections. The lay-out is a rectangular grid-iron, with frequently recurring blank spaces for amenities in 'worlds not realized'. (1).

If you open the door of one of these enclosures, you will generally find substantial buildings to your right and left,—the living rooms—, and smaller buildings,—the kitchen and latrine—, at the far end of the plot. There may be some kind of division, a fence or wall, down the middle of the plot, and if so one side is the women's and the other the men's. You will probably notice that there is no garden, although one or

more trees may have been planted to give shade, and you may wonder why there are so few buildings and so much open space. The inward-facing windows are larger than those on the street, but still small by European standards, and sometimes shaded by a veranda. The rooms are dark and cool.

In its design and lay-out the traditional house is well adapted to the climate with its intense sunshine and glare, and but few cold and wet days during the year. In the so-called temperate zones rooms are needed principally to shelter people from the wet and cold. They are working-places during the many days when the family is kept indoors by the weather. But in the Sudan they are needed to give shelter against heat, glare and parching winds. And so walls and, even more important, roofs are thick and impervious to heat. Windows and door openings are small and shuttered. After a day in glare and heat the master of the house does not want to bask in the sun, he wants a cool place in which to rest.

Almost throughout the year the family can sleep out of doors, and indeed in spring and autumn it would be impossible to sleep indoors. The compound is the family bedroom, the smaller children's playground, and in it the morning and evening meals are usually taken. Preparation of food is usually begun there and continued in a kitchen isolated from the living rooms to avoid nuisance from smoke, and heat. Those who have savoured the all-pervasive and clinging fragrance of cabbage in English lodging houses, and of garlic in Italy, will appreciate the wisdom of this. The high surrounding wall gives privacy to the bed space, and is a windbreak to mitigate the blast of dry, sand-laden winds.

The essential features are cool and shady rooms, an adequate compound, and protection from the nuisance of cooking. Yet many of the houses which the government has built in recent years seem to have neglected these desiderata, largely I feel for reasons of cost, but sometimes in the name of hygiene. In this climate an unceiled corrugated iron roof ought to be outlawed as a crime against humanity; as the under-roof temperatures can easily build up to more than 140°F.

But it is not enough merely to consider the characteristics of the individual house, while ignoring the grouping of houses in a town or part of a town. The object of town planning has been defined as the creation of an environment which will satisfy the physical, moral and social needs of the people. To this end the grouping of houses is of great importance. The present grid-iron pattern of northern Sudanese towns has three principal advantages. It is easy to keep clean, evil-doers

can be seen a great way off, and by sharing boundary walls between plots it is economical. But it is depressing, monotonous, inflexible and anti-social. Every house opens directly on to the street, and most of them have only one street frontage so restricted in length that a back and a front door cannot be provided. Yet, with the social custom of the seclusion of women, it is desirable to separate the guest and family portions of the house, and to give the women and children the maximum freedom of movement within the convention of seclusion. One of the best ways of doing this is to have separate guest and family doors to the house, and if possible to contrive that the guest doors open on to the street and the family doors on to an interior courtyard or close which is only indirectly connected with a main road. This is impossible if the grid-iron is rigidly applied.

An illustration of the evil effects of ignoring the social and moral needs of townsfolk is given in a recent survey of conditions in Elizabethville in the Belgian Congo which states:-

"The courts have to deal increasingly with very young delinquents. What is known about the terrifying moral decline of the area, the wicked example it gives and the *dangerous anonymity* it allows, goes far to explain the degree of juvenile delinquency." (2).

It is clear from the context that this "dangerous anonymity" refers to the absence of normal social groupings in an "urban agglomeration". A similar state of affairs, worse, though on a smaller scale, is to be found in Deim el 'Arab in Port Sudan, the only lodging area for Beja port workers, who number some 1600. In this Deim practically all the houses are owned by prostitutes and public security is precarious.

Such a position can be reached very quickly in the absence of social and family groupings. In a traditional town like Omdurman, the social groupings of the people are still surprisingly strong. Neighbouring families have intermarried over a period of many years or even centuries, and a network of relationship and friendship has spread over much of the residential area. With this network goes a system of moral control exercised by older people over the young, a control which costs nothing and whose efficacy is testified by the extremely low crime rate of the whole town.

This again is a vital factor which must be given weight in planning. Houses should be grouped in such a way that social contacts between neighbours are made easy and so can quickly be built up, and the rigour

of female seclusion softened. Provision should be made, if possible, for the convention that on marriage a daughter does not set up her own establishment for about a year, but lives either in her parent's house or in a small house adjacent to it. Everything possible should be done to prevent the collapse of the traditional social system and the demoralisation which follows. When such a social collapse has taken place, it is both difficult and expensive to put things right, as it has proved in Elizabethville. I quote again from the same report:-

"The evil is in the youth. If we wish to secure the future there must be no delay. We must therefore emphasize the extreme urgency of setting up juvenile centres and of reorganizing the penal system to make it more deterrent and to put the socially unreformables where they can do no more harm." (3).

The next, and most formidable problem, is that of cost. Is it possible to plan houses with the features and amenities that I have stressed, which the Sudanese worker can afford? If not, we are, as Shakespeare says,

> "Like one that draws the model of a house
> Beyond his power to build it; who, half through,
> Gives o'er and leaves his part-created cost
> A naked subject to the weeping clouds,
> And waste for churlish winter's tyranny." (4).

At the beginning of 1953 it cost £E. 180 to build the 3 room cob house in Khartoum. Annual maintenance is £E. 8 and local rates are £E. 7.200 m/ms a year. If the owner had been able obtain the necessary capital at 4% on 25 years repayment, which he was certainly not able to do, the monthly interest and repayment charges would have amounted to 970 milliemes. Including the local rates and maintenance charges, his house would therefore cost him £E. 2.236 monthly.

I would stress that he would have to spend £E. 180 to *build* his house. Before we started our enquiries everyone thought that the man and his family did much of the labour of building themselves. This is not so. Building in cob is a skilled and critical process, carried out by traditional craftsmen and their labourers.

I must also stress that he could not have obtained a loan a 4%. Apart from loans made by government to officials and, on a smaller scale, to artizans permanently employed, there is no source of cheap credit in the Sudan. A commercial first mortgage costs from 9 to 12%, and un-

secured loans earn 25%. A man can only build from savings, his own or a relative's, or by running up a bill with his shop-keeper. Since capital earns such returns it is not surprising that low-cost houses have not been generally built and rented as a commercial venture. Those that are rented fetch up to £E. 4 a month, the owner paying the rates. So if a man cannot afford to build, neither can he rent.

When a man wants to build, how does he set about it?. The first question is that of obtaining a plot. All the land suitable under zoning regulations for urban low-cost housing belongs to the government; it cannot be bought, but plots can be leased. Generally these plots are of a standard size, which varies from town to town. In Khartoum the standard size for the cheapest type of housing is 200 square metres, and a man can only obtain land in multiples of 200 square metres unless he builds in a more expensive area. There are periodic plot auctions at which people bid against each other for the right to secure a lease. The successful bidder pays his bid in to a government treasury as a 'lease premium', and the money is credited to a fund devoted to slum clearance and town replanning. He then obtains a lease and has to pay an annual ground rent of 1 millieme per square metre. He is given a time limit within which he must complete the minimum buildings * on his plot. Plots are auctioned in such a manner that areas are built up steadily without leaving vacant plots. An 'essential works' charge may be included as a part of the lease premium to cover the cost of providing roads and drains. A normal figure for a lease premium on a 200 square metre plot in Khartoum is £E. 20.

Under this system the poorer workers have to strain their resources to acquire a 200 square metre plot and may be unable erect on it more than the minimum buildings. This is clearly shewn by an analysis of the views of existing house-owners on design, taken from the report of a social survey of low-wage earners in Khartoum most ably directed by one of our members, Saad El Din Fawzi.

"The incomes (of the lower discussion group) were found to range between £E. 1 and £E. 9 per month with concentration around the £E. 5 to £E. 7 income range. When questioned about their houses it was found out that almost every one of them had not been able to build the whole of his house. A large proportion of them have succeeded in building only the outside wall and the kitchen, which is now being used as a living room." (5).

*Kitchen, Latrine and one Living room.

Thus it happens that a 200 metre plot is often under-developed for some years, because the lessee cannot afford to build. This causes hardship and is wasteful of town land. Moreover the lessee is unable, if he prospers and his family grows, to add to his plot except by buying the unexpired portion of the lease and the buildings on an adjacent plot. This is generally impossible, and so he has to find a purchaser for his rather part-worn house and move away from the neighbours and friends he has made. The system is very hard on the poorer classes as they have to find what is to them a considerable sum in ready cash to finance the inital lease and building costs, and then laboriously to lay piastre beside piastre for enlargements, while simultaneously facing considerable recurrent expenses. This hardship is evident in the design of the houses, where almost everything is sacrificed to the reduction of first cost. A building method entailing high maintenance costs, a single frontage to the street with a single door, these are dictated solely by the need to economize.

It is generally accepted that 15% of a householder's total income is the reasonable maximum which he can afford to spend in rent and rates, at least in the lower income groups. This figure is often exceeded in the Sudan, and indeed all over Africa today; but I think it should be accepted for basic planning. The monthly charge for the 3 room cob house, £E. 2.236, is 15% of £E. 15. But there are many in the Three Towns * who earn less than this. In fact the three lowest categories of government monthly-paid labour range from £E. 7.250 to £E. 13.375, including cost of living allowance at the present level of 25%. There are some thousands in these categories living in the Three Towns. Saad El Din Fawzi (5) has disclosed the fact that our 3 roomed house is above the means of a man earning less than £E. 15 a month. For those who earn less the alternatives are to have a one or two roomed house, to crowd into the house of a relative or friend, to pay more than 15%, and sometimes more than 20% in rent, or to occupy a single room at £E. 1.500 a month.

This is the central problem of low-cost housing. Can we provide healthful and decent houses for people earning less than £E. 15 per month?

The answer to this question depends entirely upon the method of appproach. Many countries attack the problem by defining minimum standards of accommodation, and then making such accommodation available by subsidies to those who cannot afford it. When the whole community is planning for the whole community, as in Great Britain, where persons working for wages form 46% of the total population, there is perhaps justification for such a use of the public purse. Again where,

1 Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman.

as in the growing industrial centres of the Union of South Africa, the growth of slums threatens the stability of the community, subsidization may be necessary. But in the Sudan only one fourteenth of the population lives in towns, and the number of those earning less than £E. 15 per month is again a fraction of this. Moreover our experience with minimum standards of accommodation has not been altogether happy. Policemen and soldiers in the main towns have sometimes been given houses which, on the 4% and 25 year repayment basis, would demand a monthly income of £E. 32. The standards have not been realistic.

I have therefore assumed that the problem is tailoring the house to the depth of the householder's pocket. At 4% interest and 25 years repayment, a man earning £E. 7 per month can only afford to pay the recurring charges on a house costing £E. 142 and even one earning £E. 15 can only afford one costing £E. 256. These calculations allow a maintenance figure of only 2% of capital cost per annum, as against 4% which has to be allowed for the "cob" house. This is a reasonable allowance for any house which we might build instead of the traditional cob house.

A reasonable target for planning would therefore be a minimum house costing £E. 150 in Khartoum at today's prices, a slightly better one at £E. 200 and a third at £E. 250. This naturally suggests houses with one, two or three living-rooms in addition to the kitchen, latrine and adequate compounds, and research has concentrated upon materials and possible methods of building at these prices. Investigation started with the cob method, which has obvious defects. It takes one and a half months to build the walls of the standard house; their poor resistance to weather necessitates frequent external plastering and produces an annual maintenance figure of 4.4% of capital cost; their low strength makes the fixing of roofs, windows and doors difficult. These defects are inherent in the method, which is not susceptible of sufficient improvement to make it a serious object of study. The traditional roof is not unsatisfactory in low rainfall areas, but the great weight of material demands a generous use of timber and with the expansion of towns this is causing difficulty and expense in the northern Sudan. Neither the walls nor the roof are suited to high rainfall areas; indeed the cob house and flat roof virtually disappear above the 500 mm. isohyet. Of the total cost of the 3 room cob house, the compound wall accounts for 19%; walling for the buildings 26½%; roofs 30%; joinery for windows, doors, lintels &c 20%; latrines 7%; zibla on the outside walls 7½%. You will notice the dominating position of walling; in these houses it accounts for almost 46% of the total cost, whereas in European low-cost housing it amounts to 17%, largely because of the extra "frills"—baths, sinks, extensive plumbing, more expensive and elaborate joinery etc. Clearly in cost

reduction the first attack must therefore be made on the walls as being the greatest single factor.

Costing shewed that red or sun-dried bricks were too expensive. *Pise de terre*, earth compacted by ramming between moveable shuttering, was considered; but experience elsewhere in Africa and in Australia proved that the method was technically difficult and expensive. Finally, stabilized earth was chosen as giving the best chance of success. This is a mixture of sandy soil with a feeble proportion—between six and ten per cent, of Portland cement. Although this material has not been used, as far as I know, in the Sudan, it has been the subject of exhaustive research and practical tests in the United States of America and the Union of South Africa. In tropical Africa it was first used in the Gold Coast in 1945 where it is said that a saving of 33% can be made in the walling of cheap houses by using it instead of sand and cement blocks or burnt bricks (6). Thorough compaction of the mixture into blocks is essential, and for this purpose we are using a machine invented by Mr. Carlstein, a South Africa engineer. It produces interlocking, self-aligning hollow blocks which can be laid without mortar between the courses. This speeds up building and saves skilled labour. In an experiment undertaken by the South African Building Research Institute with the product of this machine one semi-skilled man laid the equivalent of 5800 red bricks during one nine-hour working day in straight walling.

As regards durability Mr. Alcock, who developed the method in the Gold Coast, reports that: "unprotected cement-stabilized earth blocks made in the proportions of 15 to 18 parts of soil to one part of cement, continue to withstand the effects of all kinds of weather after a period of five years without signs of deterioration. They give promise of many more years of life before repair will be necessary." (6).

The stabilized earth block has a great future wherever walling costs are a considerable proportion of the total costs, or where red brick and skilled labour are expensive. These factors must be balanced against the local price of Portland cement which, for instance, at £E. 12 per ton forms 50% of the cost of the block. At the present state of our research. we can see no alternative to cob except stabilized earth. Its first cost in Khartoum is higher than cob, but its maintenance is one-third that of cob. The method lends itself to mass production and the machinery required can be transported to site by lorry. Actual construction is much more speedy than in brick.

We have not yet made much progress with the roof. Corrugated iron is too expensive and has appalling thermal characteristics. Even

if it is painted and maintained white on its upper surface, it can heat up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit. We are working on several ideas, and it looks as if burnt tiles, despite the need for heavy timber sections to support them, may be what we want. We are also examining an interesting method developed in Hyderabad where arched roofs are built with ribs consisting of flowerpot-like objects placed inside each other. The same method was used in the Cathedral at Ravenna in Italy during the the Fifth Century. It makes a cheap and strong roof in India today.

As a result of all this research into materials and methods of building, we are now in a position to build houses in Khartoum, with a minimum life of 30 years and an annual maintenance cost not exceeding 2% of capital cost, at approximately the following figures:

£E. 185 A house on a plot of 150 square metres having a single living room 4 x 4 metres, a separate kitchen with a simple cooking stove and chimney, one outside door, and a simple form of septic tank latrine known as an 'aqua privy'.

£E. 250 A similar house having two living rooms on a plot of 200 square metres and two outside doors.

£E. 300 A similar house with three living rooms on a plot of 250 square metres.

A single construction unit could probably turn out two hundred such houses in twelve months. The cost of the 'lease premium' and the 'essential works charge' are not included in these figures, as they were also excluded from the cost of the 'cob' house.

The improved houses are superior to the cob house in almost every way. They have concrete foundations to walls of buildings and compounds—concrete lintels and sills to doors and windows, superior joinery, concrete capping to the boundary walls, a cooking stove and chimney to the kitchen and other modest refinements. Moreover, the present figures are estimates, which are capable of some reduction under mass production.

Taking the figures as they stand, we can now build a substantial and healthful house which a man earning £E. 10 a month can buy on hire-purchase over a period of 25 years. But by reducing the size of the plot still further, a simple single-roomed quarter like those of Sudan Railways employees could be built for £150 and this would allow the £E. 7 a month man to become a house-owner. Until the figures of the Social Survey are available, we do not know how many of those

in the £E. 7-10 a month range are single men, for whom lodging is the only answer, and how many are married men. Only after consideration of the characteristics of this group will it be possible to say whether there is a real need for these tiny quarters.

Obviously the prime need is for rational financing. Without it, the main hardship cannot be alleviated. And without it the economies of rationalization in building cannot be obtained. If government were willing to make capital available even at 4%, it would be possible to build large numbers of houses in stabilized earth and sell them on hire-purchase. In order to obtain the greatest flexibility and social advantage from such a release of cheap capital it would be desirable to restrict the freehold in the buildings. An "owner" should be allowed only to dispose of his buildings to the authority from whom he bought them, and the terms of such sales should be known when the original hire-purchase agreement is signed. He should not be allowed to erect unauthorized accretions to the buildings, in order to prevent overcrowding by subdivision of plots. It is obvious that lodging will be a feature of the housing situation for many years to come; but already in the areas of Khartoum which have been developed since 1946 a number of 200 square metre plots are accommodating three complete households each, and several, four. This is not normal lodging but plain overcrowding.

Such a plan would also allow a man to start off with a one-roomed house on a small plot and later exchange it when his family grew for a large one without undue loss. It would permit the little amenities in lay-out and design which are imperative for social reasons, and which are now ruled out on the score of cost.

On the other hand the realization of such a plan would demand an appropriate organization and close supervision of housing estates. There would soon be hundreds of hire-purchase agreements, involving the collection of monthly instalments, the inspection of plots to guard against unauthorized transfer or subdivision, and many other complications. I do not underrate the difficulties, but I am convinced that they can be overcome here as they have been in other countries. In Africa, some British territories have successfully embarked upon similar plans, the Belgian and French authorities already have made considerable progress with centralized finance and construction and in the Union of South Africa, the Natal Housing Board, among other bodies, has done excellent work along these lines.

May I presume upon my trade classification of "Humanist", whatever that may mean, to remind sceptics that:

"—a cause on foot

Lives so in hope, as in an early spring
We see the appearing buds; which to prove fruit
Hope gives not so much warrant as despair
That frosts will bite them." (7).

Record of Discussion

Capt. Ogden, opening the discussion, congratulated Mr. Sandison on the clarity of his paper, and on the arduous research which it represented. He believed that Mr. Sandison had approached the problem correctly, in that he had taken cost as the determining factor. The stabilised earth method of building had, it appeared, already been tried in Kassala Province, and it would be interesting to know how successful it had been there.

Capt. Ogden pointed out that there was still a considerable discrepancy between the prices at which it had been hoped to build and those at which it was actually possible to build. The upper limits for the three classes of houese were to have been £E.150, £E.200 and £E. 250; but at present the houses were costing £E.185, £E.250 and £E.300, exclusive of lease premia and essential works charges. Could Mr. Sandison state the capital value of these charges, and could he state whether e.g., road-making and water supply were included therein? Possibly in future electricity supply and sewage disposal might also have to be provided for.

Capt. Ogden reflected that almost everywhere in the world the lower-paid wage-earner could not afford a house. In England houses had been subsidised, but objections could be raised to this practice. Was the solution a greater output per man?

He was convinced that the high costs of housing in the Sudan were not the result of wasteful methods in construction or use of material; for instance, the size of the rooms had been determined by the most economical size of the roofing material available, and Mr. Sandison could no doubt cite further examples of a similar procedure. He would, however, like to know how many houses went to a block, for an economical distribution of party walls was clearly a means whereby costs could be reduced.

Mr. Krotki asked how large an area would be required for the construction of sufficient low-cost houses to meet the anticipated demand.

Ustaz Saad al Din Fawzi said that there seemed to be a curious policy of subsidising the rates of the higher income groups, but not those of the lower grades. The lower-paid groups could not afford to pay rent and rates sufficient to provide amenities such as lighting, roads and gardens. The Municipal Council should in fact rate the better-off areas more heavily in order to provide these amenities in the poorer areas.

Mr. Disney remarked that as the construction of the roof was the greatest obstacle to the reduction of costs, the possibilities of the unsupported barrel-vaulted roof (as found in Upper Egypt) might be investigated. This type of roof required no timber supports.

'Abd al 'Aziz Eff. Abu Samra asked whether plots would be auctioned publicly or whether their distribution would be Government controlled; whether production of houses would be limited by administrative action and whether these low-cost houses would be available to all or reserved for Government employees. He also stated that in his opinion the occupier should not be exclusively responsible for the maintenance of his road frontage if it was habitually used as a thoroughfare by vehicles.

Mr. Wordsworth asked who was going to undertake the actual building. At present contractors were unable, and the Government apparently unwilling, to do so.

Mr. Andrew asked if it was known in how many cases there was more than one wage-earner per family. Mr. Sandison's calculations assumed that there was never more than one.

Fadl Eff. Barbari stressed the importance of not overlooking the need for rented houses, at rents suited to all income levels.

Mr. Young pointed out that the cost of building with stabilised earth blocks would be considerably increased if the local soil were to prove unsuitable for the manufacture of these blocks.

Mr. Wakefield doubted whether the planning of the New Deims would produce the coherent social groupings which existed in Omdurman. He also doubted whether the present plan made adequate provision for the future expansion of amenities.

Mr. Beaton said that it was depressing to find that overcrowding was already a problem in the recently-planned New Deims. If low-cost housing was to be a success, it was essential to obtain adequate administrative powers to prevent overcrowding. In England schemes were supervised by Estate Managers; in Omdurman there were the Shaikhs of Quarters. An official of the Political Service had recently been detailed to investigate what administrative powers were necessary to prevent overcrowding, and how these powers might be most effectively exercised.

Mr. Richards said that low-cost housing could not be considered in in isolation from the planning of towns as a whole. In the Sudan people lived around rather than in their houses, and single-storey buildings were the rule. The result was that nearly all towns in the Sudan were too large, and costs and rates became inflated in consequence. The Government could influence town-planning by the dispersal of industries—and perhaps by administration. Was it really necessary that all Government Departments should have their Headquarters in Khartoum? Dispersal of some of these to other parts of the country could have a very beneficial effect upon town-planning.

The President, *Mr. P. J. Sandison,* replying to the discussion, thanked members for their stimulating comments, which had ranged over a field far wider than he could cover in the time at his disposal.

The excessive growth of towns was a symptom of an unbalance between urban and rural economies, an unbalance which England had experienced in an extreme form, and which was becoming common all over Africa to-day. Sir Philip Mitchell, in his report *Land and Population in East Africa,* had devoted considerable attention to this development.

Mr. Sandison agreed with Mr. Beaton on the vital importance of effective administration of housing estates.

He thought that the grouping of houses, while not automatically grouping their inhabitants, would facilitate social intercourse and accelerate the emergence of a community spirit. Hire-purchase might help, by making it easier for people to move from one house to another, and so enabling them to group themselves.

Until the social survey of Khartoum had been completed—perhaps by the end of 1953—it would not be possible to say how many wage-earners there were in an average family.

Plans for the building of houses for rent had been abandoned because experience had shewn that the repair of negligent or wilful damage involved a substantial addition to costs—and the reduction of costs was the primary aim of the whole scheme for low-cost housing.

There was no intention of building exclusively for any particular class of the public, such as Government officials.

Mr. Sandison agreed with Ustaz Fawzi that workers' estates could not bear the full cost of services and he believed that it was a general practice for public authorities to find money for these from areas with a higher rateable value.

He regretted his inability to reply definitely to all the points raised, raised, and emphasised that the title of his Address was "*Problems* of Low-cost Housing . . . " His Address did not pretend to give all the answers, but was rather a *compte rendu* of the present state of his researches.

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مشكلات البيوت ذات التكاليف المنخفضة

يصف الكاتب تخطيطاً تقليدياً لبيت من بيوت شمال السودان ويقول إنه يبنى من الطين ويقوى « بالزبل » وأنه يفى بالحاجة إلى السكن فى السودان لأنه يحتوى غرفاً كثيفة الظل وله حوش واسع وحاجز يفصل المطبخ وما يتصل به من مزعجات عن غرف السكن ، ثم ينتقل الى تخطيط المدن ويقول إنه نعمة وزيادة غير أن التخطيط فيها ، أو فقدانه ، قد يؤثر فى خلق السكان وخصوصاً الشباب .

ثم يتحدث الكاتب عن تكاليف هذا البيت فيقرر أن أبسط بيت سودانى مؤلف من ثلاث غرف يكلف ١٨٠ جنيها ويحتاج إلى نفقة شهرية مقدارها ٢/٢٣٦ جنيهاً لتغطية أمور الضرائب والصيانة وتسديد القرض حتى ولو كان هذا بمعدله المنخفض جداً يتم تسديده خلال ٢٥ سنه بربح ٤٪ ومثل هذا البيت يؤجر فى الشهر عادة بأربعة جنيهات من ضمنها الضريبة حتى إن الرجل إذا عجز عن أن يبنى ، فانه بالأحرى عاجز عن أن يستأجر . ثم إن التكاليف الاولية التى لابد أن يدفعها من يطلب قطعة من الأرض الحكومية ليبنى عليها بيتا تبلغ عشرين جنيهاً ولكن أقل مساحة للقطع المبيعة تبلغ ٢٠٠ متر مربع ، فالفقراء من ذوى العائلات يعجزون عن الاستفادة من القطع المخصصة لهم ، أما الأحسن منهم حالا فانهم إن شاءوا الحصول على قطعة أكبر كلفهم ذلك بيع البيت الذى يملكونه ونزعوا أنفسهم من بيئتهم الاجتماعية الأولى فأصبحوا تحت عبء جديد من النفقات أكثر من ذى قبل . ولنفرض ان ١٥٪ من دخل أرباب البيوت يستطيع أن يغطى تكاليف الأجور والضرائب فان ما يكلفه البيت ذو الثلاث غرف أكبر من طاقة أى فرد يقل دخله عن ١٥ جنيها فى الشهر .

فالمشكلة الرئيسية فى البيوت ذات التكاليف المنخفضة هى كيف نهيىء سكنا صحياً ملائماً لاشخاص يقل دخلهم عن ١٥ جنيها فى الشهر ، على ان نفترض أن المساعدات المالية ليست أمراً عملياً — على نطاق واسع — (وكذلك هى الحال فى السودان).

فلو أن تكاليف الصيانة خفضت إلى النصف (من ٤٪ — ٢٪) وهذا ما يمكن القيام به ، بتحسين طرق البناء ، فأن الذى يكسب دخلا مقداره ٧ جنيهات فى

الشهر يستطيع أن يواجه التكاليف الناشئة عن بيت يكلف ١٤٢ جنيها ؛ والرجل الذى يأتيه من الدخل الشهرى ما مقداره : ١٥ جنيها يستطيع أن يواجه تكاليف بيت تبلغ ٢٥٦ جنيها على فرض أن تسديد هذا المبلغ يتم فى ٢٥ سنة بربح ٤٪ .

ولكن كيف يبنى مثل هذا البيت ؟ إن استعمال الطين فيه بطء وضياع للجهود وهو يكلف أيضا ٤,٤٪ من رأس المال للصيانة . ويتعرض كيان البيت نفسه لمواطن ضعف، ويكون تأثير المطر فيه شديداً : ولما كانت نفقات الجدران تحتاج ٤٦٪ من مجموع التكاليف فالمشكلة هى أن نوجد بديلا رخيصاً قوياً يقـوم مقام الطين . أما الطوب الاحمر والطوب المجفف فى الشمس فكلاهما غالى الثمن . ولكن يبدو أن ما يحل الأزمة هو البلوكات الترابية التى تكسب صلابة بمزجها بنسبة قليلة (٦٪-١٠٪) من اسمنت بورتلاند . وهذه البلوكات المسماة «بلوكات كارلشتاين» تصنع بالآلة وهى جيدة التماسك ولا تحتاج الى ملاط (مونة) . وقد برهنت على أنها متينة معمرة فى ساحل الذهب ويستطيع أن يرصها عامل غير كبير المهارة وتكاليفها تبلغ حوالى ثلث تكاليف الطين ويباع الطن من اسمنت بورتلاند باثنى عشر جنيها فهو يكون ٥٠٪ من تكاليف البلوك . وبعد هذا كله لا نزال فى حاجة إلى البحث عن مواد رخيصة ملائمة للسقوف .

ويمكن أن تبنى البيوت من غرفة أو اثنتين أو ثلاث وتكلف على الترتيب ١٨٥ ، ٢٥٠، ٣٠٠ جنيهاً وتكون أحسن من النماذج القديمة من كل وجه : من حيث أساساتها المتينة ، ومتانة جدرانها ، و « مصنعية خشب » أرقى . ولا تزيد تكاليف صيانتها عن ٢٪ من رأس المال وأقل الانواع تكاليف يمكن أن يستطيعه شخص يبلغ دخله عشرة جنيهات شهرياً .

إن الحاجة ماسة الى المال فما لم توجد الحكومة رأسمال بربح ٤٪ فلا نجاح للمشروع لأن رأس المال الخاص لا يمكن الحصول عليه بهذا الربح الضئيل ؛ والمال الحكومى معناه ضمنيا الاشراف على عناية أصحاب البيوت بها وعلى نظام فى جمع الأقساط الشهرية المطلوبة ممن تملكوا تلك البيوت .

لقد كانت المصاعب واضحة ولكن كاتب المقال لا يظن تذليلها أمراً مستحيلا خصوصا وان مثل هذه المشروعات نجح فى افريقيا الفرنسية والكنغو البلجيكى وناتال (بافريقيا الجنوبية) .

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF URBAN HOUSING IN THE NORTHERN SUDAN

By Sa 'ad ed Din Fawzi

I. INTRODUCTION.

In this paper I make an attempt to consider only a few of the many problems of urban housing in the Northern Sudan. The problems I shall be concerned with are mainly of a social nature, although I shall find it necessary to touch from time to time on the economic aspects of the question. My treatment of the subject is further limited in two more respects. In the first place the social aspects which I shall be dealing with will be reviewed with particular reference to low-cost housing, for these problems, as we shall see later, assume special importance where the need for economy imposes severe limitations on house design, plot lay-out, and size of plot. In the second place the investigation upon which the discussion is based has not been extended beyond the native lodging areas and urban suburbs of Khartoum — capital city of the Sudan. However the general uniformity of social customs and traditions in the urban centres of the Sudan affords some reason for the belief that the investigation conducted in the Khartoum *Deims* (or native lodging areas) may shed more than a local light on the problems involved. This belief is further reinforced by the fact that the population resident in the New *Deims* of Khartoum gives a fairly representative cross-section of the living conditions of urban working classes in the Northern Sudan.

Before proceeding therefore with the main subject of this paper it is desirable to give a brief account of the investigation on which the discussion is based as well as a short description of the general character of the site and population among whom it was conducted.

The main work, which took the form of a sample survey in the New *Deims* and of a hundred per cent survey in Buri Abu Hashiesh, a suburb of Khartoum, was designed to shed light on a number of important problems, and to give as clear a picture as possible of the life of the people concerned. The subjects covered by the questionnaire forms can be conveniently grouped as follows :

(i) There is a set of questions relating to the size and structure of the population, the occupational structure of the communities concerned, their levels of income, and a host of related issues connected with conditions of employment.

(ii) The second set of questions concentrates fundamentally on housing conditions with special reference to the distribution of family sizes, population density, the ratio of owners to tenants, the occupancy

rate (i.e. the number of persons per room), the degree of overcrowding, credit facilities and the degree of indebtedness in relation to house-building, and other related problems.

(iii) The third set of questions will shed, it is hoped, some light on the social life of the people, both as individuals and as a community. Such fundamental questions as the way in which people spend their leisure time, the means of transport they use in getting to work, the details of their life while at home, are all covered by the questionnaire forms.

This, then, was the general purpose and nature of the main survey. A survey of opinion, male and female, was also undertaken. It took the form of discussion groups and dealt with equally important, but rather different questions. This part of the work, as its title implies, was concerned essentially with opinions not facts. The idea was to ascertain the people's views on such questions as the adequacy of the basic layouts of the houses they occupy in relation to their family life, social commitments and economic resources. It was also designed to ascertain their views on the sizes of the plots they at present occupy. Their views on the provision of various additional facilities to the basic layout (of two rooms, pit latrine and kitchen) were also sought.

This, in brief, was the general scope of the investigation. It will be impossible to deal with all the problems raised in the Survey in this paper. The writer, therefore, intends to restrict himself to one principal theme: namely, house design and plot layout in relation to the requirements of family and social life of the lowly paid[1] section of the urban population.

II. THE DEIMS OF KHARTOUM.

Before dealing with this problem, however, we must go on, as promised above, to describe briefly the character of the site and population among whom the investigation was conducted.

The principal suburbs in which the Survey was carried out were the New *Deims*. This is a native lodging area most of which sprang up in the post-war years, and it forms at present the Southern part of the Khartoum Municipality. It lies outside the Railway Ring, south of the new Residential Areas and the Light Industrial Area, both of which date back to the years of feverish building activity and expansion following the close of the second World War, and both of which lie south of the Railway Ring. This Ring until 1945 formed the southern boundary of Khartoum.

The New *Deims* are dignified by the term "New" in order to distinguish them from the OLD *DEIMS* or insanitary slums from which the residents have been moved to the New *Deims* in the last few years, and which were completely demolished in order, among other things, to enable the Capital City to pursue its natural and inevitable growth.

1 "Lowly paid" is defined for the purposes of this paper to cover households whose incomes do not exceed fifteen Egyptian pounds per month.

The Old *Deims* dated back to the early years of this century, when they were built to accommodate the working people who had been busy building the newly occupied Capital. At the time of resettlement (1949) there were twelve Deims altogether, comprising some five thousand "houses" built of *jaloos* (i.e. rammed earth or cob) and accommodating some seventeen thousand people, who lived in conditions of terrible overcrowding.

The plots were very much undersized — ranging from thirty to sixty square metres. The typical "house" consisted of a single room of abou 5 x 5 metres, and at the beginning had no compound. Compounds were subsequently allowed and the residents provided themselves with some privacy by walling in a small area around their rooms. To make things worse, there were no proper latrine arrangements, and the people had to use the empty spaces around their *Deims* which was both unhygenic and offensive to the ordinary sen e of decency amongst the people.

The residents of the Old *Deims* were, of course, essentially workers employed in urban jobs in Government departments and private establishments. Their standard of life and their money incomes were low by any standard. The natural growth of the population, the influx of many people into Khartoum during the War years, as well as the lack of alternative accommodation, increased the degree of overcrowding in the old *Deims* in the last ten years of their life to a very serious extent. The authorities became increasingly aware that a single room with a tiny compound, and as the only latrine accommodation a long journey into the open desert, did not provide the possibility of any decent sort of family life even on the very lowest standard.

This depressing picture of the Old *Deims* is however brightened, especia ly on the social side, by one or two interesting features. Before going into these one or two remarks about the general layout of the old *Deims* must be me ıtioned. While it would be true to say that very little conscious planning went into the Old *Deims*, it would be equally wrong to maintain that they grew in a completely haphazard fashion. They were, in fact, in blocks of approximately 100 square metres, divided by 40 metre roads which, being v:rtually free from traffic, provided extensive "open spaces". Within the blocks the "houses" were divided by five metre lanes which were not twisting, nor excessively narrow, and there was nothing similar to some of the more congested parts of Omdurman or Medani.

On the social side the Old *Deims* seemed in many ways to comprise well-integrated communities, sharing certain loyalties, and exchanging certain mutual obligations. The binding force in some of them seems to have been tribal cohesion. Thus *Deim Ta'aisha*, as its name impl es,

consisted principally of members of the *Ta'aisha* tribe. The same could be said of *Deim Gawama'a* whose name had a tribal ring. *Deims Tagali* and *Nyala*, both called after certain districts in the Western Sudan, contained, originally at least, residents drawn from these districts. *Deim Telegraph*, on the other hand, combined tribal features with another binding force. It so happened that it consisted mainly of *Ja'alin* drawn from the *Shendi* district in the Northern Province. But it also had members of other tribes. As its name implies, however, most of its early inhabitants were workers employed by the Posts and Telegraphs Department.

Another aspect of the community spirit which used to animate the various sections of the Old *Deims* was the amount of help which the inhabitants gave to their poor. On such questions no exact or statistical data could be given. But the fact that at the time of resettlement the hard core of the really poor was found to be surprisingly small is significant in this connection.

It is, however, very important not to exaggerate the cohesive force of tribal allegiance in the Old *Deims*. The *Deims* were, after all, a suburb of Khartoum, the centre of national and political sentiment, and tribal ties must have gradually weakened and other ties have grown in their place. The important point in this respect is the fact that the peoples of the Old *Deims* seem to have had a certain communal spirit and to have enjoyed certain communal ties. It is hoped that something of the same spirit has been transferred through the process of resettlement to the New *Deims*, to which we must now turn.

Perhaps the best way of introducing the New *Deims* is to describe the way they came into existence, and perhaps the best way of doing this is to begin by summing up briefly the various factors which made it imperative that the Old *Deims* should be demolished.

That slum conditions prevailed in the Old *Deims* had been recognised by the authorities long ago. Indeed many abortive attempts were made in the last twenty years or so to resettle some of the population living there. Thus as early as 1930 an area south west of the then existing Old *Deims* was earmarked for resettlement and a plan for its development was made consisting unfortunately of very small (5 x 10 metre) layouts. The houses built stand nowadays as *Deim Sagganc*, and efforts are being made to amalgamate them into larger plots. Two more attempts at resettling the people in the New *Deims* took place in 1939 and 1946/47, this time, however, on larger plots of 200 square metres. All this did not help very much in solving the problem of the Old *Deims*. For the occupants of the newly built houses in the New *Deims* left their houses in the Old *Deims* intact and started renting them out to tenants. Thus what the "resettlement" did was to create a class of absentee landlords —which class, as we shall see later, provided the hard core of opposition when resettlement proper started in all seriousness later on.

Before we go on to describe the general principles involved in the vast task of resettling the people in the New *Deims*, reference must be made to the fundamental factors which brought things to a head, and made the demolition of the Old *Deims* necessary in the post-war period. The first important factor has already been referred to, namely the appreciation by the authorities of the fact that housing conditions in the Old *Deims* were seriously inadequate for the minimum requirements of decent family living. The second fundamental factor was the fact that the Old *Deims* lay athwart the line of expansion southwards of Khartoum. This important aspect of the problem should be viewed against the natural growth of the population inside the Railway Ring, and the inevitable pressure to build outside it. This land hunger led to a terrific rise in land values and brought the newly approved residential areas south of the Railway Ring to the doorsteps of the Old *Deims*. And yet the demand for land in Khartoum South, enhanced by the greater accessibility of the outlying areas due to the end of petrol rationing in 1949, could not be satisfied until the Old *Deims* had been demolished. This expansion of Khartoum southwards gave rise to another consideration, that of public health. New buildings started to occupy many of the open spaces around the Old *Deims* and the question of latrine arrangements became particularly acute.

All these factors gave a sense of urgency to the problem and in March 1949 a *Deims* resettlement officer was appointed to carry out a social survey of the Old *Deims*, to lay down general principles according to which resettlement should take place and to supervise the projected operation itself.

In allocating land in the New *Deims* two fundamental criteria were adopted : ownership and length of occupation. Thus 200 square metre plots were allocated to :

(a) All owner-occupiers.
(b) All tenants who :
  (i) had been residing in the Old *Deims* for the previous ten years,
and (ii) had their families living with them,
and (iii) had permanent employment in Khartoum.

All resettled persons were left to build their new houses without financial assistance from the Government. On the demolition of their old houses they were entitled to collect all woodwork, wooden beams and the like, and to use them in their new houses. It was, however, recognised that there must be a certain portion of the population who qualified for plots, but who could not build without substantial assistance, and who did not want to go into alms houses. Such persons were given *ex-gratia* payments of L.E. 10 and were left to their own devices. The number—29 persons altogether—of people who fell into this category among the inhabitants of *Deims Salma*, *Gashasha* and *Telegraph*, is surprisingly small,

when we remember that there were altogether about 1233 dwellings in these *Deims*. The hard core of the really poor, which had also turned out to be surprisingly small (24 persons in the three *Deims* surveyed in 1948) were to be accommodated in alms houses, built at public expense.

The fact is that the New *Deims* were built during a terrific building boom, covering the very much wealthier First and Second Class Residential Areas, and the Light Industrial Area south of the Railway Ring. Consequently the cost of building materials, particularly roofing material, soared upwards. The people of the *Deims* had also to compete, with unequal resources, for the services of skilled and unskilled labour, and for the services of expensive motor transport. All this was coupled with a rising cost of living which affected in particular the prices of grain—the staple food of the population.

Legally, of course, the residents of the Old *Deims* were not entitled to compensation. The Old *Deims* were classified as "native lodging areas" and as such were subject to the provisions embodied in regulations 65-69 of the Standard Local Government (Municipalities) Regulations, 1938. According to Regulation 68 residents of native lodging areas could not qualify for compensation on eviction if they had enjoyed a minimum of ten years occupancy, This regulation, in fact, ruled out the possibility of compensating allottees in the Old *Deims*, for most of them had been in residence for at least ten years.

The Khartoum district authorities were not unaware of the financial strain imposed on the population by rising building costs, but they were hampered by shortage of funds and personnel. An extensive scheme of housing loans or government subsidies would have required special funds and extensive organization, for which the district authorities were not equipped.

The fact remains, however, that building costs were beyond the resources of a certain portion of the population. A conservative estimate made in 1949 of the cost of building a standard *jalloos* (rammed earth) house consisting of two rooms, pit latrine, Kitchen and a wall surrounding a 200 square metre plot, stood at L.E. 96. It is not surprising therefore that practically all the forty persons or so who attended the discussion groups held for the lowest income groups (L.E. 1 to L.E. 9 per month with concentration around the L.E. 4-7 income range) have not been able to build the whole of their houses. A large proportion of them have succeeded in building only the ouside wall and the kitchen which is now being used as a living room. It would also be interesting to know the degree of indebtedness in which those who built the entire house had involved themselves. [1]

1 Information is being collected on this important subject and when analysed will be published.

When all has been said, it r mains true that from June 1949 onwards great progress was achieved in what was, in effect, a great operation of slum clearance and social resettlement. In its initial stages the scheme was met by the bitter opposition of absentee landlords, but the resumption by government in June 1949 of one hundred and three plots allotted in 1946/47 and hitherto undeveloped, dissipated the opposition and opened the way to a compromise whereby the scheme was to go through unopposed and the plots were to be restored.

According to the Khartoum Province annual report for 1949/50 "demolition of the old houses began in June and increased in intensity in each succeeding month. By the end of the year the whole of *Deim Salman* was resettled and most of *Deims Gashasha* and *Telegraph*. A total of 1057 houses had been demolished leaving only 103 to be finished off in January. Five hundred and eight plots were allotted in the New *Deims* in September to residents of these three Old *Deims*. Standard house plans were produced by the Municipal Engineer and plot boundaries pegged out on the ground by the Survey Department, Each tenant chose the plan he preferred and on payment of fees for the plan and the survey, a total of P.T. 35 (approximately seven shillings), was allowed to proceed with the building. A considerable number of houses had been finished by the end of 1949 and all residents had moved by mid-January."

Equally spectacular progress was achieved in 1950/51, and according to the Province report for that year, 3099 houses had been demolished altogether by that time in the Old *Deims*, out of a total of 3777 houses earmarked for demolition. The operation has now been completed, and the New *Deims* are estimated to comprise about 8000 houses accommodating some forty thousand people. The success and the smoothness with which resettlement has been achieved stands as a tribute to the skill and ability brought into it by Mr. S. R. Simpson, Commissioner of Lands until 1953, Mr. A. J. V. Arthur, the then District Commissioner Khartoum, and Ali Effendi Nadeem, Deims Resettlement Officer.

III. REVIEW OF EXISTING PLOT LAYOUTS.

After this rather lengthy introduction I come to the main theme of this paper The subject will necessarily revolve around the all-important question of how to provide adequately for the requirements of family life and the family's social commitments within the limitations imposed by the need for economy in low-cost housing. The problem is one which concerns not only the planning authorities but also the people to be housed. I shall therefore begin by examining the views put forward by the residents of the New *Deims* on the layouts with which they were provided during resettlement, with special reference to the issue under discussion. There is reason to believe, as I shall try to show, that the problems, raised are not peculiar to the *Deims*, but a question for urban low-cost housing in the Northern Sudan as a whole.

House design will be defined for the purposes of this paper "as the organization of space in such a manner as to provide for the domestic needs, and protection against the elements, of the society for whom the houses are intended, in the most economical and efficient way." [1]

With this definition in mind let us review the two predominant plot layouts one encounters in the New *Deims*.

(1) *First Design.* The first important design the investigator came across is very simple. It is illustrated in four different versions below (see Figures I-IV). In discussing the adequacy or otherwise of the design, a remarkable degree of similarity was observed among the various income groups who took part in the discussion. This general similarity, transcending as it does differences in economic resources, is mainly explicable by reference to the general social tradition in the country, and by reference to the generally accepted views as to the position of women in Sudanese society. Without going fully into the matter at this stage, one fundamental point must be stated from the beginning. This is the fairly general seclusion of women, practiced almost universally in most urban areas and by most sections of the community, in the Northern Sudan. While there is nothing approaching the *harem* institution, women are expected not to mix with strangers, and not to take part in social and other activities with men.

With this sociological background in mind I must now go on to discuss the views expressed in the various discussion groups in the New *Deims*.

There is no doubt that there was a general dissatisfaction with the design under review amongst all "classes" of the community. Their complaint put briefly is this : it does not allow satisfactorily for their family life or social commitments. To elucidate this point the detailed criticisms put forward by them can be summed up as follows :

(A) Sleeping Arrangements :

(i) It does not cater for the fundamental privacy required by the parents in relation to their off-spring. Hence the sleeping arrangements are most unsatisfactory. The mother may sleep with her daughters in that part of the yard lying in front of the two rooms or in front of the verandah if there is one, while the father may sleep, together with his sons in that very small part of the yard which lies behind the gate.

(ii) The situation becomes particularly bad when the household includes adult sons and daughters. Sleeping arrangements which satisfy social proprieties become impossible.

1 Calderwood · House Design, in *Proceedings of the Regional Conference on Housing Research South of Sahara. Technical Papers* — Vol. I. 1953.



1:100 & PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM DEIMS

ON NORTHERN PLOT

FIG. I

PLATE III



1:100 PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM

ON SOUTHERN PLOT

FIG. II

PLATE IV



1:100 ₣ PLAN (S.1) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM DEIMS

ON NORTHERN PLOT

FIG. III

PLATE V



1:100 PLAN (S.I) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM

ON SOUTHERN PLOT

FIG. IV

PLATE VI

(iii) The situation becomes really critical when a male guest visits the household and stays for a short or long period. The people of the New *Deims* who are living in standard plots (i.e. 200 square metres) laid out according to the design under discussion, solve the problem by arranging for the guest to sleep in the street.

(B) The Problem of Guests :

The life of the household is seriously disrupted whenever the family receives its guests. The difficult points, as put by the people, are as follows :

(i) If the guest is in the Guests' Room, it becomes almost impossible for the women-folk to use the gate leading into the street. It becomes equally difficult for any female guest to enter the house.

(ii) There is hardly a "private" place, in the yard for the women or the men to entertain their female or male visitors. Whenever female visitors call, the adult male members of the household must leave the house, or sit indoors. Similarly if the male members of the household are about the house then the female visitors must stay indoors. In the hot climate of the Northern Sudan this is hardly a suitable arrangement.

(C) The Position of the Latrine and the Kitchen.

The position of the latrine and the litchen was the subject of heated discussion. The views expressed fell naturally into two parts.

(i) The position of latrine and kitchen in relation to domestic needs.

(ii) Their position in relation to visitors.

(i) In some versions of the design (Fig. II) the kitchen is situated in that corner of the yard which faces the gate. It also happens to be the furthest corner from the family room. To this layout two objections were raised :

(a) It involves a longer distance for the women to walk from family room to kitchen. And since most cooking is done during the hottest part of the morning this is hardly satisfactory .Moreover the kitchen is more frequently used as compared with the latrine, and its natural place is thus nearest to the family room.

(b) To put the kitchen opposite the gate is to invite constant embarrassment to the women. This is so because they would be exposed whenever the gate is opened. The matter is of special importance because the women often go about their domestic work in the minimum of clothes due to climatic conditions.

When questioned about the layout in which the kitchen is opposite the family room, and the latrine lies in the corner that faces the gate (Fig. I), they had the following points to make.

(i) The position of the kitchen in this case was satisfactory.

(ii) The siting of the latrine opposite the gate was also a source of embarrasment to the women and especially when there are male visitors in the guest room. Something like the position of the latrine in Figure IV, especially when the latrine is equipped with two doors, seemed suitable in their opinion, within the frame-work of existing designs.

Two important points were stated, however, in favour of the design in question.

(i) It is economical in walls and is therefore cheaper to build. This is perhaps the reason why a lot of people have opted for it.

(ii) The siting of the rooms next to each other leaves a relatively large compact open space, while the second design (discussed below) virtually divides the yard into two relatively small parts.

What are we to make of these critical opinions ? Some of the criticisms contain, to my mind, a lot of force and cannot be brushed aside lightly if we subscribe to the view that in house design we must try, within certain limitations imposed by economic factors, to meet as many of the requirements of family life as possible. Thus the point about the inadequacy of sleeping arrangements must be given serious consideration. The siting of the kitchen opposite the gate seems to me indefensible and should be easily rectifiable.

The problem of guests, whether they stay for longer periods or merely drop in, links up, of course, with the social structure of Sudanese society, at its present stage of development. The matter requires some serious thought, and an attempt will be made to touch upon it later, when we have dealt with the second predominant design.

(2) *Second Design.* The second main design in its various versions is illustrated below (Figures V-VIII).

What do the people think of it ? They were in general less criticical of it, and for reasons which will emerge in the course of the discussion. In presenting the point of view put forward in the various discussion groups, the same sequence of subjects followed in discussing the first design will be adopted.



1:100 PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM DEIMS

ON NORTHERN PLOT

FIG. V

PLATE VII



1:100 PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM

ON SOUTHERN PLOT

FIG. VI

PLATE VIII

A. Sleeping Arrangements.

(i) The design caters more than the previous one for the proprieties entertained by the people as to sleeping arrangements. The parents can sleep in that part of the yard which lies between the street wall and the guest room (yard I). The children can sleep, on the other hand, in that part of the yard into which the family room opens. (Yard II.)

(ii) If there are male guests staying with the family the male guests and the host can sleep in Yard I, while the rest of the family can sleep in Yard II. A similar arrangement can also be made for female guests.

(iii) If the household includes adult sons and daughters sleeping arrangements become more complicated, but they are not insoluble. Besides the two areas mentioned above (Yards I and II) there are small spaces which give a certain amount of privacy.

B. The Problem of Guests.

(i) Sleeping arrangements in this type of layout are much better, as noted above, even when guests are staying with the family.

(ii) The situation is also better in relation to casual visitors, male or female. The female visitors can share that part of the yard usually used by the family. The male visitors can be entertained in that part of the yard which lies outside the guest room.

C. The Position of Latrine and Kitchen.

(i) Objections similar to those mentioned when dealing with the siting of the kitchen opposite the gate in the first design, were put forward. These can be summed up as follows :

(a) The kitchen is too far from the family room. (b) The women are exposed whenever the gate is opened.

To this was added the argument that the kitchen, when sited opposite the gate, is vertually next door to the Guest Room with all the complications attendant on this when there are male visitors in the house.

(ii) In those designs where the latrine is sited in that corner which faces the gate, some difficulty is experienced by the women in getting to it when there are men in the guest room. This is, however, solved by the people by providing the latrine with two "doors" opening in the appropriate directions.

It would seem from the above that the second design meets to a large extent the requirements of family life and the family's commitments in society.

The design has, however, been criticised on economic grounds. It is certainly not economical in walls as compared with the first one. It involves higher capital expenditure, and higher maintenance costs. This, in its turn, influences the level of rents in the New *Deims*.

Are we to conclude, then, that we have reached a situation whereby the happiness and comfort of the household can only be satisfied by adopting the more expensive designs ? In order to resolve this dilemma we must discuss the three fundamental questions which lie at its very roots.

(a) To what extent should we make allowances for the generally accepted scale of values as to the place of women in Sudanese soceity ?

(b) Have we exhausted all possible ways of reducing capital expenditure and maintenance costs in low-cost housing ?

(c) Have we exhausted all our resources in producing standard designs which could combine family comfort and relatively low cost ?

IV. HOUSE DESIGN AND SOCIAL FACTORS.

To begin with the first question. What, as precisely as possible, is the meaning of this " seclusion " of women in Sudanese society ? " Seclusion" of women, certainly, does not mean the division of the members of the *same* household into males and females who, though residing together, have virtually separate lives. In many cases social custom may dictate that the two sexes in the same household should eat separately, but for most functions of family life, the family is one unit. " Seclusion "is valid only for one sex in relation to the " stranger " or " outsider " of the opposite sex. To explain what is meant by " stranger " or " outsider " in this context, an example may be appropriate. I might be on very good terms with my life-long neighbour, but I am still a stranger in relation to his womenfolk, and must be treated accordingly. The same, of course, applies to him. The concept of the " outsider " or " stranger " itself is, of course, not precisely bounded, and we must expect to find a number of borderline cases varying from one household to another and from time to time.

If the above analysis is to be accepted as generally correct then one important question follows. To what extent should we modify house design, essentially planned for a family living as one unit, to take into account the situation created by the presence in the household of " strangers " or " outsiders " ? Here again we must distinguish between two types of " visitors." There are, on the one hand, those (e.g. neighbours) who drop in for the ordinary purposes of social intercourse and there are, on the other hand, those visitors (e.g. friends of the man or the woman) who come to stay for shorter or longer periods. The distinction is very important, for if we were only dealing with the occasional visitor who comes to stay for some time, then the situation could be regarded as "abnormal" and we need not take notice of it in house design. The women would certainly suffer by the presence of a " stranger " in the house, but they could reasonably be expected to put up with an admittedly difficult situation on the ground that it would not last long. Unfortunately for the designer, however, we must cater for the



1:100 Fº PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM

ON SOUTHERN PLOT

FIG. VII

PLATE IX



1:100 of PLAN (S.2) FOR SINGLE PLOT AT KHARTOUM DEIMS

(ON NORTHERN PLOT)

FIG. VIII

PLATE X

ordinary exchange of visits of different households, and these visits, as stated above, are almost always exchanged by the different sexes separately. To this we must also add the pressing but natural need, for a certain amount of privacy as between the members of the same household.

What conclusions have we reached as a result of the preceding discussion ? To say with some "reformers" that we must ignore the question of "seclusion" altogether, and design our houses with an eye on economic considerations only, with the purpose of "forcing," as it were, the residents of these houses to adopt the social habits that go with a mixed society, is in my opinion, to take an extreme view. It is certainly not the most suitable way of bringing about a social revolution, of the type the "reformers" contemplate. To say this is not to approve the traditional place occupied by women in the urban societies of the Northern Sudan. All that the writer is maintaining is that changes of deeply rooted attitudes, and well established social values take a relatively long time to achieve and are best tackled through the spreading of education and the dissemination of new ideas. Moreover housing designs which ignore the question of "seclusion" altogether, at the present stage in the development of Sudanese society will amount to a policy of forcing the people to adopt their lives to their houses, rather than adapting their houses to the lives of the people.

To ignore economic considerations, on the other hand, altogether, and to design with an eye primarily on social factors is unrealistic. There is something in the view advocated by one expert that "subsidies do not lead to a real solution of the housing problem. They are to be considered only as a measure of transition until ways and means are found for solving the housing problem economically."

The solution, as usual lies somewhere between these two extreme views. This is particularly so if we keep another consideration in mind. No society stands still and Sudanese society, like other societies, is slowly changing, and the social concepts and standards of its members are gradually assuming new forms. This requires that house design should be flexible.

It would seem that the best solution lies in a design which satisfies to some extent social considerations and economic factors. The provision of a dividing wall within the plot, put forward by the people as a solution, seems to satisfy, *prima facie* at least, these criteria as well as that of flexibility. The problems involved in such a solution will be dealt with in a subsequent section of this paper.

V. THE NEED FOR HOUSING RESEARCH.

The second question raised above, viz: have we exhausted all possible ways of reducing capital expenditure and maintenance costs in low-cost housing? — indicates, at once, the need for research into housing problems

in the Sudan. The need for research is equally implied by our third fundamental question, viz: have we exhausted all our resources in producing standard designs which could combine family comfort with relatively low costs ?

The necessity for such research has been recognised in many countries — and the fine work done in South Africa is one of the best attempts in this field. The Sudan has, however, lagged behind and apart from an excellent start by the Gezira Board and the Workers' Housing Committee, nothing much has been done.

Broadly speaking two main lines of research have been pursued :
(a) The improvement of existing methods of building.
(b) The introduction of new methods.

With regard to the first line of development research continues at present in order to improve the methods of *jaloos* building. Unfortunately, however, the scope is limi ed in this connection. "*Jaloos* methods" says an official note prepared by the Chairman, Workers' Housing Committee, "can be rationalised and the resulting structures can be to a certain extent protected more adequately from the weather. But the necessity of allowing each course of mud to dry for two or three days before placing the next course is a positive limiting factor to speed and economy of labour. In general *jaloos* has very poor weather resistance, depends for its strength upon the characteristics of local soil, and is unsuited to medium and heavy rain-fall areas."

In the second field i.e. the introduction of new methods, the idea has been from the start, according to the official note, to look for a method which "while producing structures of satisfactory thermal characteristics, with a life of thirty years, will use the minimum of cement and labour, especially skilled or supervisory labour, and which will produce houses quickly. Furthermore the amount of fixed plant needed must be low and the operating capital reasonable." The solution to the problem has been found in a block-making machine invented by Mr. H. J. Carlstein, of South Africa. The blocks produced are hollow, self-aligning and positively interlocking, to avoid the need for using mortar.

As far as costs are concerned the official note makes the following most illuminating comparison. "The *jaloos* walling of a Khartoum *deims*—pattern house (a 200 sq. m. plot with two rooms, kitchen and pit latrine) costs L.E. 90, and the completed house L.E. 196. Built in Carlstein blocks the walling will cost between L.E. 105 and L.E. 125 according to the proportion of cement used (6% or 8% or 10%). The complete house will cost not more than L.E. 247 (excluding aqua privy which is not allowed for in the *jaloos* house cost). The additional cost is saved in maintenance charges (estimated for a *jaloos* house at L.E 5 annually) over the first fifteen years' life, and over the remaining fifteen years the owner saves L.E. 60".



SKETCH - PLAN FOR SINGLE PLOT WITH DIVIDING WALL

FIG. IX

PLATE XI

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The fundamental lesson driven home by this account is very simple, but extremely significant : it is only through housing research that we can reduce costs, and it is only when we reduce costs that we allow ourselves a wider scope for meeting, within reason, the pressing needs of the life of the people to be housed.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE DIVIDING WALL.

It has been argued above that a satisfactory house design must take into account a number of points.

The most important of these is the provision of a certain measure of privacy in relation to the members of the same household. The second and equally important point is the necessity of meeting some of the problems created for the household by the presence of visitors and guests. The third important problem is the need for reconciling the first and second points with the limitations imposed by economic factors in low-cost housing.

It has also been suggested above that the provision of a dividing wall within the plot, a solution favoured by the people, is one way of meeting the problem. The whole question of the dividing wall must now be touched upon.

Leaving for the time being the additional cost involved, one look at Figure IX shows us the real danger inherent in it. The layout is tantalisingly inviting to the subletting of one part of the house to a different family. This, if it happens on a large scale, would, it is said, re-create slum conditions with all the social consequences and dangers to health that accompany overcrowding. It is this possibility which has induced the Public Health Authorities at present to forbid the construction of any partition, made of permanent material, in the plots of the New *Deims*.

The danger is certainly real—but to think that the absence of a dividing wall is a real safeguard against the danger of subletting and consequent overcrowding is to over-simplify the whole question at issue. The fact is, when all has been said about the dangers of a dividing wall, that subletting and overcrowding have diverse and deeper reasons. Some of these reasons are social, e.g. the Sudanese habit whereby newly married couples think it proper to stay with their in-laws for a few months. Some of them are, on the other hand, economic in nature, e.g. the need for the extra income derived from renting a room, the high ratio of dependants in relation to earners in the family and the economy achieved by putting up these dependants in the same house, the inadequate supply of dwellings in relation to the demand for housing, the relatively high level of rents

which makes it imperative for some people to share a house because they cannot afford separate houses. Some of the reasons relate to the natural growth of the population and to population trends. Urbanization has certainly been accelerated during the post-war period in most urban centres of the Sudan.

It would seem, therefore, that the presence of a dividing or partition wall might contribute to the danger of overcrowding, but it cannot explain it altogether. It would also appear that a combination of administrative regulations and rigorous supervision by Public Health inspectors might considerably reduce the danger in the short run. The ultimate solution to the problem of overcrowding lies, of course, in tackling its long term causes, and in increasing the supply of low-cost housing.

The question, however, cannot be left at this stage. For there is no doubt that the provision of a dividing wall will add to costs, and the burden may be serious in low-cost housing. This is, in my opinion, a matter for housing research, and there is no reason to believe that considerable economies may not be possible. It is sometimes argued, however, that a partition made of " temporary " material e.g. *birsh* matting[1] may solve the problem by providing the household with the required privacy, without incurring the relatively heavy costs involved in extra walling. This seems quite plausible, but the writer has seen how inadequate, untidy and slum-like such partitions look in the plots of the New *Deims*. This line of thought has nevertheless one merit. It acknowledges the need for privacy within the same household and in relation to its guests and visitors, and makes an attempt to meet the problem. If the present paper establishes only this need, the writer would be quite contented.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am much indebted to Mr. A. J. V. Arthur, District Commissioner Khartoum during the Resettlement of the New *Deims* and Mr. S. R. Simpson, Commissioner of Lands until 1953, for their valuable comments on my report on the Survey of Opinion conducted in the New *Deims*. The Report has formed the basis of this paper. I have also found very useful the official notes and memoranda prepared by Mr. Arthur and Ali Effendi Nadeem, *Diems* Resettlement Officer, on the Old and New *Deims*, I wish also to acknowledge with thanks and gratitude the help and guidance given to me by Mr. J. P. Sandison, Commissioner of Labour, and Chairman, Workers' Housing Committee until January, 1953, throughout the whole work connected with the Survey.

[1] Matting locally made from the branches of date palms

النواحى الاجتماعية في امور الاسكان بالمدن

فى هذا البحث استعراض لمشكلات تخطيط البيوت ونفقات أرض البناء وعلاقة ذلك كله بالحياة العائلية والاجتماعية لذوى الدخل الصغير من سكان المدن فى شمال السودان . وذوو الدخل الصغير هم من يقل كسبهم عن خمسة عشر جنيها فى الشهر. أما البيانات التى اعتمد عليها الباحث فقد استقيت كلها من الخرطوم ، وهذا لا يؤثر كثيرا لان الاحوال فى سائر مدن السودان الشمالى شبيهة باحوال الخرطوم نفسها.

يبدأ الكاتب بحثه بوصف « الديوم القديمة » (وهى مساكن المواطنين) ؛ وكانت الديوم القديمة معروفة بكثافة هائلة فى عدد السكان وبانعدام المعدات الصحية ، ولكن سكانها كانوا على درجة لا بأس بها من التكاتف الاجتماعى (وذلك يظهر من عونهم الجماعى للفقراء) كما كانت تظهر لديهم تجمعات قبلية فى السكن وخاصة حين يضم الديم افراداً من نفس القبيلة او الاسرة .

وقد بذلت محاولات عام ١٩٣٠ ، ١٩٣٩ ثم ١٩٤١ — ١٩٤٧ لتجديد بيوت سكان الديوم القديمة ، ولكن بما ان البيوت التى اخليت بقيت ماثلة ولم تهدم ، فان تلك الاجراءات انتجت وجود طبقة من الملاك المتغيبين الذين يقاومون خطة الهدم ثم التجديد ، ولم تدخل المشكلة فى دورها الحاسم الا فى مارس ١٩٤٩ عندما اصبح امتداد الخرطوم وراء خط السكة الحديدية يقضى حتما بحل المسألة حلا سريعا.

وقسمت الارض فى الديوم الجديدة على أساس الملكية وطول الاقامة فى الديوم القديمة ، ولم يعط الناس فى البيوت الجديدة تعويضات ولكن سمح لهم ان يجمعوا مواد البناء النافعة لهم من بيوتهم القديمة . اما من كان يعجزهم الفقر عن اقامة البيوت بانفسهم فى الديوم الجديدة وابوا ان يقيموا فى بيوت الفقراء فقد دفعت لهم منح إضافية ، ومما يلفت النظر ان عدد هؤلاء كان قليلا .

غير ان كثيرا من الافراد وجدوا صعوبات جمة فى انشاء دور لهم وقت ارتفاع الاسعار واجور النقل واجور العمال ، وفى سنة ١٩٤٩ كان انشاء بيت من غرفتين ومطبخ ومرحاض وسور لحوش على مساحة قدرها ٢٠٠ متر مربع يكلف ٩٦ جنيها

على اقل تقدير . وقد كشفت استطلاعات الباحث عن ان عددا من الافراد ذوى الدخل الصغير، مانجح الا فى اقامة سور للحوش ومطبخ استعمل ايضا غرفة للسكن.

وبعد ان استعرض الكاتب تاريخ تجديد البناء فى هذه الديوم مضى يبحث عن أحسن الوسائل التى تتفق وحياة العائلة السودانية . داخل الحدود التى يفرضها نظام البيوت ذت التكاليف المنخفضة . وكان بحثه يقوم على بيانات استمدها من حلقات النقاش المنظمة التى دعا لها سكان الديوم ليعلقوا على حسنات « تصميمات » المبانى وسيئاتها حين طلب اليهم ان يختاروا « التصميم » الذى يرونه مناسبا لهم .

ولقى أول تصميم ومنه انواع اربعة (انظر الشكل ١–٤) نقدا شديدا وجيها ذلك لان الترتيبات التى اتخذت للنوم لاتسمح بانفصال الابوين عن الابناء وخاصة الكبار منهم ، فاذا حضر ضيف من الرجال فان تلك الترتيبات تختل اختلالا تاما ولايبقى امام الضيف الا ان ينام فى الشارع .ثم ان استقبال الزائرين يضطر اهـل البيت -- الرجال منهم او النساء ان يقضوا وقتهم داخل الغرف وهذه نقيصة سيئة فى منطقة حارة كالسودان، واخيرا فان موقع المطبخ والمرحاض فى اكثر هـذه الانواع مصدر تعب او ازعاج او كليهما وخاصة للنساء فى البيت . ولهذا النوع من التصميمات فائدتان واضحتان :

(١) فيه اقتصاد فى الجدران ومن ثم فتكاليفه اقل.
(٢) ان تلاحم الغرف يترك سعة فى ساحة البيت.

اما المجموعة الثانية من التصميمات (الشكل ٥–٨) فكانت اتم وأوفى لان ترتيبها يحل مشكلة الضيوف من الرجال.ومشكلة الابناء الكبار ولكن النقد وجه الى موقع المطبخ والمرحاض فى بعض اشكالها فان فتح باب البيت يعرض من بداخله لرؤية المارة كما ان المسافة بين غرفة العائلة والمطبخ بعيدة .

ومن الواضح ان تخطيط البيوت فى السودان الشمالى لابد ان يراعى العادات التى لاتسمح بلقاء احد الجنسين،لغرباء من الجنس الآخر،وتضم لفظة « الغرباء» كل من لاتصلهم بالعائلة روابط وثيقة وكل محاولة تتجاهل هذه العادات عند تخطيط البيوت تكون فاشلة او غير مرغوب فيها ولكن يشترط ايضا فى التخطيطات التى تراعى تلك العادات ان تكون غير باهظة فى تكاليفها.

هذا وإن حل مسألة البيوت ذات التكاليف المنخفضة لايتم الا بالبحث فى مواد البناء واساليبه ومن الامثلة الناجحة فى المواد البنائية استعمال « بلوكات كارلشتين» وهى مصنوعة من تراب يمزج ميكانيكيا بنسبة قليلة من الاسمنت وهذه «البلوكات» يمكن ان يصفها بناء عادى المهارة،واستعمالها يخفض تكاليف الصيانة التى تعدباهظة فى بيوت « الجالوص » . ويتبين من هذا ان الدراسة كفيلة بالوصول الى حـل تخفيض التكاليف وعند انخفاضها ـفقط ـ يستطيع الناس الذين هيئت لهم المساكن ن يواجهوا الشئون العائلية والاجتماعية

وفى نهاية البحث يعود الكاتب الى مشكلة الجدار الحاجز « القاطع » ويقترح تصميما (شكل ٩) يلائم حاجات العائلة السودانية لانه يحتوى على مثل هذا الحاجز،ولكن مثل هذا الجدار قد يغرى صاحب البيت بان يؤجر نصف بيته لعائلة اخرى فيزيد فى كثافة السكان ، وماينجم عنها من قذارة . ومن هذا السبب لم تقم حواجز بين البيوت فى الديوم الجديدة ومنع الناس من اقامتها .

ولكن هذا المنع ليس حائلا حقيقيا دون تكاثر السكان إذ أن اسباب التزاحم والتكاثر تعود الى امور اجتماعية واقتصادية بل يرى الكاتب ان الحيلولة دون التكاثر والازدحام والتأجير ممكنة بقيام نظام من التفتيش . أما هذه الحواجز التى يقيمها السكان من « الابراش » فمع قلة تكاليفها ، لاتزال غير وافية بالغرض ، لانها لاتحجب بين الناس حجبا كافيا ، اذ تتهرأ بسرعة ويصبح منظرها العام قذرا منفرا . اما الحـل الصحيح لمشكلة الانفصال (بالمعنى الذى تعترف به العادات السودانية) ضمن الحدود التى تفرضها التكاليف المنخفضة فما يزال غير متيسر . ومن أول أهداف هذا البحث توجيه الانظار الى هذه المشكلة .

SOME PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL SURVEY IN THE SUDAN

By G. M. Culwick

(Paper presented to the Philosophical Society at its meeting on 24th February, 1953.)

A social survey is a rather humdrum thing compared with the anthropological studies in which the literature on the Sudan abounds. It is usually closely tied to some prosaic subject such as food or family budgets, or work or debt, or some other problem of everyday life in its contemporary setting. It attempts to collect detailed information from a large number of people and to let this information tell its own story. It turns a bright light on some part of the general social field and concentrates primarily on the area selected. But, of course, to interpret what the beam of light picks out will require reference not only to the wider anthropological background but also to the perspective of time. A survey may be undertaken with the object of producing concrete proposals, or it may be concerned more with simply presenting factual material as a foundation on which other people can build plans and policies.

Social survey traces its descent from the classic work of Le Play, a Frenchman, whose first great work was a study of European labour published in 1855.[1] He inspired the father of social survey in Britain, Charles Booth, whose ten volumes on the *Life and Labour of the People In London* appeared between 1889 and 1903. The threefold formula of Place — Work — Folk was the basis on which this line of work largely developed, corresponding to the biologist's basic triad of environment, function, organism.

Systematic study of human beings and their social setting is not, of course, nearly so easy to arrange as systematic study of creatures or objects whose behaviour can either be readily subjected to controlled experiment or at least be studied without bothering about their consent. In social survey what one would like to do is always limited by what can be made acceptable to the people concerned. You find, perhaps, that you cannot repeat your observations on certain families either because they have had enough or, if the wind is blowing the other way, because the rest of the community will take serious offence if you do not spread your attentions more widely and give someone else a turn. Or what you would like to make a genuinely random sample has to be modified on account of local personalities and their reactions.

In this country, too, there usually seem to be other limiting factors besides the human one. Your field programme may well be determined less by a consideration of the best way to obtain statistically valid samples or the most promising places to work, than by inexorable facts of accommodation, transport and staff. And what it comes down to in the end,

[1] Ouvriers européens

I fear, is something very much more lowly than the well designed, systematic and theoretically sound programme of one's dreams.

The three surveys discussed in this paper are a diet survey in Zandeland in 1947-8, a diet survey in the Gezira in 1949-50, and my present study of money and family budgets in the Gezira. The last is not far enough advanced for me to talk about the money side at all, but I shall use material from three general village surveys which come into it to illustrate some of my points. (See Appendix).

The first problem in any work of this kind is, of course, to reach the people you want to study. I do not mean reach them physically, though indeed when transport is as difficult as it was Zandeland in 1947, that can itself be one's foremost problem, but how to reach them as people. I will come back to the language difficulty in a moment. Leaving that aside, when all possible arrangements have been made for one there is always the icy plunge one has to make on one's own into the new environment—always the individual problem of establishing good personal relations. Every time I have to make the plunge I start full of misgivings and expecting to find shut doors and shut unfriendly faces. And of course there are never lacking a few croaking ravens to encourage one, assuring everybody that the villagers will see one out of the place within the month.

It never ceases to astonish me that so far from resenting my intrusion and, above all, my insatiable curiosity, people seem to regard my incursions into their lives as a welcome diversion. Perhaps it is because village life is so dull, apart from occasions of social ceremony and the big religious festivals. Almost anything that breaks the monotony would, I feel, be welcome. And so the antics of a social survey team appear to fall in to the category of public entertainment rather than public nuisance, at least after the initial shyness and nervousness have worn off.

That first plunge, of course, always remains difficult. I hope for the good fortune not to fall into some hideous social pitfall before I have had a chance to get my bearings in an unfamiliar environment. It would be very easy at this stage to lock and bar all doors against oneself before they have ever begun to open.

Inevitably at first, there is hesitation on the part of the people, if not outright suspicion. In Zandeland I had my headquarters at Li Yubo which is an entirely medical station for sleeping sickness control. The lower grades of hospital and public health staff provided a sounding-board for gossip about us. My party consisted of an excellent clerk-interpreter and eight semi-educated youths as recorders. The latter were an unruly crew who found it much more fun to expend their ingenuity on baiting me than on observing the Zande in their homesteads.

Despite attempts to prepare the ground and explain my work, people around Li Yubo developed their own theories about it. First of all, guilty consciences stirred uneasily. "*Food*?" they said incredulously. "*Food*?

What would she want to look at food for ? It's *bangi* and *araki* she's after ! " People burdened themselves accordingly with precautions to prevent my eyes from falling upon either of these twin deadly sins. But after a time, when they knew me better, nobody bothered at all.

Here I may point out one of the essential conditions of social survey — you must have eyes and you must have ears, but you must have no tongue. Otherwise you are just authority's spy and you will become acquainted only with a world of cardboard angels.

In due course, as we went round the homesteads, it became apparent that food was indeed our objective, so some reason had to be discovered for this odd preoccupation. It was 1947, and some people in the station had been reading about rationing in England. " Ha ! " said they, " We have it. She's come to find out what we've got and then those people in Yambio will force us to sell it for her hungry brothers in England." This idea produced the only positive act of resistance we encountered. One Monday morning a trembling recorder returned hotfoot to me with a report that one of the householders on his daily round, in a rural settlement outside the station, had met him with spear upraised and menacing. This set a nice problem for a newly arrived social research worker, and one which had to be solved without benefit of counsel, for we were 140 miles from Yambio with one weekly lorry as the only link. I put on a bold face and sent a message to the sub-chief asking him to produce the culprit before me. He duly arrived escorted by a straw-hatted tribal policeman. He was an old man, full of beer and bewilderment and not at all truculent. My interpreter sorted it all out and we so contrived it that the episode ended in laughter and goodwill, and there was no more trouble of this sort.

These somewhat frivolous stories will show you some of the hurdles we had to get over. I may as well complete the series of rumours. When we did not force them to sell food but did start looking at their main grainfields, in addition to the cassava gardens and mixed cultivation round their houses, they thought up another one. " She's spying out the land to find the best places, so she can bring her hungry brothers from England to live there." We lived that one down, and for some months no more was heard. By that time we had been keeping daily records for months and had weighed everybody at least twice, and finally Dr. Ibrahim Hussein had been round pricking fingers to examine haemoglobins. My clerk subsequently overheared two women discussing this at the bush shop. " . . . . weighs our food and measures our fields, weighs us and our children, and now they come and look at our blood to see if we're getting fat. And when we've got fat enough, she'll call her hungry brothers from England to come and EAT us." In spite of this alarming prospect, the work went on undisturbed.

In southern villages, given a readiness to go and spend time to no particular purpose in just being around in the village and homesteads, joining in whatever is going on, I would say it is not difficult to create an atmosphere favourable to successful social survey. Moreover with proper

preparation of the ground, you can use recorders to visit the homestead regularly and bring in detailed data. This, however, is a mixed blessing when the only staff available is of the quality I have described. My gang's usefulness depended on establishing a simple and regular routine under constant supervision by my clerk-interpreter but even then we steered an erratic course through an endless series of exasperations.

In the Muslim north, the process of getting to know any group really well and the problems of record-keeping are complicated, of course, by the social Iron Curtain. A woman investigator like myself has the great advantage of being free of both sides of the Curtain. But when, one may wonder, can one expect to see a Sudanese investigator in the same happy position ? I do not need to describe in detail the disadvantages under which my Sudanese assistant labours in this respect, as compared with myself. He cannot ever get to know the village as a balanced social unit. His direct knowledge is inevitably limited to a part abstracted from its fundamental social context, the family. Yet most social problems send down at least some of their roots into the family, and many are firmly and deeply embedded in it.

Even in England, where family life is lived very much more out in the public view than here and where, consequently, one grows up with at least some awareness of the varied patterns of living all round one — even there, we say, " One half of the world does not know how the other half lives". In the Sudan this has double force. Sudanese men normally have the opportunity to be acquainted with the domestic background of only an extremely limited circle of families, within a limited social range, and it is constantly brought home to me that it is this narrow picture which is projected into generalisations.

This immense over-simplification is a great handicap to anyone called upon to appraise social problems. I am now working with a diplomate of Gordon College as my assistant. I have no hesitation in saying how pleased I am at the aptitude he is showing for the work and his capacity for creating happy relationships with all the varied kinds of people we encounter. But repeatedly, in one way or another, something crops up to remind me that he only knows half the village that I know. It is difficult for me to visualise just what the picture looks like when you have blacked out half of it, but it obvious that when he is dealing with any matters affecting family life, he has to rely entirely on what he is told and not on observation. And his yardstick for measuring the probability of what he is told can only be that of his own background, which is quite irrelevant to the conditions he is investigating. I can recall, for example, points in our budget work when he has exclaimed, " This is all nonsense ! " — whereas I could tell from day-to-day experience in village homes that it was not only possible but even probable for that type of family.

On his side, then, there is the problem of the Iron Curtain. On mine there is the crippling problem of language. This was almost insuperable at the start of my diet survey in the Gezira, when I knew no Arabic at all. When I wanted to talk with the women, if my interpreter was to be admitted it made the interview a formal and heavily veiled affair in the public part of the house, under a code of manners entirely prohibitive of any flow of conversation or communication of ideas. So at first I was limited to an explanation by my interpreter of what I wanted to do or see, and then visits by myself to do and see it, in which I could observe but not enquire, and conversation on my side was limited to a few polite phrases. Gradually that frustrating phase wore off as I acquired a smattering of Arabic and picked up some of the women's colloquial speech, becoming able to follow much more than I could say. But language remains for me the major handicap, with the incessant exasperation of having to say what you can and not what you want to.

As part of his training, as well as for its own intrinsic interest, my present assistant explored a small Hausa settlement during my absence on leave last year. There he had to cope with both these difficulties at once — language and social barriers — and the observant and delightful essay he has written on his venture well illustrates both.

During my diet survey in the Gezira I lived for a year not in one of the Syndicate [2] (as it was then) staff houses but right in a village, in the *diwan*[3] of one of the tenants. It transformed me from a visiting stranger into a neighbour, and gave me a firm foundation for all my subqesuent work in the Gezira. Where the life of one half of the community is so secretive, it is difficult to acquire more than a superficial understanding, coloured by the values of one's own background, if one remains outside it. They remain " they ", and to them one remains a remote and incomprehensible " she " — strangers looking at each other across a gulf, thinking and talking in different social idioms. While they could not come to me, it was possible for me to cross the gulf to them and get the " feel " of life on that side of it The give-and-take of being neighbours, with my house open to them as theirs to me, sharing the round of little village happenings not as an investigator but as one of " us ", taught me more than years of recording from outside could have done.

When I came to the Gezira I was more than usually apprehensive of failing to get on terms with the people, because I had never worked before where there was this rigid Iron Curtain and, moreover, I was told that the Gezira tenants would be specially likely to resent me. In fact it has been quite the reverse, and no people could have been more welcoming. Naturally at first they had their suspicions of me. Some thought I was

[2] The Sudan Plantations Syndicate was the (privately owned) predecessor of the Sudan Gezira Board.

[3] A group of men feeding together, their food being supplied from several kitchens.

a government or syndicate spy, and their minds turned at once to the cotton stalks which at the season of my arrival were being illegally stowed away as usual. Others suspected me of being a missionary, and indeed my host in the village had an indignant letter from a friend, disowning him now that he had taken a missionary lady into his house. These misunderstandings cleared themselves up as time went on. I think it was keeping the fast with them that opened more doors to me than anything else. By the end of my year there, however, they had long ceased to bother about my religion, and I shall never forget the consternation in one house, where I was chatting with a large family gathering during my round of farewells, when it suddenly dawned on them that I was, after all, a Christian. " But you can't be ! It's not possible ! You wouldn't come and live with us here in the village if you were. Christians are hard people who live in big houses."

The question of food recording was a difficult one in the social conditions of the Northern Sudan. Quantitative recording had inevitably to be limited to what I could undertake myself with such little help as my clerk was permitted to give. But by various devices we managed to get qualitative recording going and to keep it going, more or less, for the whole year in all the 100 families of that village. This may sound highly improbable but it is true. No one was more astonished than I that it did in fact get done. I say we kept it going " more or less," for as you may imagine there were gaps in some of the records, and sometimes our system of cross-checking showed that a good deal of material had to be scrapped as useless. Keeping up with it was an immense burden on my clerk and myself, even though relieved after a time by the help of a junior clerk. Anyone passing my windows late at night would often have heard a monotonous sort of chant going on inside as we struggled to keep up with dictating and transcribing the mass of material flowing in, much of it barely legible. About 60 different people took part in this — the householder himself, or his son, or his brother, or his neighbour's son, and so on. One small schoolboy kept six books and was known as my *bashkatib*.[4] It was a community effort and in recognition of it I paid a monthly sum into the funds of the village council. In addition we celebrated the completion of the year by hiring both the village lorries and making a hilarious expedition to the Medani cinema.

The tables appended to this paper, besides illustrating some of my problems, give some of the general social data which emerge from my work.

In Table I the categories call for some explanation. " Temporary residents " are obvious — labourers, *maahad sheikhs*[5] and students, Government employees and their families. Casual visitors were omitted unless making a prolonged stay. But " partial residents " may sound odd. I found that I had to make this category to cover three types of people :—

4 Chief Clerk.

5 Teachers in schools specializing in Islamic studies.

(a) polygamists with homes in two villages and bridegrooms with brides outside their parental village ;

(b) non-tenants whose livelihood kept them away from home most of their time, e.g. there were some people working as drivers in El Obeid, others in trade in Omdurman ;

(c) students who were away most of the year.

All these definitely had a home in the village to which they came from time to time. I did not include young bachelors who had been away from the village for a period of years, working, but obviously these might later marry back into it and so become partly resident there again.

In Table II I must point out that ages are, of course, estimates, and the age-grouping cannot be more than a tentative approximation. You will notice, for instance, that the totals between the ages of 13 and 50 come out at 320 for both males and females, but the sub-totals swing one way and the other. These swings might be real, or they might be due to our errors in judging where to put those who were near the borderlines of 13, 15, 20 and 50. I would expect the figures for females to be nearer the mark than those for males for two reasons. First, for them some guidance can be obtained from personal histories. Secondly, I think I was probably more alive to the possibilities of cross-checks than my assistant, who did the males in two of the villages. and in any case I who could visit the families in their homes was obviously in a better position to make such cross-checks.

This table refers only to the village families, not to the strangers among them. If the men are divided into tenants and non-tenants it is found, as would be expected, that more of the older men were tenants and more of the younger men non-tenants. The total number of tenants (men) in this sample was 153 (plus one boy) against 188 non-tenants. The social status of the latter, together with the temporary residents, will be seen in Table IV. One of the non-tenant householders, it may be remarked, was the husband of a woman tenant while two of those classed as relatives of house-holders were sons-in-law of tenants and were themselves house-holders in other villages.

22 of the women were tenants, making up 12½% of the total, whereas the comparable figure for the three blocks in which the villagers held tenancies was 7%. In the distribution of holdings of various sizes, however, it will be seen from Table III that the survey villages were typical of the blocks in which they were situated.

I have no comments to make on Table V, but in Table VI we come to one of the major problems of social classification in these villages, namely what is a household ?

The English dictionary says it is " a number of persons dwelling under the same roof, and comprising a family ; by extension, all who are under one domestic head or manager." The Sudan census instructions say it is

those who share a common cooking-pot. In the Gezira I have failed to find any one definition which will fit all the facts without distortion. The situations to be covered are too varied. Displeasing as this is to any orderly mind, it has to be accepted that the life of the village pursues its own convenience and not that of an investigator.

The census definition of the common cooking-pot is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it goes no further than the first polygamous establishment. A man has a house — which in local parlance means a wife — in this village and in that. Is he then two householders ? Even if they are both in the same village, even in the selfsame courtyard, each wife will have her own cooking-pot — a jealously guarded right — and they will take turns in cooking for the house-holder.

In practice I have found the household to be a most flexible institution. The actual bond linking its members as a functioning domestic group may be any of the following combined in various ways :—common stewpot, common baking-sheet, common purse, common kitchen, common courtyard, common *diwan*. One or more of these will be found operating, but in my experience no one of them alone necessarily denotes a household. Nor does the absence of any *one* of them *necessarily* mean that the group is not one household. It is an institution protean in scope and form, adjusting itself to the circumstances of the moment and the interplay of personalities. With close cousin marriage still the standard practice, with frequent late marriages by the men confusing the generations, the family group is both large and unbelievably intricate. People tend to be related to each other several times over, in varying degrees of propinquity, and within this web of relationships, the domestic units form and reform as the many individual lives weave the involved family history.

By trial and error, I have arrived at the following procedure. First, I accept as households whatever are stated to be such — this gives me a village list from which to work. Subsequent house visiting reveals which of these are living a corporate life sufficiently close-knit to allow one to say that in fact they function as households. At two points only do I impose a definite ruling : in the case of polygamists and in the case of young couples still in the bridal stage, which lasts for months or even years. Taking the polygamist as one householder, both (or all) his establishments belong to one household wherever they may be situated. Young-marrieds are awkward because for periods extending even into several years they are involved in a slow process of emergence as a separate household, and during that time they belong partly to both their parent households. I apply an arbitrary rule to the effect that until the girl makes her own *kisra* (the last stage in the process) they are not a separate unit. Each is entered in the parental home if both belong to the village. In the case of a bridegroom coming and going from another village, he is entered as a " partial resident " in the bride's parents' home. Conversely a son with a bride in another village is only a " partial resident " in his parents' home.

What this all means in practice is that some of the units originally listed as households get subdivided and others get amalgamated as we go along. This may seem a deplorably loose way of handling the problem, but it is the only way I have found which avoids doing violence to the actual situations we encounter in the field. In my most recent village survey I kept a record of the alterations made in the original list of households and their members. At the end of it, we had added six households and deleted sixteen in an original list of 120. We had added fourteen people and deleted nine. Three women had been found to be double-recorded in the original listing by my assistant. Eight other people (in three households) had to be transferred from one household to another, e.g. children listed with their parents but actually living with some other relative.

Economic conditions within the Gezira Scheme are, of course, chiefly responsible for the tendency of the patriarchal household of the traditional subsistence economy to break down into the multiplicity of patterns found in the Gezira village. The family's arrangements are greatly affected by the location of the tenancies held by its members, particularly when it comes to the question of a bride setting up a home. Again, the ready availability of money-earning occupations naturally loosens ties and encourages the independence of what would formerly have been parts of one composite household. As a result of all this variation in pattern it seems that the census enumerators are likely to find a Gezira village more complicated to count accurately, and especially to arrange in households, than one where the traditional social pattern survives.

I recently had an opportunity to glance at the preliminary lists of heads of households produced in the blocks where the pilot census in the Gezira is to be done. Although not required at this stage, the number of people belonging to each household had been entered against it. Village after village ran in large figures — say from six up to twelve or more. Then suddenly we came on a village running in three's and four's. Was this a genuine difference, or was it a difference in classification ? I cannot help wondering, also, whether all those double-figured households really and truly had one common cooking-pot.

A word of caution is necessary, I think, about the figure given in Table VI for the average number of dependants per tenant household. There are three reasons why this should not be read as being the average number supported by a standard tenancy of 10 *feddans* of cotton. First, some of these households contain more than one tenant. Secondly, as we have seen earlier, not all tenants have a standard holding. Thirdly, some of the non-tenant households are directly supported by a tenancy as share partners, e.g. two brothers who in fact share what was formerly their father's tenancy though it is officially held by one of them alone. I am not yet able to say what the actual number supported by a standard tenancy was in my three survey villages, as the point is still under investigation.

The remaining tables do not raise any special problems of field-method but the figures themselves will probably be of interest. I will only pause for a moment at Table XI. There is, of course, no direct means of checking the accuracy of these life histories. All I can say is that the atmosphere in which they were collected was easy and unstrained, and that the majority of them were endorsed by certain of the older women whom I have found to be generally helpful and reliable. The ones about which I have serious doubts are the very old women, for though everybody knew what surviving children they had, no one could endorse what they said about the children they had lost long ago. I think they probably left out both the births and deaths of a number of babies lost in what is now to them a very dim past.

There are two further problems which I wish briefly to discuss. The first concerns documentary material, which is sparse enough on social problems. Reference has already been made to the importance of the time perspective in interpreting data collected in a survey of existing conditions. If no documentary material is available one has to rely on the impressions remaining in very fallible human memories. I only recently started work on this aspect of my present study, and one thing I began to look for was old court records in order to analyse the debt cases. The first local court I approached was a great success — I found records back to 1940. I did not realise how lucky I was. Since then I have failed to get anything earlier than 1946, and sometimes nothing earlier than 1950. It appears that when there is a change of President, the court's current records are handed over, but the past ones are taken into the *merkaz* and there burnt. Of course, to keep masses of old records presents problems of storage and preservation, but I hope that the Historical Society of the Sudan will give early attention to this question. The wholesale destruction of valuable social data of this kind is a grievous loss to future historians - and, of course, to present social research workers.

The last problem I wish to mention relates not to fieldwork but to writing it up. It is the problem of communication. I am constantly defeated by the difficulty of conveying to other people what I conceive to be a true impression of the life of the villages. Too often when I am talking to people about the Gezira I find myself frustrated by the picture of it they already have in their minds, so that we end up by discussing some abstract puppets called tenants and labour, instead of the concrete realities of the village life I know. I have recently seen this difficulty most aptly described by Col. van der Post in an article called *The Africa I Know*.[6]

> " During the war," he said, " I travelled along the impressive lines of communications between my part of a war front in the Far East and London. First I was sent on an urgent mission by my division to Corps H.Q. and I was gratified to discover that at Corps H.Q., the appreciation of the military situation corresponded roughly to our own. From Corps H.Q. I went to

6 *African Affairs*, 61, p. 216.(1952.)

> Army H.Q. and there for the first time I noticed a tendency for the official vision to deviate and become blurred though still not so blurred that it could not be put right with patient exposition. From Army H.Q. I went to the Supreme H.Q. and from Supreme H.Q. to London with the deviation from reality becoming progressively so much greater that by the time the ultimate and decisive London appreciations were put to me I realised, with dismay, that we were in that specific instance directing a war which did not exist under conditions that had not and never could be."

That exactly expresses the problem of communication which I face when I write up my fieldwork.

Record of Discussion

The Chairman, *Professor R. Kirk*, thanked Mrs. Culwick for her paper, and emphasised the peculiar difficulties of her task as a social research worker. Nowhere — except perhaps in the United States — did people enjoy being questioned about their private lives. They were reluctant for two reasons — first because everyone had something in his life which he did not like to have enquired into too closely ; and second because all over the world Government enquiries were regarded as a prelude to higher taxation or to some form of "interference". Mrs. Culwick's story about the "hungry brothers" reminded him of the days when it was commonly believed that the object of surgical operations was the removal of the more edible parts of the patient ; and the questionnaires of the Government Statistician were even now regarded as an attempt to find out how much people were drinking, with a view to reducing their pay.

Mrs. Culwick had spoken mainly of her difficulties ; she had not talked about her results, the dietary surveys of the Gezira and Zandeland. These were reports of the greatest value ; and their value would increase as more and more people in the course of their work came to feel the need for this basic information.

Mr. Krotki questioned Mrs. Culwick's approach to the problem of the definition of a household. He suggested that some criterion had to be adopted and applied consistently, even though any such criterion would produce anomalous border-line cases. In England, when a census was taken, the definition of a household was not affected by the presence of temporary visitors or lodgers.

Mrs. Culwick replied that her work was not comparable with a census. She was not criticising the census definition of a household, but simply investigating how the "common cooking-pot" rule worked out in practice.

Ustaz Saad al Din Fawzi said that the definition of the household was one of the most formidable problems of social research in the Sudan, and he was not yet convinced that it had been solved. In villages the baking-

sheet was more significant than the cooking-pot ; but this was probably not true of the towns.

In reply to a member who asked what was involved in the weighing of family foodstuffs, Mrs. Culwick replied that when the seasons changed and the type of foodstuffs available changed with them, the whole stock of foodstuffs in the household was weighed on each day over a period of several days.

Ustaz Fawzi asked how the amount spent on foodstuffs in the Gezira compared with the amount spent elsewhere ; and what proportion of the family budget was devoted to the purchase of foodstuffs.

Mrs. Culwick replied that the amount spent on foodstuffs seemed to be as high in the Gezira as anywhere else ; but the distribution of food *within* the household was often very unsatisfactory. It was not possible to answer the second question until material for a budgetary survey had been collected.

In answer to an enquiry whether it was true that the Gezira tenants spent excessively upon drink, *Mrs. Culwick* said that her observations had convinced her that in this matter the tenants were considerably maligned ; it was labourers, rather than the tenants, who tended to drink heavily.

Professor Dean Smith said that, while Mrs. Culwick was probably wise to be circumspect in accepting the statements of older women about the survival of children, experience had shewn that these statements were not always so inaccurate as might be expected. In a recent survey the conclusions of a trained observer concerning the infantile mortality rate had coincided very closely with the evidence provided by local householders. Although in this particular village memory further back than the birth of the last three children was quite unreliable, the coincidence thereafter was remarkably exact.

Mr. Levick asked whether the employment of the casual labourers shewn in Table V was agricultural work, and whether this work kept them occupied for most of the year.

Mrs. Culwick replied that this employment was agricultural work. In the off-seasons the casual labourers worked on odd jobs of building and repairing : some migrated in search of work at some period during the year. There was never any considerable body of unemployed persons to be found.

APPENDIX

SOCIAL SURVEY OF THREE GEZIRA VILLAGES

TABLE I.

POPULATION SURVEYED

	Men	Women	Boys	Girls	Total
Villages					
A	136	122	82	84	424
B	120	107	84	87	398
C	184	141	120	130	575
Total	440	370	286	301	1397
Categories					
Full residents	297	359	275	293	1224
Partial residents* ..	44	—	2	—	46
Temporary residents ..	98+	6	7§	5	116
Absentees	1	5	2	3	11
	440	370	286	301	1397

* Residence divided between two places by reason of work, marriage or study.

\+ Includes 89 labourers. Excludes approx. 12 living in a *maahad* hostel which was not visited.

§ Excludes approx. 25 in the *maahad* hostel.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED AGE-GROUPING.*

Group	Male	Female	Total
Adults			
Over 50 years	65	78	143
20-50 years	230	208	438
Under 20 years	46	73	119
All	341	359	700
Children			
13-15 years	44	39 +	83
7-12 years	97	105 §	202
1- 6 years	114	118	232
Under 1 year	22	31	53
All	277	293	570

* Excluding temporary residents and absentees.

\+ 13 of these were already married.

§ 2 of these were already married.

TABLE III

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF TENANCIES.*

	½	1	1½	2 and over	Total
Survey Villages.					
Men	46	98	5	5	154
Women	14	8	—	—	22
All	60	106	5	5	176
Percentage ..	34	60	3	3	100
Corresponding Blocks					
All	650	1317	56	53	2078
Percentage	31	63	3	3	100

* 1 = a standard tenancy of 10 feddans of cotton.

TABLE IV.

SOCIAL STATUS OF NON-TENANTS (Men).

Status	Number	Percentage
Householders	94	33
Immediate relatives	97	34
Maahad guests	6	2
Employees	89	31
	286	100

TABLE V.

PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF NON-TENANTS (Men).*

Occupation		Number	Percentage
Family field-work		57	20
Agent for father		2	
Students		12	
Teachers (religious and secular)		5	
Other public services		8	
Other wage-earning :			
Casual labour	126		
Building labour	10		
Herdsmen	6		
Car drivers	14		
Gardeners	3		
Other	6	165	53
Self-employed :			
Trade	15		
Crafts	5		
Camel drivers	2		
Water carriers	3	25	9
Idle		12	4
		286	

*Includes migrant labour employed as follows :—Casual labour 66; building labour, 10 ; herdsmen, 5 ; car drivers, 3 ; gardeners, 2 : camel driver and ploughman, 1 each.

TABLE VI

NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS.

		Households	Members	Dependants Elsewhere
Tenant households				
Village	A	44	265	No record
	B	42	265	41
	C	70	407	29
	All	156	937	—
Non-tenant households				
Village	A	27	110	No record
	B	25	102	9
	C	38	132	9
	All	90	344	—

Average tenant household 6.0 excluding dependants elsewhere.
„ non-tenant „ 3.8 excluding dependants elsewhere.

TABLE VII.

TENANTS BORN OUTSIDE THE SURVEY VILLAGES.

Place of Birth.		Occasion of Migration.	
Other Gezira villages ..	18	Came as a child	11
White Nile and Managil ..	12	Marriage	13
Sennar	2	Seeking tenancy	5
Dongola	3	Seeking work	9
Western Sudan	2		
Egypt	1		
	38 (25%)		38

TABLE VIII

LABOURERS : PLACES OF ORIGIN AND SOCIAL PARTICULARS

Places of Origin (71 men).		Social Particulars (43 men).	
Other Gezira villages ..	1	Married in home district ..	15
East Bank	5	Number of children ..	21
White Nile and Managil ..	4	Sending money home ..	9
Dongola	9	Literate	2
Western Sudan	31	Semi-literate (*Khalwa*) * ..	17
Southern Sudan	1	Fed by employer entirely ..	33
F.E.A.	20	Receiving grain only ..	10

* Sub-Grade Schools.

TABLE IX.

OTHER MEN BORN OUTSIDE THE SURVEY VILLAGES

Place of Birth		Occasion of Migration	
Other Gezira Villages ..	16	Came as a child	14
Medani	1	Marriage	6
East Bank	3	Religious reasons	8
White Nile and Managil ..	14	Work	24
Omdurman	1	Unrecorded	1
Dongola	3		
Western Sudan	8		
Not recorded	7		
	53 (27%)		53

TABLE X

LITERATE MEN : LEVEL OF EDUCATION REACHED. *

School	Tenants	Non-tenants	Total
Khalwa	44	30	74
Elementary school	22	33	55
Local *Maahad*	—	8	8
Omdurman *Maahad*	1	—	1
Night school, Omdurman	—	1	1
Intermediate or higher	2	4	6
Unrecorded	—	4	4
	69 (45%)	80 (43%)	149 (44%)

Excluding temporary residents and absentees.

TABLE XI

WOMEN : BIRTH AND SURVIVAL OF CHILDREN.

	Under 20	20-50	Over 50	All
Histories recorded	73	208	76	357
Number with no live births	27	34	5	66
Number with no survivors * ..	29	41	11	81
Live births per head	0.8	3.8	4.3	3.3
Survivors per head	0.7	2.8	2.7	2.3

*Those who died after puberty are counted as survivors.

NOTE.—Of 1174 live births, 338 (29%) died as children. And of the 338 who died, 251 (74%) died before weaning.

TABLE XII

ANIMALS PRESENT IN THE VILLAGES.

	Tenants	Non-tenants	All
Village A (March)			
Cattle	No record	No record	72
Sheep	No record	No record	32
Goats	No record	No record	451
Donkeys	No record	No record	102
Camels	No record	No record	5
All	No record	No record	662
Village B (June)			
Cattle	108	3	111
Sheep	60	—	60
Goats	178	29	207
Donkeys	69	16	85
Camels	1	—	1
Horses	1	—	1
All	417	48	465
Village C (December)			
Cattle	117	3	120
Sheep	76	2	78
Goats	280	58	338
Donkeys (foals not recorded) ..	72	17	89
All	545	80	625

Households owning no animals :—

Village A ..		..		14	(20%)
B	Tenants 2	Non-tenants	9	11	(16%)
C	Tenants 5	Non-tenants	14	19	(18%)

Maximum in one household :—

Village A ..		..		70
B	Tenants 59	Non-tenants	16	
C	Tenants 29	Non-tenants	12	

بعض المشكلات فى استطلاع الاحوال الاجتماعية

الاستطلاع الاجتماعى — كما تعرفه كاتبة المقال — محاولة جمع المعلومات المفصلة عن عدد كبير من الناس فى مسائل كمسائل التغذية وميزانية الأسرة والعمل والديون، وقد تجمع تلك المعلومات لذاتها أو لتكون وسيلة لوضع خطط اجتماعية واقتصادية، والصعوبة فى مثل هذا العمل إذا قارناها بما يجده العالم الطبيعى من صعوبات هى الحاجة إلى رضى الناس الذين يراد استطلاعهم وإلى موافقتهم ومعاونتهم، وهذا العامل إذا أضيف اليه المشكلات العملية فى أمور التنقل ومعدات السفر، ذو أثر كبير فى استمرار الدراسة وطبيعتها وهو أثر أكبر من بعض الاعتبارات النظرية فى طريقة الاحصاء مثلا .

وتصف الكاتبة بعدئذ المشكلات التى تثيرها الريبة وقلة الثقة وتخلقها قلة الاكتراث أو التهور فى الحماسة عند بعض المساعدين، ولكن التغلب على النوع الاول من المشكلات يتم بالتودد وحسن التقدير بل حالما يستطيع الباحث الاجتماعى أن ايكتسب ثقة الناس الذين يدرس أحوالهم فأنهم يرحبون بنشاطه ويعدونه نوعاً من التغيير فى طبيعة الحياة الرتيبة بالقرية . أما فى شمال السودان فالمشكلة هى مسألة الفصل بين « عالم الرجال » و « عالم النساء » أو ما يسمى « الستار الحديدى الاجتماعى » . وتستطيع المرأة الاوربية أن تكون حرة التنقل فى هذين العالمين إذا أتقنت لغة الناس الذين تدرس شئونهم . أما الباحث السودانى فانه فى موقف عسير من هذه الناحية لأنه لا يستطيع أن يتوصل إلى معرفة القرية كوحدة اجتماعية متوازنة بل إن معرفته المباشرة محدودة بجزء منفصل عن الوحدة الاجتماعية الأساسية التى هى الأسرة . وأغلب المشكلات الاجتماعية تتصل جذورها بحياة الاسرة وكثير من تلك المشكلات ملتحم بها ونابع من أعماقها .

ثم تصور الكاتبة أهمية تغلغل المستطلع الاجتماعى فى حياة المجموعة بما أفادته هى من تجربتها الخاصة فى هذه الناحية، لأنها اشتركت فى حياة « الديوان » بقرية من قرى الجزيرة .

ثم تعود الى مشكلات معينة مثل : التفصيلات الكثيرة التى تحتويها دراسة شئون التغذية والصعوبات الناشئة عنها كتحديد السكن وتقدير الأعمار ، ولكن الصعوبة الرئيسية فى هذه الأمور صعوبة تتغلغل فى أساس كل استطلاع اجتماعى سليم وتلك هى تحديد « أهل البيت » : فليس هناك من تحديد جامع ما دامت الحياة العائلية معقدة بتعدد الزوجات ، أو بالزواج عن سن كبيرة ، أو بالزواج من أبناء الأعمام ، أو بالبطء فى انفصال الزوجين الجديدين وانشائهما بيتاً مستقلا . فما يسمى العائلة مجموعة كبيرة متداخلة إلى حد كبير والناس يميلون إلى تشابك الأنساب فيما بينهم مرارا وتكرارا على اختلاف فى درجات التقارب . وفى هذه الشبكة من القرابة تظل الوحدات المنزلية تتشكل بمقدار عدد الأفراد الذين ينسجون خيوط الملك الشبكة ، وبنسبة طول اعمارهم .

وتنهى الكاتبة بحثها بذكر مشكلتين أخريين : الأولى قلة الوثائق المكتوبة لأن هذه الوثائق فى القرى تعدم باتلافها دون تمييز ، بعد أن تصبح غير ذات قيمة إدارية ومثل هذا الاتلاف خسارة كبيرة لمؤرخى المستقبل وللدارس الاجتماعى المعاصر . والثانية : الصعوبة فى كتابة نتائج الاستطلاع الاجتماعى بطريقة ترى الاجنبى الحقائق الحية فى مجموعة اجتماعية. وتعفى هذه الحقائق من أن تصبح ظلالا مشوهة ميتة نتيجة للتجريد والتلخيص .

ومع المقال جداول احصائية ترى نماذج من المعلومات المستقاة من هذا الاستطلاع الاجتماعى (فى ثلاث قرى بالجزيرة) .

TEWFIK BEY.

by A. Paul

FROM the melancholy record of Egyptian defeat and demoralisation in the Eastern Sudan in the early years of the Mahdia there stands out the name of one man of courage and ability whose fate it was, like that of Gordon in Khartoum, to fall the victim of the vacillations and indecisions of those under whom he served.

Mohammed Bey Tewfik el Masri was a Cretan Jew, one of that large class of mercenaries of many races which officered the Egyptian army at that time, and who at the opening of the Mahdia was Governor of Suakin and the surrounding district, which included the small but important post of Sinkat. On receiving information early in July 1883 that Osman Digna had appeared at Erkowit and was attempting to rouse the local tribes, he at once moved to Sinkat with a small body of Police with the intention of dealing with the rebel and restoring order. The wisdom of this action has been called in question, and various friendlies, including Sh. Mahmud 'Ali of the Fadlab/Amarar, urged him to retire. Sinkat was, however, an important post on the Suakin-Berber road, and Tewfik was of the opinion also that a withdrawal would involve too great loss of prestige. He remained, therefore, where he was, and asked for reinforcements of 200 cavalry, 9 guns, and 2000 infantry. The force demanded was not very much smaller than that with which Baker engaged at El Teb seven months later, and shows that Tewfik, far from being rash, had a proper appreciation of the seriousness of the situation which he had to face.

Before, however, he could receive any reinforcement at all, or put the post in a proper state of defence, Osman Digna appeared with a force of 1,500 tribesmen and demanded his surrender. Tewfik cleverly prolonged negotiations, utilizing the time gained to improve his defences, until afternoon, when Osman finally lost patience and sent an ultimatum to which he replied:

"His life was the Khedive's, his honour his own; his daughter Effendina had promised to look after, and he therefore intended to defend the place to the last."

Osman's followers were not all of them by any means eager to begin the assault, and by the time he came to press the attack he was left with no more than three hundred men. Even so the odds were formidable, and although Tewfik's force held its fire until it could be used with

SKETCH MAP OF THE RED SEA COAST: SHOWING ENGAGEMENTS FOUGHT PRIOR TO THE FALL OF SINKAT



Scale 1:2,000,000

Miles 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

PLATE XII

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the maximum effect, the attackers succeeded in bursting through the defences, and a desperate melée took place inside the barracks from which they were finally repulsed with sword and bayonet. Osman himself was wounded in several places, an experience which may account for his habit of directing all future battles from a safe position in the rear, and after an hour's heavy fighting the enemy withdrew with a loss of nearly 250 killed and wounded.

This was a notable achievement. It is true that Osman's forces were armed only with spears, clubs, and a few swords, but they were no better armed when they routed the Egyptians at El Teb and elsewhere, and though Turco-Egyptian soldiers always fought better behind defences than in the open, much must be attributed to Tewfik's courage and leadership. He used the respite now gained to put Sinkat in a proper state of defence, and to prepare plans for an offensive against the enemy. He seems also to have been reinforced from Suakin, as early in September he moved to Gabab (near Erkowit) with 200 men, and there repulsed an attack on his position with a loss of 70 killed to the attackers, who fled, abandoning their camp and grain supplies which Tewfik immediately destroyed. Unfortunately, when his plans for a further advance against the now thoroughly demoralised Beja were maturing, there appeared on the scene on his way from Berber to Suakin Sulaiman Pasha Niazi, the newly appointed *Mudir Ummum of* the Eastern Sudas. This high official was, according to Stewart, "a miserable looking old man of seventy five" who, as nominal Commander-in-Chief of the troops in the Sudan, had used his position to obstruct in every possible way the efforts of General Hicks to instil some order and discipline into his ill-fated command, and who was finally got rid of by the well known expedient of promotion to a different post. Knowing nothing of the situation he immediately set everything in confusion , reprimanded Tewfik for opening fire on the Beja, "poor ignorant men" when they attacked Sinkat, and begun a futile policy of negotiation and appeasement, the sole effect of which was to revive the drooping morale of Osman and his followers. The Pasha was, however, inclined to be nervous about his own safety, and a reinforcement for his escort was sent for from Suakin. Marching without proper precautions, and in no sort of order, this force Khor Abent on October 16th, with the loss of 150 rifles and 30,000 was set upon and asnihilated by the Garib/Hadendowa in the narrow rounds of ammunition. There ensued an angry scene between the Governor General and Tewfik which ended in the former leaving Sinkat with his original escort and a few extra camelmen, and eventually reaching Suakin in safety by a round-about route.

Tewfik was now in command of a force about 600 strong, and might even now have crushed the rebellion had he received any sort of support from his superiors in Suakin. Nothing decisive, however, could be looked for from the obstinate and now thoroughly alarmed Pasha. He continued to make overtures, interspersed with empty threats, to Osman Digna who was unimpressed by either, and attempted to show his zeal and efficiency by committing small bodies of untried and reluctant troops to ordeal by battle. On November 4th a small force, which was attempting to relieve Tokar, was cut to pieces at El Teb, a rout in which Lyndoch Moncrieff, the British Consul in Suakin, lost his life. A month or so later a battalion of 400 blacks, which had been brought from Massawa, was sacrificed at Tamanieb, having been sent out without proper water supplies, transport or provisions, and being deserted by its officers and supporting cavalry the moment the enemy appeared. The defeat at El Teb, and the even worse disaster which befell Hicks in Kordofan about the same time, determined the Egyptian Government to reinforce its garrisons in the Eastern Sudan. It had, however, no competent troops to send, and the War Office in London supported the Sirdar in his refusal to hazard the newly recruited regular levies on active service. It saved its face by despatching a force of Gendarmerie under Gen. Valentine Baker, with Col. Sartorius as Second-in-command The latter arrived at Suakin in December and at once found himself misled and obstructed on all sides by the Egyptian authorities in whom panic had destroyed whatever natural abilities they might at one time have possessed. He would have liked to have done something as soon as possible for the relief of Sinkat which, first attacked in August 1883, had now been invested closely since about mid-October; but realised that neither were his troops of the quality required to make the attempt through such difficult country, nor was there sufficient transport available to convey them. He was also, to begin with, completely misinformed as to the position by Mohd. Taher Pasha in command of the troops at Suakin, who reported that Tewfik could march out with 600 men whenever he liked, and yet leave an adequate garrison in Sinkat. When these figures were challenged it was found that no proper ration state of the troops existed, and it then took some time to discover that Tewfik's whole strength was only 482, composed of 300 infantry, 150 Bashi-bazouks, and 32 gunners. The women and children of the garrison brought his numbers up to nearly 700. It was revealed also that as early as November 7th Mahmud 'Ali of the Fadlab had offered to throw a convoy of stores into Sinkat if it could be done at once. It took Sulaiman Pasha a fortnight to make up his mind, and when he finally signed the order releasing the stores on November 22nd it was too late. and the opportunity had been lost. Sartorius came to the conclusion

also that, incompetence apart, the Pasha was in no great hurry to relieve Tewfik, fearing what his uncompromising subordinate might have to reveal about his mismanagement of affairs in general.

Though Sinkat was sufficiently closely invested to prevent evacuation of the garrison or entry of supplies, it proved possible almost to the very end to smuggle letters in and out by friendlies, and Sulaiman Pasha was therefore unable to plead that he knew nothing of the condition of the garrison.

"I am obliged," wrote Tewfik at a fairly early date in a letter to the Governor General, "to reduce the soldiers' rations to what is strictly necessary, so as to run as little risk as possible of starvation. If our provisions were to be exhausted before assistance should arrive (which God forbid!) we shall attempt a collective sortie, and endeavour to reach Suakin. We prefer death to surrender. I might easily save my own life, but military honour makes it my duty to share the fate of those placed under my command. We trust in God and await His decision."

Why Tewfik never attempted a sortie sooner than he did will never be known. It is probable that, encumbered with women and children as he was, he thought it unlikely to succeed, and he seems always to have been full of the not unreasonable hope that a relieving force would be able to cover the forty miles from Suakin, and come to his rescue. These hopes were revived when he heard of the arrival of the Gendarmerie, and on January 2nd, 1884 he described his plight in a letter to Sartorius, asking for immediate relief, and estimating that the force by which he was beleaguered was not less than 5,000 men :-

"La nouriture nous suffira jusqu'à 20 janvier et même au 23 à raison de 150 drachmes de mais et cent de biscuit le jour pour chaque soldat, toute autre espèce nous manque, même le sel."

On January 27th he wrote again to General Baker announcing that they had eaten the last of their horses:-

"Sur ma foi Excellence, nous les avons mangés même avec la peau: il n'y a plus de chiens ni de chats à Sinkat," and adds as a postscript, "Si le renfort n'arrivera pas à Sinkat le 1er ou le 2 de février . . . je serais obligé sans faute de quitter la place pour arriver à Souakin quoique je ne crois pas que je réussirai, mais je préfère beaucoup de mourir en bataille que de faim à Sinkat"

Gen. Baker, who commanded the Gendarmerie, had the reputation of an able and daring soldier who, since he had had had to resign his commission in the British Army under unfortunate circumstances, had every reason for wishing to re-instate himself by distinguished action in the field. There can be no doubt therefore that he would have attempted the relief of Sinkat had it been under all the circumstances of the case, at all possible. His troops, recruited for local service in Egypt, and never at any time very dependable, were ill-trained and badly officered, and in a state not far removed from mutiny. The inane policy pursued by the Governor General had resulted in the estrangement of the Amarar and Shaiab friendlies, and transport animals were thus almost impossible to obtain. He was, moreover, under orders both from the possible caution, whatever the consequences for Sinkat and Tikar, on Sirdar, Sir Evelyn Wood, and from Sir E. Baring to act with the greatest account of the inadequacy of the forces at his command. Thus while he was unable to go to the relief of Sinkat, involving a march through difficult hill country, where the enemy would have every advantage over his half-trained and unreliable troops, Tewfik's representations must have influenced him in a decision to hazard the relief of Tokar in the hope that successful action on the coast would relieve pressure on Sinkat, and in the mistaken belief that in open country his superor fire power would be the decisive factor.

He therefore transported a force of 3,500 men and six guns by sea to Trinkitat, and on February 4th began his advance on Tokar. At El Teb (already the scene of one Egyptian disaster) his entire force was thrown into confusion by the charge of some 1,200 Beja, and utterly routed with the loss of all his guns, 3,000 rifles and about 2,300 officer and men killed or missing. The second Battle of el Teb proved one thing at least; that with such forces and means as Egypt was able to provide it was impossible to relieve Tewfik, and such indeed had been sufficiently evident, had anyone had the wit or inclination to realise it, ever since the seige was first closely pressed in October 1883. Had he then been given definite orders to cut his way out to the accompaniment of a demonstration from Suakin, it might well be that he would have succeeded, but such orders, involving loss of prestige, were such as the Egyptian authorities were to their cost at all times too reluctant to give.

Four days after the débâcle at El Teb, and quite possibly as the result of receiving news of it, Tewfik spiked his guns and prepared to fight his way out with the remnants of the starving garrison. Enfeebled, cumbered with women and children, they sallied out some 700 strong

in a desperate attempt to break through and reach the coast, but the enemy closed in before the pitiful column had gone more than a mile or two and there made an end of it.

"On Friday 10th *Rabi' el Akhir*" (8th February 1884), wrote Osman Digna in a report to the Mahdi, "they marched out from their fort and advanced in square, their women in the centre . . . all were put to the sword until not one of them was left."

So died Mohammed Bey Tewfik, true to his promise, sword in hand in the midst of the garrison which he had refused to desert to save himself, having fitly earned the rare distinction of praise from one to whom all things Egyptian were abomination:-

"One of the ablest of the accursed 'Ala el Din's men, renowned for his bravery and good administration."

توفيـــق بـــك

تقص هذه المقالة ، قصة دفاع توفيق بك عن سنكات ، ضد جند المهدية ، بقيادة عثمان دقنة ، وتحكى وفاة توفيق بك حين حاول الانسحاب بحاميته من سنكات الى سواكن .

كان محمد بك توفيق المصرى ، وهو يهودى من كريت أصلا ، حاكم سواكن عام ١٨٨٣ فلما سمع بوصول عثمان دقنه الى اركويت تقدم مع جماعة صغيرة من البوليس الى سنكات ، وغايته إعادة النظام والسيطرة على الطريق الهام الواصل بين سواكن وبربر .

وكان رد عثمان دقنه على هذا أن هاجم سنكات ولكن قوانه المتفوقة عددا وعدة هزمت وتكبدت خسائر فادحه ؛ وبدأ توفيق يضع خطة هجومية ضد العدو ، ولكن خطته تلك عطلها سليمان باشا نيازى الذى عين مديراً عاما على شرق السودان ، اذ فضل نيازى خطة التهدئة والمفاوضة ولم يعمل شيئا لتقوية سنكات .

وفى منتصف اكتوبر طوقت سنكات تطويقا تاما واصبح انقاذها يستدعى عملا عسكريا حازما ، وكان الجنرال فانتين بيكر الذى نقل الى سواكن قائدا للجندرمة ، يأبى أن يقوم بذلك بمساعدة الفرق التابعة له .

وبحلول شهر يناير كانت الحامية قد اصبحت فى حالة قاسية من الجوع ، وانفذت رسائل سرا الى سواكن تصف الورطة التى منيت بها فصمم بيكر ، مع انه كان مايزال يأبى أن يخاطر بقواته فى منطقة تلال البحر الاحمر الوعرة على ان يحاول تخليص طوكر لعل ذلك يقلل الضغط عن توفيق فى سنكات . ولكن فى الرابع من فبراير منى بيكر بهزيمة تامة عند التب ، وفى اليوم الثامن منه سار توفيق (ولعله فعل ذلك نتيجة لتلك الهزيمة) من سنكات يحاول ان يشق لنفسه طريقا الى سواكن ، وقبل ان يقطع الجيش معه مسافة ميل او ميلين ، انقض عليه الاعداء وافنوه وقتل توفيق والسيف فى يده ، ويصفه عدوه عثمان دقنه فى تقرير ارسله الى المهدى بقوله « انه من اقدر رجال علاء الدين الملاعين ؛ مشهور بالشجاعة والادارة الحسنة »



A	Mihrab		Surround wall in section
B	Traces of walling		
C	Small embrasures		

URI

GROUND PLAN OF MOSQUE

PLATE XIII

ISLAM AT URI

By H. G. Balfour Paul
Resident Dar Masalit

ARKELL, in his description of the mysterious stone-built city of Uri (or Orrei) north-west of Kutum (*S.N.R.*, Vol. 28) declares on p. 186 that " there is no trace whatever of a mosque " despite the fact that the Lower Palace buildings were " known to the local inhabitants as The Mosque." In fact, there is a fine mosque adjoining the Lower Palace on the west side. (The fact that Arkell missed it only shows how much else may remain unrecorded in the midst of the infamous Kitr-bush which covers the mountain).

This mosque, of which the accompanying Figure shows the ground plan, gives rise, both by the fact of its presence and by reason of its peculiar design, to various speculations.

Local tradition about Uri and 'Ain Farah credits both these mountain headquarters to that elusive race, the Tunjur. The bulk of other traditions about the Tunjur indicates that they were pagan, or nearly so ; that group of them that fled south-west to Abu Telfan in the early 17th Century after the successive downfalls of their Darfur and Wadai empires, was still pagan in the 19th Century. It seems odd then that the very items to which the founders of Uri and 'Ain Farah paid particular attention were, precisely, their mosques.

In his paper on 'Ain Farah (*S.N.R.*, Vol. 19 ,Pt. 2 p. 309) Arkell sets out his reasons for believing that " in Darfur history the Tunjur are the local representatives of the Sultan of Bornu and that Shau " (the reputed founder of both 'Ain Farah and Uri) " is the Sultan of Bornu himself." [1] Similarly his preferred hypothesis about Uri is that it was the headquarters of the Kanemi administration of Darfur in the 13th Century. In my own view actual Bornu hegemony over Darfur at any period is still by no means proved, and I find the greatest difficulty in placing Uri as early as the 13th Century. But some such intimate connection with the strongly Muslim empire of Bornu would at least explain the presence of the mosques in reputedly Tunjur capitals.

1 There can be little doubt that the title " Shau " comes from Bornu. I am assured by Kanuri pilgrims passing through Geneina that " Shau " is in fact the normal Kanuri word for Sultan, bearing to the more familiar title " Mai " the same relationship as, in Darfur, " Sultan" bears to "Amir."

As regards the design of the Uri mosque, two things are worth pointing out. Firstly, the internal lay-out is like no other early mosque I have yet come across in Darfur : the apparently unroofed court in the centre of the mosque has no parallel in imperial Fur architecture, which one also supposes to have been derived from the west. Secondly, the walls of the mosque with their continuous bonded buttress on the outside (see the Inset in the Plan) are remarkably like the external masonry of the mosque at 'Ain Farah (See *S.N.R.*, Vol. 19 Pt. 2 p. 304, Plate VII, B). Nor do I know of any other Darfur parallel. It would be nice for us all if a parallel would turn up amongst the hill Berbers of North Africa.

PLATE XIV (a)



Jeton from Um Rish

Similar Nuremberg Jeton

The small brass discs.

These turn out to be Jetons (Counting Tokens) minted in Nuremberg between the 16th Century and the 18th Century (when manual arithemetic finally gave way to the decinal system). Private jetons were minted from the 13th Century, initially as a royal prerogative in France, and soon by banking-houses, guilds, etc., throughout western Europe, each with their own emblematic design and motto. Later " Stock Jetons," such as the Umm Rish ones, were minted, mainly in Nuremberg, for public use. (Today one of the few surviving descendants of the jeton is the Communion Token in the Church of Scotland.) These Umm Rish jetons, though not all off the same die, bear on the obverse 3 open crowns and 3 lys arranged alternately round a rose ; and on the reverse the Reichsapfel (or Orb of Empire — a common jeton emblem first used by the Lombard bankers in the 13th Century) set in a double tressure of 3 curves and 3 angles. The peripheral inscription, as on many stock jetons designed for an illiterate public, is just gibberish. Plate XIV (b) and (c) shows, slightly enlarged, one of the Umm Rish jetons alongside a drawing of a better Nuremberg stock jeton, inscribed with the maker's name and an adage, illustrated in Barnard's " The Casting Counter and the Counting Board," Oxford 1916.

The beads.

The majority are hexagonal tubular beads of carnelian varying from $\frac{1}{4}$ to 1 inch long, bored longitudinally with a diamond. Mr. Arkell has little doubt they were made in Cambay (India) like many current until recently in Darfur. He suggests they date from the time counting-tokens went out of circulation in Europe.

How this assortment of trinkets came together in the bank of a Khor in Dar Masalit is a mystery. The site of the cache is not a burial ground or occupation site. Close to the south of Umm Rish are sundry groups of rough stone tumuli, locally regarded as pre-Islamic burial mounds and familiar throughout these latitudes, (Cp. MacMichael, *Coming of the Arabs*, Vol. 1, p. 27). Like those uncovered by MacMichael in Northern Kordofan, the only one of those tumuli I have excavated contained no trace of human remains,[1] though one pair of decayed iron bangles occurred in curious isolation at a depth of $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft. below ground level. It appears improbable that any of the Umm Rish objects derive from such tumuli. As for the Nuremberg jetons,[2] it is a fact that Nuremberg's pre-eminance in the marketing of small brass-ware throughout Africa still

1 Nor, according to Mr. G. Andrew, was there any trace in the soil specimen sent to him of any mineral destructive of bone.

2 By an odd coincidence Mr. G. R. F. Bredin, ex-Governor of the Blue Nile Province, unearthed in his garden in Oxford an almost identical jeton on almost the identical day.

obtained when Barth was wandering in these latitudes 100 years ago; and as can be seen in Plate XIV the jetons have been pierced for attachment as ornaments. It is not to be imagined that the Masalit at any stage of their history have practised manual arithmetic.

B.

ROCK ENGRAVING AT SILEIA.

Plate XV (a) and (b) shows a rock-engraving recently discovered on the upper of two vast superimposed boulders at the foot of Jebel Sileia (N. 14° 00' — E. 22° 36'), the summer watering-place of the Mileiri (Jebel Mun) tribe. It cannot be described as a work of art. On the other hand it is not simply an enormous doodle. No one would execute for fun a drawing measuring 8½ ft. by 2 ft. a quarter of an inch deep in a granite surface inaccessible without scaffolding. It is interesting for two reasons.

Firstly, if we except the small roundels inside Arch Rock at Uri (Arkell *S.N.R.*, 27, p. 194, Plate XIV) it is, I believe, the only known rock drawing in Darfur (as distinct from the rock-*paintings* in the Tagabo and Furnung Hills described in *S.N.R.*, 20 Pt. 1, p. 281 ff. Actually the Ghurra Murtenga cave in the latter does include some rough scratchings in the rock, but nothing smoothly wrought like this). The nearest area, as far as I know, in which rock-engravings are common is the Tibesti mountains.

Secondly, it recalled immediately to Mr. Shinnie, Commissioner for Archaeology, drawings of snake symbols recorded amongst the Australian aboriginals. And this is no doubt what it represents. The Mileiri of Jebel Mun practised until twenty years ago, on the top of their mountain ten miles away, one of the most elaborate snake rituals in Darfur. (See Davies' account of the Omen-taking ceremony in *S.N.R.*, 5). The drawing has nonetheless no meaning for the present-day Mileiri, though they are certainly as autocthonous a group as anything in the area. Their considered opinion is that it is an inscription in Abyssinian. This only shows how far back in time these widespread snake-rituals must stretch.

IKANG, QUEEN OF TIRRANGORE

By Fr. Carlo Muratori, V.F.M.

IKANG, the late rainmaker of 'Tirrangore (Tarangole of the maps) was born at Lirya and was the daughter of Lewwot, who belonged to the Lirya rainmakers, and of Ngajon, who belonged to the Longulu or Lowudo rainmakers. Her mother Ngajon had three children by Lewwot, namely Ikang herself, another daughter Ingwak and a son Rugang, who later became the father of the late Lirya rainmaker Jata. Ngajon afterwards left Lewwot, and was married to Lekeng (*alias* Khujang), the 'Tirrangore rainmaker, by whom she also had three children, a daughter Khidanga and two sons Khaswani and Lokhide. The latter was afterwards chief of 'Tirrangore.

Ikang, according to information given by Lomiluk and Muga, the Head Chief and Chief of 'Tirrangore, was born not later than 1860, for she is known to be co-eval with the elders' group of the warrior class Nyagwat, who were 33-40 years old in 1893, the year of their solemn initiation.

This fact, strange as it may seem, is confirmed by the statement that Lokhide, Ngajon's sixth child, was born c. 1872. Ngajon died in about 1876, three years after the initiation of the warrior class Ojetuk (1873), leaving Lokhide as a child of about 3 or 4. When I saw Ikang for the first time about 1932, I should not have thought that she was then about 70 years old. It is also worthy of remark that in 1948, ten members of the Nyagwat class were still living, though none of them was as old as Ikang.

In about 1886, Ikang was married at the age of 26 to Lajaru, a son of Lekeng and Iloyi, both of whom were rainmakers. Lajaru and Ikang were related, not only on the legal ground that Lekeng, Lajaru's father had married Ngajon, Ikang's mother, but more especially because Iloyi, Lajaru's mother and Sigira, Ikang's grandmother, were both descended from the rainmakers of Khulla. (Khulla was a village between Lirya and Lafon Hill, the population of which dispersed about the year 1848, according to the missionary Fr. Angelo Vinco who saw the place four years later, on his way to Lafon Hill in 1852). But Iloyi and Sigira were of different clans. It is said that Lekeng was also married to Ingwak, the elder sister of Ikang. This seems most unlikely ; for if it were true he would have married a mother and her daughter. The year 1886 seems a very likely one for the marriage of Ikang, because Lekeng conducted the solemn initiation of the warrior class Ojetuk in 1873, and reigned for 14 years, dying in 1887. Lajaru succeeded him in the following year, and died after a reign of one year (i.e. in 1889), having married Ikang three years previously (i.e. in 1886). On his death he was succeeded by his brother

Lomoro (1890), who took Ikang as his wife, conducted the solemn initiation of the warrior class Nyagwat (1893) and died after a reign of 15 years (i.e. in 1908). Ikang is said to have been wife of Lomoro for about twenty years.

Lonnik, Lomoro's brother, succeeded him in 1909, or perhaps at the end of 1908, and also took Ikang to wife. On Lonnik's death Lokhide took over the kingdom, in 1910 or 1911, and the warrior class Nyagwat still continued to hold the village for three years under him. Lokhide did not inherit Ikang from his brother, because she was his uterine sister (both of them being children of Ngajon). She was in fact inherited by Lonyong, her step-brother, who was a son of Khujang but not of Ngajon. It is a matter of historical record that in the year 1910 Lokhide visited the Government at Gondoroko, and said that he was Chief of the Lotukho.

The above information about Lomoro, Lonnik, and Lokhide seems to the author to be correct, but it is contradicted by another statement, according to which Lomoro died in 1912 (not 1908) after having accepted British rule (from Uganda through Ikoto Post) two years before. Perhaps this contradiction may be reconciled by the fact that Lomoro was living at Loguruny, and Lokhide may have had a certain moral authority over the Lotukho people from 'Tirrangore (from which place Lomoro had had to flee some years previously) as far as Torit. This may have given Lokhide sufficient pretext to present himself as Chief of the Lotukho to the Government officials at Gondoroko, probably with a view to obtaining their support against the powerful Lomoro.

It is however indisputable that Lokhide conducted the solemn initiation of the warrior class Mur-Khatikha in 1913. He died in the following year, the fifth of his reign. He had rebelled against the Government, relying upon his possession of rifles. A Company under Bimbashi Wolf attacked the village, and he was shot by a soldier from inside his hut while firing at the troops from the top of his hut. He had in fact already killed two soldiers who had summoned him to surrender. He left two sons, Lomiluk (now the Head Chief) and Lonnik, who died a Christian, taking the name Valeryano. Neither of these were sons of a rainmaker woman, and are therefore not true *Khohwok* (rainmakers); nor could they have become rainmakers in the olden days.

Lonyong (alias Lefuk, or Ibrahim), the son of Khujang, was appointed Chief by the Government in the place of Lokhide, and Ikang seems to have taken over the functions of rainmaker. Lonyong agreed in 1921 to the establishment of a village school, but this school had very little success. However, he sent his nephew Lomiluk to the Mission School ; but after the latter had twice absconded from the school, he took no action to send him back and keep him there.

When Lonyong died of pneumonia in 1928, the son of Lajaru, Lotuyek (who was still living, at Torit, in 1948) was made Chief. His mother was *Iwwakha* (not a rainmaker) , and Ikang continued to act as rainmaker. Lotuyek was an intelligent man, and at first proved to be a good Chief, but after some years (in 1931) he was deposed for the embezzlement of L.E. 57 from the poll-tax, and for gambling. He was later reinstated, but very soon had to be finally deposed for gambling. The sub-chiefs then chose Ikang herself, their rainmaker, as Government Chief. But she handed over the Civil Administration to Lomiluk, and the latter was in practice administering Ikang's country as early as the year 1932. Ikang was already too old for administrative work and travel, but she conducted the solemn initiation of the warrior class Ngokhe in 1933.

In 1932 the villages of Khidonge and Lofi were transferred to the area of Ikang ; and in 1936 the villages of Lobira, Chalamini, Ilyeu, and Loming also. But this had no effect on her rainmaking functions. The only villages which ever " asked her for rain " were 'Tirrangore, Khaforyere, Loguruny, Lolyanga and Lofi.

By this time Ikang was feeling her age and was becoming less and less able to travel in the course of her duties as rainmaker. So in 1936 she handed over some of her rain-making duties to Lomiluk, who was thereby given powers as a rainmaker and was popularly recognised as such ; although he would not have been so recognised at an earlier period, as his mother was a " commoner." When Ikang died in 1938, Lomiluk become the recognised rainmaker of the Khujang or Ikang people — (the other group is called *Aati Mayya*, Mayya's people). The village of Lofi, however, fell to the share of Lokong (an ex-dresser) in accordance with the expressed will of his father, the late Lonyong.

In spite of the small area of the Lotukho that she controlled, Ikang was certainly an influential rainmaker, having also for a time in her religious obedience some villages of the Imotong (a sub-tribe of the Lotukho). She was useful to the Government in keeping quiet the turbulent people of 'Tirrangore, who greatly respected her as rainmaker. At first, as has been remarked, she had a certain authority even among the Imotong people ; but this authority was destroyed by Lonnik when he attacked the Imotong in the face of Ikang's protests. She was a woman of great natural dignity and self-respect. In her bearing, her conversation, and her relations with others she was so dignified and at ease that I was surprised when I met her for the first time at 'Tirrangore in 1932. As soon as I reached 'Tirrangore she came to pay me a visit, and when I offered her tea, she seemed so much at her ease that I also offered her a cigarette, which she accepted and smoked in my presence just as any other habitual smoker would have done. I was even more astonished when, instead of remaining indefinitely as most Africans do, she politely and spontaneously took her leave of me after having stayed for about a quarter of an hour.

Of course, I understood that I had to deal with a Queen and a sophisticated politician !

In so far as she had any dealings with the Government, she showed herself loyal to it, perhaps seeing in it a possible support for her kingdom. In fact, when in 1931 the village of Lolyanga refused to participate in any rain-making ceremony of hers, and went for rain to Achalili (the rain-maker of the Mayya group ; his headquarters was at Oronyo), she brought the matter before the District Commissioner. But the case did not come to very much, for the cunning Achalili assured the District Commissioner that if Lolyanga went to him for rain in the following year, he would do nothing for them.

Ikang's behaviour toward the Mission was always correct and friendly. She welcomed the Fathers when they visited the village, and used to visit the Sisters who were already established at the Mission. But, in spite of her verbal assurances, she never whole-heartedly helped the Mission's educational work ; and in this, Lomiluk, her nephew and successor differs but little from her, in spite of the fact that the village has a brick-built school.

Ikang died in November 1938, in the native month Lolong, and was buried inside her hut with her head to the North, but in such a way that her legs projected outside the hut wall. A year later, her bones were exhumed and deposited in the rainmakers' " bone-place ". And Lomiluk, as we have said, took over her religious kingdom as well as the Civil Administration ; but he had in fact fulfilled both functions since the year 1932.

(NOTE : The original Ms. followed the rules of the Rejaf Language Conference, 1929, for the spelling of African proper names. For typographical and other reasons certain modifications have been made with the author's consent.

(i) " X " (equivalent to the Arabic خ) has been replaced by " KH."

(ii) The tailed " N " has been replaced by " NG " (phonetic value as in English " sing.")

(iii) " C " has been replaced by " CH " (phonetic value as in English " Church ")—Ed.)

A FURTHER NOTE ON THE NGALA (OR NGARA) TRIBE

By Fr. S. Santandrea, V.F.M.

Further to his Article *A New Tribe? The Ngala or the Ngara* (*S.N.R.*, XXXIII, 2, pp. 317-321), Fr. S. Santandrea, V.F.M., communicates the following :—

In 1952 I was able to pay a visit to Boro village, and with the help of some of the Ngala elders, to check and complete my former notes. These notes were in fact largely correct and there is very little to be added.

(a) Numbers, country, history, general customs : no amendments.

(b) Religion : I was fortunate in getting a few more points of information, which might otherwise have faded away unrecorded. God was called *Nauku* by the ancestors of the Ngala, though general terms for spirits were often employed when referring to Him. (Later on, at Sopo, an old Ngala woman confirmed the exactness of the term). *Makaw (a)* is a Kreish word ; in Ngala they say *gugu* The word means both the " spirit of rain " and the rain-making ceremony connected with it. They used to make a hole in an ant-hill of the small, umbrella-like kind, and they danced around it — all naked — until the rain fell. *Yambishi* stands for a particular spirit, and possibly can be applied to any spirit, except the souls of the departed, for which *mbashena* is used. (Cf. Nzakara, where *bassina* is used with this meaning).

(c) Family, etc. A boy is given a name four days after birth, a girl three days after. The days of funerals are regulated in the same way. This practice is almost universal all over this country. An interesting detail is connected with death. Commoners were buried in the " crouched position," legs and hands against the breast ; men with a throwing knife and women with a calabash in their hands. But men of some importance chose a nobler burial. They themselves, while alive, prepared their coffin of *abu-suruj* (*Prosopsis Africana*), in the shape of a big (native) beehive, in which they were carefully sealed after death, and which was placed on a *kurnyuk* (*? Vitex Cienkowskii*) tree. Yamende, my main informant at Boro, assured me that his father's corpse is still there, near their village, in its hard coffin, on the well-known tree. (My Sopo informants, too, confirmed this piece of information).

Cannibalism : It was not a common practice : people practised this habit during wars, mainly out of hatred for their enemies. Blind old Yamende professed himself ready — even now — to eat Gabu flesh, for the Gabu had eaten numbers of their tribesmen !

EAST AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH:

A Report on Three Years' Work. Kampala, Uganda.1953. 3/-

The report begins by giving a brief outline of the "history, constitution and finance" of the East African Institute of Social Research.

The Institute, we learn, "is attached to Makerere College, Kampala, Uganda, the University College of East Africa. It is one of the three Institutes for research in social sciences, which were set up after the second World War on the recommendation of the Colonial Office, and financed from funds voted under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945. All these Institutes are attached to Colonial University Colleges, the parallel bodies being the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research attached to the University College at Ibadan, Nigeria, and the Institute of Social and Economic Research of the University College of the West Indies in Jamaica."

The objects of the Institute are set out in section III of the report and may be summed up as follows :

(a) "The establishment of a centre of East African studies including knowledge of the cultures and languages of the East African peoples and their political, legal, economic and social structures".

(b) "The collection of basic data whether enthnographic, sociological, legal, economic, psychological or linguistic which is required by social scientists in the East African region."

(c) "The organisation of comparative studies of particular problems in the field of anthropology, economics, psychology and political science".

(d) "The organisation of investigations of practical importance to the governments of East Africa or other interested bodies."

(e) "The organisation of experiments in research methods and the training of field workers, both European and African, in field methods specially suited to local conditions".

(f) "The publication of material in the field of East African studies".

The staff of the Institute consists of a fairly large number of experts, and work is being carried out at present in almost every field of social research. The bulk of the report consists of short accounts of the various lines of investigation being pursued.

The Institute and its work are interesting from at least three points of view.

In the first place it represents the ever-growing recognition both in academic and government circles of the urgent need for research into the social and economic problems of the under-developed regions of the world if something is to be done to help them, in a scientific way, along the road of progress.

Secondly it shows the part which a University College can play in conducting research relevant to the problems of the society in which it is established. This is of fundamental importance for the proper development of University institutions in under-developed countries. It creates a most-needed tradition of research into local problems, and provides a link between university and society.

Thirdly the work of the Institute is interesting as an outstanding example of team work in scientific research.

S.F.

THE BIRDS OF WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

By David A. Bannerman, M.B.E., Sc.D., F.R.S.E. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. £6.6.0 (2 vols,)

This is an abridged edition, in two volumes measuring 9 x 5⅔ inches of the author's larger work in eight volumes entitled "The Birds of Tropical West Africa." The former work was too bulky to carry about, and too costly to suit the purses of many. This edition, though still too large and heavy to go into the pocket, can easily be carried on trek ; and the price is reasonable for the times.

The author has had to sacrifice all detailed scientific description, all separate treatment of sub-specific races, and many of the field notes which enlivened his larger work. But what is left is of great value to the fairly advanced field observer in West and Equatorial Africa for recognising the birds he meets, and learning in adequate summary what was known to the author and his many collaborators about their habitat, field characteristics including song and call notes, breeding, migration distribution and sub-specific races.

Recognition is aided by fifty-four full page plates, thirty in colour, and four hundred and thirty three black and white or half tone figures in the text. The coloured plates are mainly by G. E. Lodge, with some by Roland Green, the late Henrik Gronvold and others. Lodge's pictures of the Martial Eagle and the River Eagle are really fine : his passion always has been the Falconidae. For the rest his colour values are good

and detail painstakingly accurate, but the attitudes, more especially of his Passerine birds, are lifeless. Roland Green's plates are excellent. The text figures, mostly by Gronvold, are very good. The Author's notes on field recognition, and on the distinguishing characteristics of similar species, are clear, and his keys to identification of the orders, families, genera and species are admirable.

There are inevitably some small errors in a work of this compass ; for example, the omission from the Index of the Nubian Fiscal Shrike (p. 1162), and the reference at p. 1354 to *Spreo pulcher* as the Red-billed Starling, its name being correctly given as Chestnut-bellied Starling at p. 1245, and the mention of three volumes in the Author's Preface at p. viii, when in fact there are but two. The print is admirably clear. I should have chosen Lodge's River Eagle for the picture on the dust cover. Its call is the call of Africa.

Since the publishing of Praed and Grant's Handbook on the Birds of Eastern and North-Eastern Africa students of Sudan birds will have less need to refer to Bannerman's works, since some of our birds do not appear in West Africa, and conversely, about a quarter of the 1536 species and sub-species dealt with by Bannerman do not occur in the Sudan. Moreover, the Handbook has drawn on Bannerman's work among a multitude of others for its material. It follows that the Handbook is the better work for beginners in the Sudan field, while advanced workers will wish to refer to the larger Bannerman, but I would not recommend the abridged work to either class of student in the Sudan. P.H.

THE NORTHERN NILO—HAMITES

by G.W.B. Huntingford.

London, International African Institute. Pp. 108, 13/-.

This little book is Part VI of the East Central African Section of the Ethnographic Survey of Africa being undertaken by the International African Institute of which Professor Daryll Forde is the Editor. It covers the Bari speaking and the Lotuko speaking groups of tribes in Equatoria Province.

It provides a useful summary of the published literature on these tribes. It is not the Author's fault that the published literature is meagre and some years out of date but it is unfortunate that this summary was written in England with the result that Mr. Huntingford was unable to make use of the not inconsiderable unpublished material available in District offices and the stations of the Verona Fathers' Mission.

As it stands it adds little if anything to our knowledge of these tribes except in the case of the Mandari where Miss Buxton has supplied some later information. No use has been made of Miss McHatton's or Father Muratori's work amongst the Lotuka. Apart from this Mr. Huntingford has worked hard to produce a concise critical and accurate account of present knowledge (of the) tribal gatherings, physical environment social conditions, pol tical and economic structure, religious belief, technology and art of the peoples concerned, which is the stated aim of the Ethnographic Survey. The material is presented "as briefly and on as consistent a plan as possible" and so it is idle to expect too much from this contributon to the Survey and perhaps its main value lies in indicating where further research is necessary. With conditions changing so fast much will be lost for ever if this research is not undertaken in the near future.

B. A. L.

The Editor, Sudan Notes and Records,
Sir,

I should like to congratulate Dr. Mansour Ali Haseeb on his careful observations on a scorpion, ("A Scorpion in Captivity" *S. N. R. XXXII*, 338, (1951)) and call to his notice the work of Millot and Paulian, (*Bull. Soc. Zool. Fr.*, 58, 97, (1943)) which reveals some even more astounding facts on the adaptability of these creatures.

Their results and others, are summarised in an excellent article by Dr. Max Vachon on "The Biology of Scorpions," (*Endeavour XII*, 80, (1953)). He states that they can, '... remain in an inert condition at freezing-point for a period of weeks, and yet return in a few hours to a normal mode of life. They can withstand, without hurt, total immersion in water for days on end, or the blocking of seven out of their eight lungs ... they can gorge themselves with food in a few hours, or survive without feeding for many months — even for more than a year.'

Yours etc.,
H. E. HALLAM.

University College of Khartoum.
October 6th, 1953.

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF THE SUDAN

Report on The Proceedings of the 1952 Season.

1. This report covers the period from 1st January 1952 to 30th September 1952. The report on the season 1952-1953 will cover the period 1st October 1952 to 30th September 1953 in accordance with the amendment to Rule 14 (a) of the Constitution, passed at the Seventh Annual General Meeting.

2. **Membership.**

15 ordinary members and 3 student members were elected during the period.

Membership of the society now totals 166, made up as follows :

Ordinary members	159
Student members	3
Honorary members	4
	166

3. The **Seventh Annual General Meeting** was held on 8th January 1952, when 39 members were present. The following officers were elected for the year 1952 :—

President	Dr. R. L. Knight.
Vice-President	Dr. H. Sandon.
Secretaries	Mr. W. T. Jones.
	Mr. J. D. M .Jack.
Treasurer	Mr. M. Jolliffe.
Committee	Mr. R. C. Wakefield.
	Mr. G. Andrew.
	Mr. L. S. Cobley.
	Capt. G. W. Ogden.
	Mrs. P. J. Royston-Piggott.
	Mr. P. J. Sandison.
	Mr. G. C. Wood.

4. **The Committee** held 3 meetings during the period. Apart from routine business, the more important matters discussed included the postponement of the Rainlands Conference, the prospects of holding a small two or three day conference of the Society, and the arrangements for eminent astronomers, visiting the Sudan in connection with the eclipse, to address the Society.

5. The **Publications Sub-Committee** consisted of the following officers :—

Dr. R. L. Knight.
Mr. G. Andrew.
Mr. P. J. Sandison.
and Mr. J. D. M. Jack (Secretary)

No formal meetings were held but three papers were read with a view to their publication in Sudan Notes and Records. One only, "Law in the Sudan" by J. J. Gow, was approved for publication.

6. **Ordinary Meetings.** The Society held five ordinary meetings at which the following papers were read :—

49th Meeting on 22-1-52. 58 members and guests present.

Chairman : Sir James Robertson.
Speaker : Mr. D. C. Cumming.

"The Sudan and Ethiopia."

50th Meeting on 30-1-52. 42 members and guests present.

Chairman : Dr. R. L. Knight.
Speaker : Dr. W. E. Ripper.

"The effect of chemical control on world food shortages."

51st Meeting on 26-2-52. 52 members and guests present.

Chairman : Mr. G. Andrew.
Speakers : Dr. A. J. Brook and Dr. J. Rzoska.

"Hydrobiological problems of the Nile."

52nd Meeting on 25-3-52. 22 members and guests present.

Chairman : Mr. J. W. Seamer.
Speaker : Mr. C. H. Harvie.

"Population census in the Sudan."

53rd Meeting on 22-4-52. 24 members and guests present.

Chairman : Dr. J. F. E. Bloss.
Speaker : Dr. R. Kirk.

"Notes on Yellow Fever."

7. **Special Meetings.** Three special meetings were held during the period, at which the following papers were read :—

(i) 5-2-52. "The object of eclipse observations" by Professor R. O. Redman of the Cambridge University Observatories.

(Chairman : Mr. R. C. Wakefield.)
130 members and guests present.

(ii) 12-2-52. "Radio astronomy and Eclipses"
by Dr. John P. Hagen of the
United States Naval Research Laboratory.

(Chairman : Mr. R. C. Wakefield.)
110 members and guests present.

(iii) 6-3-52. At Wad Medani.
"Locusts in the Sudan."
by Mr. R. C. Maxwell-Darling.

(Chairman : Dr. R. L. Knight).
39 members and guests present.

8. **Short Communications.** One short communication was presented to the Society during the period under review :

"Population map of the Sudan" by Dr. E. J. Howell.

9. **Field Days.**

Only one Field Day was held. This was a visit to the excavations at Soba on 19-1-52, conducted by Mr. P. L. Shinnie.

(Compiled with assistance from many sources)

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No. 4. A note about Grade for tenants.

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

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

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

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